In the new US National Security Strategy (NSS), Russia is placed in the European basket
, third among regional priorities after the Western Hemisphere and Asia. It is no longer considered an existential threat
, and indeed many Europeans
who regard it as such are criticised.
Alongside Donald Trump’s on-again, off-again openness to negotiations with Moscow on Ukraine, this helps to create an impression of rapprochement between the two powers. Obviously, there can be no comparison with the Yalta era, for at least two reasons: first, because the world has changed profoundly since then, starting with German and European reunification and the emergence of China as a great imperialist power; and second, because what was then part of the USSR has been the scene of a bloody war for four years, with hundreds of thousands of deaths. A setback that no public image can conceal.
Russian caution
In Moscow, analysts and commentators are questioning the meaning and prospects of this new American strategy. The general tone is one of caution and, if anything, focused on identifying opportunities for Russia that might emerge from the shifting relationship between the US and Europe.
The currents of opinion most in favour of the war in Ukraine are also those that issue the strongest warnings. Among them is Dimitri Trenin who, after a career in the Soviet armed forces and then as director of the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, now holds research positions in various institutions, such as the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). In Profil magazine, he reports his interpretation of the NSS as a pragmatic
strategy, which nevertheless remains assertive
, aimed at preserving military superiority
and peace only through force
; in short, not a retreat
, but a selective consolidation of hegemony
, a rationalisation of the American empire
[Russia Today, January 30th]. According to Trenin, Moscow should draw three conclusions from this: the US will remain a geopolitical adversary; its decline should not be overestimated; Russia must therefore strengthen its nuclear deterrence capabilities.
Declining powers
Other, more mainstream and more establishment-aligned commentators likewise urge caution in their assessments: they emphasise that the Trump line is, in certain respects, an inevitable one, reflecting the relative decline of American power.
This assessment appeared in a series of articles that Fyodor Lukyanov, president of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council, has written in the magazine he edits, Russia in Global Affairs. On December 16th, he noted the position that the NSS reserves for Russia: no longer depicted as a threat or a rogue actor
, nor as a global challenger
, but rather as part of the European landscape
. However, this is a Russia that is included, but not on an equal footing
, in a role that is not yet acceptable
to Moscow.
In the next article [January 1st], he compared Trump’s America First
line with that espoused by George W. Bush in 2001, at the height of US global power
. After all, he noted, 25 years, even in quieter times, is enough time for serious change; let alone today, when ten years are compressed into one
. Hence, the US administration’s decision to critically re-examine the choices made at the time and to embrace a pragmatic line.
Finally, on January 11th, Lukyanov drew his conclusions: One could say that Washington is acting this way because it understands, instinctively or consciously, that American capabilities are diminishing. That awareness only intensifies the urge to extract maximum benefit while the accumulated advantage still exists
. It is implicit that the confrontation that alarms Washington is more with Beijing than with Moscow.
European margins?
A strand of commentary seeks the margins that Russia can exploit in the policy expressed in the NSS. Timofei Bordachev, programme director at the Valdai Discussion Club, referred to this in a series of speeches. On December 9th, he wrote in Vzglyad that the US is humiliating Europe, so we must not rule out the possibility that in the future, relations with our neighbours in Western Eurasia may be established on terms favourable to Moscow
. It is worth noting the reference to Europe as neighbours in Western Eurasia
, a sign that Russian attention to Europe has not been entirely eclipsed by the war in Ukraine.
On January 20th, Bordachev returned to the subject in the same newspaper: American pressure on Europe could lead to crises and internal disputes within the West that could end in complete defeat for the Europeans
. The following period of transition could be exploited intelligently
by Russia, China, and the rest of healthy humanity
.
