The quantity and quality of the contradictions accumulated by the crisis in the world order are fertile ground for the unprecedented attempt of European Leninism. Two passages by Arrigo Cervetto, in the Quaderni (Notebooks
) of 1981-82 and in The Difficult Question of Times, are a compass for dealing with every aspect of uneven development, both in terms of the struggle between classes and the clash between powers in the system of States.
Cervetto writes in his Quaderni that the battle to establish the Bolshevik model of party in Italy in the 1960s was based on the analysis of capitalist development. Thanks to Lenin, I could finally see the development of capitalism in Italy as a molecular process. [...] This process would create such and so many contradictions that it would allow a group, which was able to analyse the process scientifically and follow it closely, to create a revolutionary organisation. When, inevitably, over the course of decades, the contradictions became catastrophic, this organisation would be the only one to have full awareness of the events and could use them to overturn social and political relations
. Leninism had been able to do this in Russia. We could have done it in a metropolis that was maturing imperialistically, provided we had scientifically analysed this phase of maturation
.
In 1964, Class Struggles and the Revolutionary Party established an organic [...] link
between the scientific analysis of Karl Marx’s Capital and the Bolshevik model of Lenin’s What Is To Be Done?. The concept of science-party made it possible to tackle imperialist development in the Italian metropolis. In the May 1984 editorial “Il lungo sviluppo capitalistico nella grande crisi” (The long capitalist development in the great crisis
), we find the same approach applied to the international dimension of the imperialist contention, exacerbated by decades of uneven post-war development and the restructuring crisis of the 1970s. Imperialism, which provokes war and, consequently, crisis, at the same time spreads capitalism throughout the world. The contradictions that this global process generates are such and so many that they cause economic and political crises. These could be transformed into revolutions, provided that there is a communist party capable of doing so and that the working masses are objectively drawn into the struggle
.
The editorial, later included in the book The Difficult Question of Times, will become its political core. As Marx and Engels had already observed in 1850, likewise, for Lenin, the ‘question of times’ concerned not so much the world market and the fate of capitalism, but rather the assessment of the quantity and quality of its contradictions and of the subjective ability of the vanguard party to exploit such contradictions
. It made no sense to expect an irreversible crisis, an automatic collapse
of capitalism, just as it makes no sense to set a deadline for a breakdown of the order. Instead, it is a matter of seizing, in the internationalist struggle, the contradictions that uneven imperialist development inevitably produces. These contradictions are manifesting themselves today in the crisis in the world order.
The chain of partial wars, from Europe to the Middle East to Asia, cannot give vent to the accumulation of tensions, due to such a shift in power within the system of States – primarily because of the rise of China – which makes possible, even if not probable at the moment, a general breakdown of the order. The wars of the crisis in the world order are thus interconnected, but they are also accompanied by a new cycle of rearmament led by the great powers, which is breeding even more deadly contradictions.
The NATO summit in June saw the alliance's military spending target increase from 2% of GDP, as decided in 2014, to 3.5% plus 1.5% for strategic infrastructure, based on the German model. This is a planned increase of about a quarter of global military spending, in line with current global trends, which also includes the United States, bringing the defence budget from $850 billion to $1 trillion in 2025. Europe, including London, would go from $450 billion to over $800 billion in five years; Germany would jump from €80 billion to €150 billion as early as 2029, doubling France in the next two years. In terms of the political figures of rearmament, these projections confirm the transformation in the balance between the two sides of the Atlantic and the Rhine.
European rearmament opens up the battle for military contracts in the industrial arena. This defence supercycle
objectively attracts American groups, which are willing to enter into joint ventures with European ones, according to the Financial Times.
According to Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness, the relative decline in military spending in Europe between 1992 and 2014 created a supply gap that will require investment and industrial policies of European preference in order to be filled. At the moment, 78% of orders go to non-EU suppliers, and 63% to the US; for a certain period, European industry, despite strengthening, will not be able to meet the increase in demand, making a Euro-Atlantic combination necessary.
