On February 28th, the attack launched by the United States and Israel against Iran ignited the third Gulf War. Already dealing with the conflict in Ukraine on its eastern flank, Europe now finds itself facing a second war on its borders, this time to the south. Unlike in 1991 and 2003, in the current conflict Washington has made no effort to build a coalition. No European or NATO country, nor any regional power, has been formally involved in the plans for intervention.
European exclusion and the Atlantic crisis
Europe’s initial exclusion – despite now being called upon to bear the energy, economic, and political consequences of Washington’s new war of choice
– is the latest chapter of the Atlantic crisis. The issue has been at the centre of the European press’s commentary. Particularly in the early days, Brussels’ delays and impotence were highlighted. The Europe that isn’t there
ran the headline of the Corriere della Sera. For Stefano Lepri, Europe’s absence constitutes one of the most disturbing aspects of this crisis that risks setting the world ablaze
. This lament is steeped in the crocodile tears of imperialist Europeanism. For the Corriere, without Europe, one of the key players
would be missing – one that has always striven to defend the values of freedom and justice
– given that obligations exist
and that Iran must be stopped at all costs
[March 3rd].
In June 2025, moreover, it was Friedrich Merz himself who stated on TV that Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us
, referring precisely to the targeted military operations against Iran’s nuclear programme. This stance already reflected the goal, shared by Rome, of mitigating friction, as much as possible, with Washington.
Dramatising Europe’s absence may serve as an invitation to accelerate its process of political, economic, and military rearmament. This prospect emerges clearly from the realist perspective featured in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. For Nikolas Busse, the fact that the war against Iran is the first major war the United States has fought without Europe’s direct involvement reflects a harsh strategic reality: American and European interests are no longer aligned, neither in the Middle East nor in Europe
[March 12th]. For Berthold Kohler, one of the four editors of the FAZ, Europe cannot afford to remain a bystander. If anything, it must reduce its dependence
, not only on oil and gas from the Persian Gulf, but also on the United States for defence
[March 17th]. Caroline de Gruyter, writing in the Dutch liberal daily NRC Handelsblad, directly calls for action. With every bomb dropped on Iran
and with every costly mistake by Trump
, she writes, European strategic autonomy is taking shape
[March 7th].
European delay and forward deterrence
European imperialism’s delay in centralising its foreign and security policy is certainly a matter of fact. This is nothing new. In the past, we have already observed how, during the second Gulf War, American interference ended up freezing for two decades the substantial steps
that Europe was taking in the field of common defence. The third Gulf War has struck Europe in the midst of a colossal rearmament process, which has its foundation in the crisis in the world order. It is underpinned by massive industrial and spending programmes, which now also explicitly include a nuclear dimension.
In this context, the French have declared a policy of forward deterrence
in the wake of the Israeli-American attack and established an embryonic nuclear directorate within the E3 (France, Germany, Britain). This also represents a substantial political response, in the name of continental strategic autonomy, to the unilateralism of the current American administration and of any which may later follow suit.
A coordinated European defensive game
On the one hand, the Old Continent is playing a defensive game, given the impossibility of speaking with a single voice from the outset. At the same time, this is also how European imperialism’s projection of power is expressed: on this occasion, one can at least note the relative speed with which, from the very first days of the conflict, a common line has been taking shape.
On February 28th, the first day of the war, there was a joint statement by the E3, followed by a second on March 1st. In the first, Friedrich Merz, Emmanuel Macron, and Keir Starmer reiterated Europe’s non-participation in the US and Israeli intervention, criticised Iranian attacks on countries in the region, and called for the resumption of negotiations. In the second, in the name of defending European interests and those of regional allies, non-belligerence became active
, with the E3 pledging logistical support to the US and Israel for actions aimed at striking Iran’s offensive capabilities.
Within 24-48 hours, the core of the European line
was thus defined; while subsequently subject to further adjustments, in substance it was confirmed and accepted without significant distinctions across the continent. A Europe that claims not to be a co-belligerent
– it is not our war
– but whose defensive stance does not rule out logistical and military support for Washington’s intervention. Furthermore, it seeks to be a committed player in the diplomatic solution, without, however, positioning itself as a neutral party between its Atlantic ally and the Iranian theocracy.
European shield in Cyprus
On March 2nd, after a drone attributed to Hezbollah struck the British base at Akrotiri in Cyprus, the European response also took the form of an air and naval mission in the name of defending a member State. Paris deployed the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier group. Rome sent the frigate Martinengo. Further naval units were dispatched by Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain, including the frigate Cristóbal Colón, the jewel of the Spanish Navy. London, in coordination with the European mission, diverted the destroyer HMS Dragon to the area. Alongside these naval units, the Europeans deployed air assets and anti-missile systems. A European Shield for Cyprus
, headlined Il Messaggero on March 6th. Il Foglio described it as a new coalition of the willing
, in this case directed towards the eastern Mediterranean [March 9th].
