No surprise: the US Supreme Court struck down Donald Trump's protectionist policy. He was not allowed to bypass Congress and impose tariffs through emergency procedures. Some see in this a vindication of the principle of checks and balances. The unchecked claims of the executive power – the presidency – have been pushed back by the highest expression of judicial power – the Supreme Court – which has returned the matter to the legislative power – Congress – to which the US Constitution grants authority over taxation. Everything seems to fall into place, yet liberals can easily shut themselves inside their paper labyrinths and thus lose sight of the clash of real forces which shape rules and institutions. For us Marxists, the plurality of powers reflects the plurality of interests of the dominant groups of capital, amid relentless battles that know no truce.
The Court's ruling is certainly an act of rebalancing, but ultimately and above all it confirms the depth of the imbalance. As in the clash with the Fed, the centre of monetary power, it is now clear that behind Trump's boorish adventurism there is no broad consensus among the key groups and fractions of American imperialism. Yet, in the wake of this ramshackle presidency – partial and inconsistent as it may be – a powerful coalition of interests has nevertheless come together, ranging from high-tech and fossil fuel groups to the opportunistic convergence of many financial power centres. To hold this entire mercenary company together, a weakened Trump has been compelled to demonstrate that he still holds the initiative. For his part, he has already showered the Court with insults and raised the stakes with a universal 10% tariff.
In truth, there is much more behind the confused performance of a boastful president. The real driver of the imbalance lies in power relations. For the first time, America has found an equal rival in China and no longer tolerates the old rules; Europe, in order to avoid being crushed between Washington and Beijing, is rushing to rearm; other powers are finding room for their own forays. The American imbalance, as well as the populist uprisings in Europe, are only symptoms of the immense tensions accumulating in the world system of States, a disorderly and convulsive reaction to Atlantic decline. What lies ahead, then, is a decade of imbalances: political tensions at home and wars of the crisis in the world order abroad. They will try to drag our class into their conflicts. More than ever, the autonomy of Marxist science and revolutionary organisation is indispensable.
The governor of the Bank of Italy, Fabio Panetta, spoke on January 15th at the opening of the academic year at the University of Messina. In his speech, he focused on some aspects of today's labour market in Italy.
The issue of wages was a prominent one, which Panetta placed in a broader context: weakened
economic growth and exports slowed down by geopolitical tensions and the fragmentation of world trade
bring the structural weaknesses of the Italian economy
to the fore. The brakes on growth
translate into persistently weak income and wage dynamics
.
Differentiated inflation
The data speak for themselves: since 2000, hourly wages in Italy have remained virtually unchanged
, while they have grown by 21% in Germany and 14% in France. Looking at the years since 2019 – which have been marked by high inflation – prices have risen by 20%, but nominal wage growth has stalled at 12%, resulting in an eight-point loss in real wages. In other major European countries, however, the initial loss has been reabsorbed
.
Panetta points to two factors which may have reduced this loss in Italy as well. The first is fiscal policy intervention by successive governments in recent years, with tax relief that is said to have reabsorbed three points of the loss. It is worth looking more closely at this point.
Marco Leonardi, former head of the economic planning department of the Draghi government, in articles in Il Foglio (January 28th and 30th), offers some observations on the methodology of inflation calculation. The prices of essential goods, commonly referred to as the shop-ping basket
, have consistently grown at above-average rates during this period: 24%, seven points higher, between 2021 and 2025. It goes without saying that this trend has had a particularly big impact on lower incomes, on households whose consumption tends to be limited to essential consumer goods. As a result, for these income groups, the recovery
from inflation has been weaker than average.
It is worth noting that immigrant workers are mainly concentrated in these income brackets. As documented in the 2024 report by the Ministry of Labour Foreigners in the Italian Labour Market
, they earn 30% less than Italian workers with the same level of formal education. This month, the case of delivery riders was again in the news. They work long hours for low wages in a sector that employs tens of thousands of workers, mainly immigrants.
Even among wage earners, the burden of inflation is not the same for everyone and weighs more heavily on migrant workers.
The multi-income factor
Returning to Panetta, the second factor in wage restoration that he points to is employment growth, i.e., the increase in the number of income earners per household. This is what we have long referred to as the multi-income family. This is also a factor in the stratification of the wage-earning world.
Leonardi calculates that, among the fifteen million households that derive their income mainly from employment, three million have seen their income grow thanks to an increase in earning members, from zero to one or from one to two. For the other twelve million households, however, income has followed the negative trend in wages. The result: On the one hand, three million households are much better off because they have more people in employment; on the other, twelve million households, despite working as before, are slightly worse off than five years ago
. Leonardi concludes: Employment may grow, but it cannot replace indefinitely the fundamental role of wages that are losing purchasing power
.
The demographic constraint
There is another factor that the governor of the Bank of Italy points to as one of the weaknesses of the system: the demographic constraint
. Here too, the data speak for themselves: by 2050, Italy will lose more than 7 million people of working age, which will translate into a reduction in GDP and overall wellbeing.
On this point, an assessment by the ADAPT social studies centre, which looks at the more immediate future of the decade, is of use. The study sets the current 55-64 age group, which will leave the workforce during the period in question, against the 15-24 age group, which will enter the workforce: the result is a shortfall of 4.3 million workers, a drop from 23.1 to 18.8 million, or a reduction of 18.6%. In manufacturing alone, there will be 872,000 departures, accounting for 20% of the workforce.
The demographic problem is not unique to Italy. In fact, it is also affecting France, which in the past enjoyed an advantage in this regard. 2025 was its first year with a negative natural balance, meaning it recorded more deaths than births. According to the Cour des Comptes, by 2070 the total working-age population (20-64 years) will decline by 5%, which translates into a loss of 3.4 million people (Les Echos, December 3rd, 2025).
European trends
The conditions of French workers are further aggravated by the spread of various forms of precarious employment, which affects more than a quarter of workers (Le Monde, February 3rd). These include fixed-term contracts, temporary work, internships, and involuntary part-time work, as well as the growth of so-called micro-entrepreneurs
, situations comparable in Italy to partite IVA
(self-employed workers or freelancers) or platform workers such as the delivery riders mentioned above, who are independent only in name.
Working conditions are also deteriorating in Germany. Among the measures being considered by the government is a change to the law on working hours: the rule setting the normal working day at 8 hours would be abandoned and replaced with a ceiling of 48 hours per week, all in the name of flexibility in the use of the labour force, so often invoked by employers.
Opposition from the trade unions is explicit, at least in the statements made by their leaders. Yasmin Fahimi, head of the DGB confederation, has announced her opposition to the reform, pointing out that the trade unions have been fighting for the 8-hour working day as the standard working time since 1918
(Avvenire, January 29th). The reference is to the demands that emerged in the class struggles which erupted at the end of the First World War.
Completing the picture of a normal
Germany, a study by the German Economic Institute (IW), which has close relations with employers, reports that more than 90% of domestic staff work illegally, without registration or insurance: there are between 3.7 and 3.9 million of them (Avvenire, January 22nd).
Class stratification
This is a European snapshot of precarious working conditions which are much more widespread throughout the world. The ILO report Employment and Social Trends 2026 (January 14th) estimates that 300 million workers live in extreme poverty, on less than $3 a day. Those in informal work
will number 2.1 billion in 2026, a figure that is growing.
The broader the horizon, the more apparent the differences that mark the stratification of the world of wage labour. This is our class. Hence the need to work towards a unification that cannot be achieved on the trade union front alone, but must look beyond it. Internationalist unity requires a political struggle.
Lotta Comunista, February 2026