From the series European news
The next half-century will be the age of nuclear weapons
. This was the grim prediction with which Emmanuel Macron concluded his speech on nuclear deterrence, delivered on March 2nd at the Île Longue submarine base. Standing before Le Téméraire, the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine that carries a strike force equivalent to the sum of all the bombs dropped on Europe during the Second World War
, the president announced a significant evolution in French nuclear doctrine.
The emergence of new threats and the realignment of American priorities
make it necessary, according to Macron, not only to strengthen deterrence by increasing the number of nuclear warheads, but also to rethink the deterrence strategy deep inside the European continent
. His proposal is the gradual implementation
of forward deterrence
, which will initially offer the possibility for partners to participate in deterrence exercises
and could lead to the deployment, if necessary, of elements of strategic forces with our allies
. Macron is not proposing the permanent stationing of French nuclear weapons in third countries, as the United States does with its extended deterrence; he is referring to the possibility of a temporary presence of French fighter jets equipped with nuclear weapons in other European countries. Furthermore, there will be no sharing of the final decision on the use of nuclear weapons, which will remain exclusively in the hands of the President of the French Republic. Forward deterrence
, Macron emphasised, is a distinct commitment that has its own intrinsic value and is perfectly complementary to that of NATO
.
“Épaulement”
Macron explained that a strategic dialogue has already been initiated with the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, and Denmark, although discussions are also underway with several other countries
. He also confirmed the rejection of the flexible nuclear response
in French doctrine. France no longer possesses small
nuclear bombs, known as tactical bombs, and rejects the idea of a nuclear war. It possesses only strategic nuclear weapons, capable of inflicting such damage
as to prevent any adversary or group of adversaries from recovering
. French doctrine rules out a gradual escalation through a nuclear exchange, and provides only for a single, non-repeatable nuclear warning
, as a last chance to restore deterrence
. It is precisely this absence of tactical nuclear weapons in the French arsenal that has prompted some voices in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Poland to call for their development, either at national level or through cooperation between the Nordic countries and Germany. For the time being, these voices remain in the minority.
To manage sub-threshold escalation, the French president sees an opportunity in conventional contributions from other European countries, in what he has described as mutual support or épaulement. Europe, Macron stated, would benefit from this.
France does not formally offer any sharing of responsibility for the decision to use its nuclear weapons. However, the concept of deterrence as a two-pillar
system (nuclear and conventional), with reciprocal mutual support
constituting a fair distribution of efforts
, indicates an offer of cooperation. Le Monde [March 4th] sees this as potentially the basis for a European defence contract based on burden-sharing
. For Bruno Tertrais, a French specialist in the field, Macron's speech clarified the architecture of European nuclear deterrence
: French and allied conventional resources on the front line
, and at the rear
, the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines of France and the United Kingdom which guarantee the ultimate security of the continent in accordance with the Northwood Declaration
[Le Point, March 6th].
This would appear to be the definition of the strategic concept
integrating nuclear deterrence, missile defence, and deep strikes that Macron referred to two years ago in the pages of The Economist. If we also consider Macron's 2020 speech at the École de Guerre, in which he called for a dialogue on the European dimension
of French deterrence, we have a rough indication of the reaction times of European imperialism in the crisis in the world order.
The “E3” nuclear steering group
With the Northwood Declaration of July 2025, the United Kingdom and France opened up the possibility of coordinating their respective deterrents, in particular through the creation of a Franco-British nuclear steering group
. In his speech, Macron recalled that in December senior British officials took part, for the first time since the establishment of our deterrent, in one of our strategic air force exercises
. The president also announced plans to establish forums for exchange
with all countries interested in forward deterrence
, modelled on what we have done with the UK
.
Indeed, on the very day of Macron's speech, the French president and the German chancellor issued a joint statement announcing the creation by their two countries of a high-level nuclear steering group
. The statement refers to Article 4 of the Aachen Treaty: the two States are convinced of the inseparable nature of their security interests
, and shall provide mutual aid and assistance by all means at their disposal, including military force, in the event of armed aggression against their territories
. Signed in 2019 by Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, the Aachen Treaty is regarded as a confirmation and strengthening of the Élysée Treaty, signed in 1963 by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer.
Both the March 2nd joint statement by Merz and Macron and the Aachen Treaty set out the Franco-German commitments within the framework of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union. In his speech on February 13th at the Munich Security Conference, Friedrich Merz referred to Article 42(7), the Union's mutual defence clause, and called for clarification on how we intend to organise it in Europe, not as a substitute for NATO, but as a solid and autonomous pillar within the alliance
. While remaining in keeping with the ambiguity inherent to the subject, the statement by Merz and Macron represents a step forward towards integrating the nuclear dimension into this EU mutual defence clause.
The nuclear update to the Aachen Treaty, with the Franco-German agreement of March 2nd, also completes a triangle whose other two sides are formed by the Kensington Treaty, signed in July 2025 by the United Kingdom and Germany, and the Northwood Declaration between France and the United Kingdom signed in the same month. In his speech on February 14th in Munich, the British prime minister noted that for decades, the UK has been the only nuclear power in Europe to have committed its deterrent to protecting all NATO members
. However, Keir Starmer warned that, following the strengthening of nuclear cooperation with France through the Northwood Declaration, any adversary must know that in the event of a crisis, they could find themselves facing our combined force
. Together, do France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — sometimes referred to as the E3
countries — effectively form a sort of nuclear directorate? Could this be the embryonic form of a European Security Council?
Atlantic reflections
In fact, the French proposal for forward deterrence
does not envisage the creation of a European body, but rather the development of a network of bilateral entities. According to Claudia Major, vice-president of the German Marshall Fund, a think tank, the rationale behind this choice lies in the fact that a supranational body such as a European Security Council would risk competing with NATO
[Le Monde, March 4th]. Indeed, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported that German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, like the predecessors of the current Chancellor Merz, had in the past opposed the French proposal on nuclear deterrence. His primary concern was an American reaction and possible repercussions for the nuclear umbrella provided by Washington within NATO. In providing such protection, the implicit aim of the United States has always been to prevent nuclear proliferation, particularly in Germany, and to avoid the emergence of an autonomous European power. Thus, following the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963, the American reaction to Franco-German rapprochement took the form of the Year of the Atlanticists
, and pressure was exerted on the Bonn parliament to compel Chancellor Adenauer to add a preamble to the treaty emphasising the partnership with the United States.
The FAZ praised Merz for having seized the opportunity for nuclear cooperation with France
, as it believes that Macron's proposal lays the foundations for a European nuclear deterrent, independent of the United States and complementary to it
. The conservative Frankfurt daily makes a bold claim: Sixty-three years after the signing of the Élysée Treaty, Chancellor Merz has quietly freed himself from the constraints of the preamble
[March 6th].
The last time Europe was on the verge of taking a step forward on common defence was at the turn of the century, following the Balkan wars. This attempt was thwarted by the US-led war in Iraq, which Washington used to divide the New Europe
of the East from the Old Europe
of the Rhine axis. It will come as no surprise if European imperialism, which has been rearming since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and is now moving towards deterrence, faces a reaction from other powers. According to Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Europe's share of global defence spending has risen from 17% in 2022 to 21% in 2025, with a quarter of the increase attributable to Germany. Within three years, Berlin will increase its current military spending by a further 50%, becoming the country with by far the largest military budget in Europe. The disruption of previous continental balances, brought about by German rearmament, remains one of the principal uncertainties of European rearmament.