At the time of writing, bloody repression seems to have quelled the mass protests in Iran that began in late December and spread to nearly 200 towns and cities across all of Iran’s 31 provinces. The dynamics of these protests recall those that erupted in 2017 and 2019: both were similarly marked by rising living costs and subsidy cuts, abuses by the religious police in enforcing the veil on women (especially students), and the involvement of ethnic minorities. According to international estimates, the victims of those previous waves of repression amounted to 400 and 550 respectively, while there is still uncertainty about the scale of today’s massacre, with estimates ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 victims. Iranian government sources, quoted by Reuters, mention 2,000-5,000, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself, in a speech on January 17th, speaks of thousands of deaths
and enormous damage
caused by those linked to the US and Israel
.
Anonymous government sources report a peak in violence in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of the northwest, areas long marked by ethnic tensions and autonomist – if not outright separatist – demands. At the same time, despite being overlooked by the press, there is evidence of the involvement of sections of the Iranian working class in the clashes – especially the urban proletariat, 60% of whom live in precarious conditions in the “informal” economy.
The army of the proletariat
According to data from Iranian economist Kayhan Valadbaygi of the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, there were over 2,000 strikes and protests between 2017 and 2020, 57% of which were by workers in the manufacturing sector
.
The 2000s saw the emergence of two independent trade unions, in the Haft Tappeh sugar factories and among Tehran’s railway workers; while 2024 saw the mobilisation of petrochemical workers [Valadbaygi, Capitalism in Contemporary Iran, 2024]. According to estimates by the ILO and the Statistical Centre of Iran, the country has 25-27 million wage earners: over 6 million in manufacturing, 90% of whom work in companies with fewer than 10 employees; around 5 million in agriculture; and approximately 13-14 million in the service sector. Unemployment, or underemployment, affects between 9-10% of the labour force, particularly women, with female employment accounting for 17% of the total labour force.
As American historian Nikki R. Keddie points out, it was the prolonged strikes by industrial workers, especially in the petrochemical sector, rather than the revolt of the bazaaris, the merchant classes, that decided the fate of the Shah’s regime in 1979. Indeed, Reza Pahlavi, who returned to power after the coup d’état in the summer of 1953 against the government of Mohammad Mossadeq’s National Front – carried out with the assistance of the CIA and MI6, as well as the Shiite clergy – had outlawed trade unions [Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, 2006].
According to the British website Bourse and Bazaar, Iran’s profile is not dissimilar to that of Turkey, which has around 35 million wage earners, including more than 7 million in industry and 2 million in construction. The big difference is that Iran, due to international sanctions and its own internal imbalances, is unable to exploit its industrial potential in manufacturing exports. The Saudi petro-monarchy has a labour force of 18.2 million, but 14 million are expatriates
: immigrants from the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and the rest of Asia. If organised, politically conscious, and committed to internationalist positions, this proletarian army could easily shake off its national bourgeoisie, whether secular, clerical, or uniformed.
Multifaceted crisis
The trigger for the umpteenth Iranian crisis, on the domestic front, is a combination of currency devaluation, inflationary pressure (especially in the food sector), and public spending cuts, put forward in the budget law of “reformist” President Masoud Pezeshkian on December 23rd. Of particular significance are the $10 billion cuts in subsidised sectors, such as petrol and food, as well as the loss of revenue due to the fall in international oil prices. Oil revenues account for roughly 40% of the State budget.
In 2025, only $22 billion entered Iran’s coffers, as against $27 billion in oil exports. In addition to having to discount the price of crude oil, largely destined for China, part of the difference was pocketed by various local and international intermediaries
. Among the local intermediaries, various sources point the finger at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which manages around 60 oil tankers on behalf of the State and, since the 1990s – particularly after 2006, under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – has built its own economic empire; in alliance, but also in rivalry, with what critics of the regime call the clerical bourgeoisie
(akhoondi bourgeiosie), which controls the powerful religious foundations (bonyad).
Added to this picture in the autumn was the crisis of Ayandeh Bank, one of the country’s largest non-State institutions, burdened with over $5 billion in debt. Ayandeh was created in 2013 from the merger of privatised State banks on the initiative of the Ansari family, one of the richest in Iran and considered close to Ahmadinejad and the IRGC. The crisis originated in 2018 with the investment in Iran Mall, a gigantic shopping centre in Tehran, complete with cinemas, gyms, a library, and indoor gardens, including a hall of mirrors
modelled on 16th-century imperial palaces. The complex was clearly intended for the Iranian middle and upper-middle strata and was financed by debt. The Iranian banking supervision authorities called it a Ponzi scheme
, with the use of current accounts inflated by the promise of higher interest rates. The Wall Street Journal reports that, in response to the sanctions, since 2018, Iranian banks have had to resort to special liquidity funds created by the Central Bank, which do not require collateral.