Paris has taken the lead in the mission. On March 9th, the French president visited Cyprus and then boarded the Charles de Gaulle. When Cyprus is attacked, it is Europe that is attacked
, Macron proclaimed. For the president, the military deployment demonstrates France’s power
, its capacity for projection
, but at the same time is intended as a means of contributing to de-escalation
. Macron, Le Monde further reports, believes that a blueprint for European defence
might emerge around the defence of Cyprus [March 11th].
The French deployment has not been limited to Cyprus. Covering the eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, via the Red Sea, Paris has mobilised eight frigates and two helicopter carriers, in addition to the Charles de Gaulle. As Le Figaro points out, the French aircraft carrier has taken the place of the American USS Ford, moved by Trump to the Persian Gulf [March 10th]. Looking ahead, Macron sees the French naval force potentially taking part in a future international mission to protect freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, but only once the conflict has subsided, and within the framework of an intergovernmental mission
involving various countries beyond Europe, including India [Le Monde, March 11th].
Coinciding with the European Council summit, a proposal by France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands – extended beyond the EU to include Japan and Canada – has taken shape, envisaging a UN-mandated initiative in the Gulf once a ceasefire has been agreed with Tehran. At the time of writing, according to Defence Minister Guido Crosetto, the initiative is aimed not only at India but also at China.
The timing of continental rearmament
The collective refusal
of Europeans to join the war against Iran, despite Donald Trump’s threat of a bad
future for NATO, comments the Financial Times, was remarkable for its force and unanimity
. Europe has found a common voice
that contrasts with the deep divisions over George W. Bush’s war in Iraq two decades ago
[March 19th]. The difference is indeed striking. Today, Paris and Berlin are avoiding a head-on confrontation with Washington, as happened with the no
to Bush in 2003, but are distancing themselves from the intervention by the United States and Israel. London is not only declining to follow the US, as Tony Blair did, but is operating within the E3 framework and accelerating its retreat from Brexit. Spain has changed tack with respect to 2003, moving from Aznar’s Atlanticism to a European recalibration which is more critical towards Washington, while remaining within the framework of armed
non-belligerence. Although an idol of European social-imperialists, Sánchez’s Spain is fully participating in continental rearmament, and the Cristóbal Colón is there to remind us of it.
Finally, despite the war in Ukraine and the Russian threat, no New Europe
seems to be emerging in the East or the Baltics to stand behind Trump, although – as the Financial Times observes – it is here that new cracks may open if the conflict should continue. The question, for the City’s newspaper, is how long the unity will last
: whether Europe is effectively on the way to strategic autonomy
, or whether divisions will begin to emerge. Dependence on American security is shaping up as a race against time. Although European countries are dramatically increasing their defence spending
, notes the Financial Times, even the most optimistic assessments reckon it will take at least a decade to get anywhere near a position of self-sufficiency
.
Italy with the E3
As for Rome, the Meloni government has moved with extreme caution, emphasising its distance from Trump’s interventionism. Whereas in 2003 the then Prime Minister Berlusconi wavered between Washington and Brussels – ultimately being brought back into line with the European position by the intervention of the Quirinale and the Euro-Vatican party – today Giorgia Meloni has sought and even flaunted coordination with the continent’s major capitals, finding allies in the Quirinale and the Euro-Vatican party. In her first speech, on March 5th, Meloni emphasised her stance that we are not at war, we do not want to go to war
, a message she repeated on several occasions.
Equally significant was the openness, however cautious and understated, to Paris’s forward deterrence
, described as an important contribution to the debate on security in Europe
. The following day, Meloni initiated a consultation with the E3, extended to Rome. This E4 agreed on the need to coordinate closely on the situation in the Strait of Hormuz
. The storms of Trumpian activism
, writes Flavia Perina, are pushing Rome towards Brussels [La Stampa, March 6th]. Euro-soluble sovereignty is confirmed as one of the forms of imperialist Europeanism. It remains to be seen to what extent the Meloni formula will emerge weakened by the defeat in the referendum.
The wars of European rearmament
Ultimately, what has gradually emerged from this complex, multifaceted, and, for Europe, defensive game is what former ambassador Giampiero Massolo has called the Europe of the possible
: a Europe sometimes caught off guard
by an interventionist
America, yet committed to demonstrating pragmatism
[Corriere, March 4th].
Let us add two observations. The first is that in differentiating itself from the Trump line, the profile of a balancing Power-Europe is taking shape, able to turn to Asia and the Gulf, where alarm bells are ringing over the economic consequences of a crisis that appears dominated by American strategic confusion. The second is that over the last four years, European imperialism has armed Ukraine in order to arm itself. In the Gulf, a new war of European rearmament has begun.