Four objectives overlap: firstly, the integration, coordination, and concentration of national industries on a European scale; secondly, the European need and desire to preserve industrial links with American groups, which oversee the interoperability of NATO devices and guarantee assets or technologies not available in European armaments; thirdly, the construction of potentially autonomous industrial bases, always within the Atlantic framework. Finally, the intertwining of the industrial, military, and political dimensions suggests the formation of a European pillar within the alliance, which could be separated if necessary, forming the basis for an independent European defence in the long term.
In the 1990s, Madeleine Albright advocated for the 3Ds
– against duplication, decoupling, and discrimination
between the military apparatus on either side of the Atlantic. Today, Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz are advancing the 3Ss
– standardisation, simplification, and scale
– for a European defence that is complementary and interoperable
with NATO. The battle has only just begun. Lloyd Austin, former US secretary of defence, puts forward in the Financial Times the idea of transatlantic co-production
, countering Europe’s solitary temptations. Partial buy European clauses are contained in the European joint defence debt programme SAFE (Security Action for Europe), which involves eighteen countries, including Spain, France, Italy, and Poland, for a total of €127 billion over the next five years, equal to one tenth of their military spending.
In terms of European political powers, the effective operation of the E3 arrangement between France, the United Kingdom, and Germany confirms the intention to turn the coalition of the willing
for Kyiv into a laboratory [of] the European pillar of post-Trump NATO
– a French formula that returns to outline around Ukraine the contours of a European military force. Alongside this – with greater strategic potential – is the initiative of the three countries in the field of nuclear deterrence, with the Europeanisation of the French and British deterrent and the German financial and missile contribution, and even with the first steps of an unprecedented nuclear directorate.
According to the FAZ, the talks between Paris, London, and Berlin are proceeding in a confidential
manner, only to then emerge in a series of high-profile moves. The joint declarations of Northwood, between France and Britain, and Kensington, between Germany and Britain, pave the way for further steps by France and Germany. For Merz, these agreements are complementary to each other
and indicate the direction taken by the E3 countries
. They engage the major sectors of European imperialism on the military front.
Any adversary threatening the vital interests of the two Northwood contractors can be confronted by the power of both countries’ nuclear forces
. This stance, effectively a Franco-British umbrella, is directed at the continent: An extreme threat to Europe’s security
would elicit a rapid response from both countries
.
The nature of the response is not specified, but given the context, it is impossible to rule out that it could be nuclear: these subtle ties of language
, observes Jean-Dominique Merchet of L’Opinion, cannot escape those who master the language of nuclear posturing.
Paris and London are coordinating
their nuclear forces for the first time and creating a Franco-British nuclear control group
chaired by the highest levels of government. This would lay the foundations for a permanent institutional framework for political decision-making on nuclear matters, in which – crucially – Germany could also participate in the future, according to Michaela Weigel of the FAZ. This would, in effect, give rise to the embryo of a European Security Council, given the level of political decision-making implied by such a sharing, even if partial, of nuclear sovereignty.
The Anglo-German Kensington agreement includes the objective of intensifying trilateral cooperation with France, which is unusual for a bilateral treaty
, comments Nicolai von Ondarza of the German SWP foundation. The agreement completes a Europe-an triangle of treaties
on mutual military defence, which includes the 2019 Aachen Treaty between France and Germany. London and Berlin, according to the Kensington declaration, will have in-depth exchanges on strategic aspects of security policy
, including deterrence
and nuclear issues
, and will develop a new deep precision strike capability
, with potential implications for strategic missile technology.
The American press also speaks of a triangle alliance
, and German government sources have to reassure The Wall Street Journal that Paris and Berlin are only at the beginning of a strategic dialogue about nuclear security
: a very prudent first step towards exploring the European dimension of the issue
.
This is sufficient. Europe is doubling its military spending and moving closer to the US; a colossal rearmament is underway, reaching the unprecedented threshold of the Europeanisation of nuclear deterrence, with consequences in the relations between powers yet to be measured. The economic, political, and strategic contradictions that this rearmament process will generate will be such and so many
as to allow for a revolutionary political battle in the heart of old Europe, provided we are able to analyse and grasp them.