The Ayandeh crisis, long targeted by Iranian reformists
, not only led to the resignation of the head of the Central Bank, but also prompted a cut in public spending. According to analyst Bijan Khajehpour, the austerity measures proposed by the government also affect key interest groups such as importers
, which include bazaari traders. They have seen their access to foreign currency at preferential rates reduced: according to economist Valadbaygi’s analysis, on average this mechanism allowed, at least in the 1990s, returns of 2,000-3,000% on resold goods. According to the same economist, in the 1970s, the bazaaris, in addition to controlling one-third of imports and two-thirds of distribution, accounted for 20% of the volume of official credit in Tehran alone, equal to $3 billion, and over $1.3 billion in foreign currency. The credit was directed in particular towards small and medium-sized enterprises, on which interest rates of 40% could be imposed on loans, compared to the 6% charged by the banking system, which was instead oriented towards the big business groups created by the monarch’s dirigiste policies. In 1979, according to Valadbaygi, both the development of large-scale industry and distribution, supported by the Shah, and the proximity of the bazaaris to the Shiite clergy led to a rift between these small and medium-sized bourgeois strata and the monarchy. Several observers point out that today’s protests by traders are linked to the growing economic influence of the IRGC and the bonyads, which together control between 25-40% of the national economy.
Factions and armed oligarchs
Both Valadbaygi and Suzanne Maloney, a member of the NSC in the Bush Jr administration, define Iran before and after 1979 as a State-capitalist system, due to the Colbertist policies of the Shah’s technocracy and also because of the structures that emerged during and after the long conflict with Iraq [1980-88] – such as the role acquired by the bonyads [Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy Since the Revolution, 2015]. The Ayatollah regime nationalised the economy, also because of the wartime context. The function of Islamic foundations was to redistribute the wealth accumulated by the 2,000 Iranian families linked to the monarchy in favour of the oppressed
(mostafazin). In Iran, this category referred to the proletariat who had recently moved to the cities from the countryside and was later extended, in a Third-Worldist sense, against American and Western imperialism. The goal was to provide a measure of welfare, which with the conflict was broadened to widows, orphans, and war disabled. A specific bonyad was created for the basij (literally the recruited
), an auxiliary militia of the armed forces at the front which was subsequently integrated into the security apparatus. According to Valadbaygi, in 1989 the various bonyads provided welfare to about four million poor people (out of a population of about 45-50 million).
According to the Iranian economist, between 1989 and 1997, under the presidency of Ali Rafsanjani, a policy of external liberalisation
was pursued, with privatisation measures based on a compromise between the managerial bourgeoisie
, business leaders, the bazaaris, and the parastatal bonyads. As religious organisations, the bonyads were and still are exempt from taxes, direct State supervision, and the obligation to submit financial statements, and report directly to the Supreme Leader, Khamenei. Rafsanjani believed it was necessary to reduce their role, but considered the bonyads useful in countering the statist tendencies of the Islamist left
, including in the institutionalisation of welfare. This line was also pursued by his successor Mohammad Khatami (in office from 1997-2005), whom Maloney describes as an Ayatollah à la Gorbachev
: in favour of greater social liberalisation, bottom-up privatisation
, and industrial strengthening with the help of foreign capital.
The IRGC-bonyad nexus, intended as a basis for the development of conglomerates similar to South Korean chaebols, was strengthened with the advent of the new populist right
of the Ahmadinejad presidency [2005-13]: the so-called principlists
, representing the provinces and finding their base among war veterans. More hostile to opening up to Euro-American capital, they looked more to Asia, especially China, and advocated a more redistributive approach to oil rents, while also promoting the distribution of company shares among the population. These were then effectively rounded up by the oligarchs
linked to the IRGC-bonyad cartel or by the representatives of those foundations themselves. There are clear similarities between the imbalances in Iran and the crisis of Russian State capitalism and the subsequent rise of the oligarchs
— in the Iranian case, with military or paramilitary forces at their disposal. Valadbaygi evokes the frustration of Hassan Rouhani's presidency [2013-21], who had stated: Part of the economy was controlled by an unarmed government and we delegated it to an armed one
.
Economic crisis and the wider Gaza war
After 2020, Iran's external projection suffered a series of major setbacks, culminating in the twelve-day war
with Israel and American involvement. The wider Gaza conflict has weakened Iran's positions in the so-called Shiite Crescent
in Lebanon, Syria (especially with the fall of the Assad regime), Iraq, and Yemen. This external projection is based both on the use of the nuclear card and on direct military and financial support, and is conducted with the cooperation of the IRGC and the bonyads. The Revolutionary Guards oversee the military-industrial complex, especially the missile component, but also, through foundations, the exercise of Tehran's soft power towards Shiite minorities in the Levant, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Added to this influence is an economic presence through networks of entrepreneur-militiamen in Iraq and the management of part of the trade exchange with Turkey, Iraq, the Emirates, and Pakistan.
Today, the debate between reformist and conservative currents is gripped by Tehran's substantial overextension; scaling it back is seen as one of the conditions for Iran's reintegration into international financial circuits and the global market. In the view of Vali Nasr, a former State Department official in the Obama administration, the Iranian leadership, rattled
and divided
after the twelve-day war
, must listen to calls for change with regard to the doctrine of resistance
, which has shaped its domestic policies for decades. While not ruling out a sudden collapse, such as that of the USSR, Nasr is opposed to military intervention as proposed by Trump, pointing out that Iran is entering a transition like the one China went through from Mao to Deng Xiaoping
. If the Iranian leadership is weighing its options, for Nasr, the people are ready for their Deng
.
Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat, shares a similar view, arguing that Deng respected Mao, but he did not allow him to rule China from the grave
. Tehran would be wise to choose the path of reform and opening up
, rather than simply postponing a greater collapse, which would have significant implications for the region. According to Haaretz, after the bloody Iranian crackdown, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the Emirates evoked horror scenarios
to the Trump administration to persuade it to choose de-escalation
. According to the Tel Aviv daily, Riyadh and the petro-monarchies, and also Ankara, are offering themselves as a buffer
to Tehran to contain the possible regional dimension of the crisis, raising the spectre of a new Arab Spring
in the Gulf, this time in Persian. In 2011, when the local balance of power was shaken by demonstrations in Bahrain — a small Sunni monarchy governing a Shiite majority — protests were suppressed by Saudi troops.
For Clément Therme, an analyst at IFRI, Trump's statements about supporting regime change are part of American domestic politics
, modulating red lines
that can avoid immediate military intervention
. According to Le Monde, the Pentagon did not propose a quick and decisive
solution to the US president, such as the raid on Caracas on January 3rd. And according to a Turkish source quoted by Haaretz, Trump should bear in mind that Iran is not Venezuela, Greenland, or Gaza, that [he] believes he can manage
. Israel itself, which in various reconstructions has mediated, via Moscow, a commitment with Tehran not to launch mutual pre-emptive strikes
, is said to have suggested postponing military action.
It is not insignificant that the calls for caution in Washington come from the three Islamic guarantors
of the Gaza truce: Ankara, Doha, and Cairo, backed by Riyadh. For commentators from the Iranian diaspora in the US, the passage of time narrows the window of opportunity
for Tehran's adversaries. However, they share the assessment that military intervention, even surgical
, would be a risky gamble
. The Pentagon has nevertheless ordered the deployment of forces, including an aircraft carrier group, to the Middle East. The real unknown, ultimately, is that Trump's show diplomacy
may underestimate or fail to grasp the unintended consequences.
During January, events were held to mark the 60th anniversary of the newspaper Lotta Comunista. The battle for proletarian internationalism has been a common thread throughout these 60 years. The events commemorating this anniversary were an opportunity to strongly affirm proletarian opposition to rearmament and wars of the crisis in the world order, as well as internationalist solidarity with Iranian youth and workers. We publish the flyer distributed by volunteers from the Milan Workers’ Clubs for the demonstration held on February 1st at the Arena in Monza.
INTERNATIONALIST SOLIDARITY WITH THE YOUTH AND WORKERS OF IRAN!
It is impossible for imperialism to maintain a stable world order. The incessant struggles to divide up markets and spheres of influence shake and disrupt the lives of billions of people. Ukraine, Venezuela, Gaza, Sudan, Yemen, Taiwan – and now Iran – are protagonists and victims of a no-holds-barred struggle between United States, China, Russia, Europe, and India, the great continental powers that use strategic resources, energy, and missiles to carve out the largest slice of global wealth.
Despite its clerical and reactionary regime, Iran has in some respects become a modern country, a medium-sized power with over 92 million people. The regime of the Ayatollahs, taking advantage of the disastrous wars of the Americans and their European allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, has extended its reach into the Middle East, expanding its network of influence over Shiite regimes and militias. But it has probably overreached, and the Israeli and American reaction has brought it to the brink of collapse. Galloping inflation, declining oil revenues, and political discontent against corrupt cops have sparked protests. At the moment, the oil barons have responded with bloody repression, leaving thousands dead. The bourgeoisie in Tehran has long been divided between pro-Asian and pro-Western factions, and often plays on ethnic rivalries between Persians, Kurds, Azeris, Baluchis, and Arabs. Some are calling for the return of the monarchy, based on the Spanish model that allowed the country to emerge from Francoism and return to the international consensus. This may be possible, but we must remember that in 1979 the Shah ended up into ignominy after decades of rapacious and bloody rule. Trump, for his part, is trying to ride the wave of popular unrest and is threatening military intervention to destroy the Islamist State. And after Venezuela, perhaps to add another Petro-State to his collection of allies to confront imperialist China and blackmail the rest of the world.
Our internationalist solidarity goes out to the young men and women, to the workers who are fighting against the regime. There are almost 30 million wage earners in Iran. They are an enormous force that must free itself from bourgeois manoeuvres that rekindle ancient ethnic and religious rivalries or tout democratic myths. Look at how the old liberal democracies have ended up in Europe, in the grip of fear, calling for armies in the streets and atomic bombs in their arsenals.
Liberation can only come through the struggle for a classless society, against exploitation and the conflicts of capital. Workers around the world must unite against all bourgeois exploiters and their henchmen everywhere.
Against oppression and war, proletarians of all countries, unite!
INTERNATIONALIST DEMONSTRATION
For the 60th anniversary of the Leninist newspaper Lotta Comunista
SUNDAY FEBRUARY 1st – 3.30 p.m.
ARENA DI MONZA – via G.B. Stucchi