The most explicit intervention for the Valdai Club was on February 3rd. Bordachev pointed out that the US strategy tends to reduce the likelihood of a genuine reconciliation between Russia and its Western neighbours
, because such a reconciliation would revolutionise international politics – thereby America, as the most reactionary of forces, will attempt to prevent it
. But it is not certain that this American aspiration will be realised. On the contrary, if the US continues slumping in its political and economic capabilities
, European elites that are less US-dependent and favourable for Russia
could emerge.
It should be noted that other analysts are more cautious about the prospect of a rift between the US and the EU. This is the case of Ivan Timofeev, director general of the RIAC, who agrees that in 2025 transatlantic relations showed unexpected tensions
, but noted that this is not the first such occurrence. He recalled: the Suez crisis of 1956; American opposition to German participation in the Siberian gas pipeline in the 1980s; France and Germany’s opposition to the war in Iraq in 2003; and the attempt to block Nord Stream 2, which was ultimately successful in the manner we know. In the past, however, the two sides of the Atlantic have always found a way to mend relations. And even now, it is too early to talk about an irreversible and complete split
[Valdai, January 13th].
Attempts at dialogue
The issue of relations between Russia and the EU nevertheless forms the backdrop to this debate. To this end, statements of openness on the part of European political leaders are being reiterated.
An article in Vzglyad [January 19th] reported French President Emmanuel Macron’s statement on the need to establish dialogue with Moscow as soon as possible
and, above all, a speech by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on January 14th during a reception in Halle in front of entrepreneurs and regional representatives. These are the words quoted: If we succeed in restoring peace and freedom in Europe, if we finally regain balance in our relations with our largest European neighbour, Russia, if we succeed in all this, then the EU and we in Germany will pass another test
. In his speech, Merz reportedly repeated several times that Russia is a European State
, in this context a political rather than a geographical consideration.
The same article reports the following comment by Dimitri Ofitserov-Belsky, senior fellow at IMEMO. By recognising Russia as a European country, and not a foreign one, Merz transforms the [Ukrainian] conflict from an epoch-making battle into an internal dispute within Europe, one of many that the continent has experienced over the centuries
. And always, in the past, after the war came intra-European reconciliation, or even alliances between former enemies
. The example given is that of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, which did not prevent Austria from becoming, shortly afterwards, the main ally of a unified Germany
. Returning to the present, according to Ofitserov-Belsky, Merz is probably trying to remind Americans that this war is not in Europe’s interest and that Europe can also reconcile with the Russians
. In short, all options remain open.
Even in the Kremlin, despite the limited space left by the ongoing conflict, relations with Europe are not definitively buried. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself, in an interview with the Russian television channel RT on February 5th, noted a change in attitude towards Moscow on the part of European politicians, citing the statements made by Macron and Merz. Obviously, he attributes this change to a realisation that their plans for the strategic defeat
of Russia have failed. Lavrov also revealed that contacts with some European leaders continue: They call us and ask us not to make the conversations public. Some maintain ‘undercover’ contacts here
. All this, even though the Americans have never wanted, and still do not want, to leave the Europeans to their own devices
.
Conditional offer
In the interview, the foreign minister also advanced what could be interpreted as a conditional offer. He did so by saying that Russia is interested in a security system for Eurasia as a whole
, a concept which, in Russian strategic thinking, also includes Western Europe. What Lavrov complained about, however, is that on the European side, attempts to build a security system have only been considered in the context of Euro-Atlantic security
. In other words: it is for the Europeans to decide whether to broaden the horizon.
Here, the ball is back in Brussels’ court and the outcome depends on the decision-making capacity of the European Council. Timofeev posed the question to the EU: What to do?
[Valdai, January 22nd]. The decisive challenge, he wrote, is the internal transformation
of the Union towards greater political, regulatory, and security centralisation. By launching the aid plan for Ukraine in December, the European Council demonstrated its ability to limit the veto rights of member States, even in sensitive areas. Yet, the problem remains: security issues require that the EU become increasingly centralised and resolute in its decision-making, and thus, to reduce the effective sovereignty of its member States
.