In the columns of The Nikkei on October 21st, foreign policy commentator Hiroyuki Akita wrote that the new Japanese prime minister’s mandate would be defined by a far more consequential challenge
: forging a system of government capable of functioning under the duress of war
. For Akita, emphasising the need to prepare for a ‘wartime’ regime
serves to highlight that Japan is under severe stress
. Tokyo has enjoyed a long period of peace and has been able to deal with peacetime crises
, even largescale ones such as the pandemic of the century. The war in Ukraine has ushered in a turbulent global situation, reminiscent of the uncertainty of the 1930s. To confront this, Tokyo needs a government structure capable of rapidly shifting from peacetime routines to an emergency footing
. This is a dilemma that does not concern Japan alone, but Japan finds itself in an even more perilous position than Europe [...], hemmed in by the nuclear arsenals of China, Russia, and North Korea
and lacking the protective shield of a collective defence framework like NATO
.
According to Akita, history clearly shows that military force alone cannot guarantee stability. In 1941, Tokyo possessed formidable land and naval forces
, but a reckless national policy
led the country to the brink of total destruction
. Japan was unable to subordinate the military to political power and safeguard the national interest. Eighty years later, in the event of war, the prime minister must be a commander-in-chief
capable of leading the nation through crisis
. In this context, various Japanese governments since 2010 have passed a series of security laws to strengthen the alliance with Washington and establish a National Security Secretariat
. Nevertheless, citing the assessment of Shinichi Kitaoka – a diplomat and conservative realist historian who has advised both Yasuhiro Nakasone and Shinzo Abe – Japan continues to carry the unhealthy traits of the prewar period
. Among these is the precedent principle
, i.e., the tendency to stick rigidly to established policy
, which prevents Tokyo from responding to crises with flexibility
.
The context of Akita’s commentary was the transfer of power between Shigeru Ishiba and Sanae Takaichi at the helm of the executive, following the latter’s victory as leader of the LDP. The first woman to head a Japanese government, Takaichi took office without a parliamentary majority and, shortly thereafter, was forced to deal with the decision of Komeito, a centrist Buddhist-inspired party, to break its political-electoral alliance with the Liberal Democrats, in place since 1999. This coalition was replaced by one with the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), a regionalist party based in Osaka with national-liberal positions.
A mandate for Japanese realism
According to the Financial Times, during the 110 days of her government before the early elections called for February 8th, Takaichi showed a sure political touch
, despite the diplomatic crisis with China that erupted last November. She then made history a second time
. Not only is she the first woman to lead the country, but she is also the first political leader to obtain a super-majority in the lower house
: 316 seats, and 352 for her coalition, out of 465 contested. The Economist dedicated a flattering cover to the victor, titled The World’s Most Powerful Woman
, hailing her achievement as a once-in-a-generation chance to remake
the Land of the Rising Sun – an opportunity Takaichi must seize in order to face the new world disorder
.
The British weekly describes as healthy
the prime minister’s willingness to break taboos
, including discussing nuclear weapons and increasing defence spending to 2% of GDP. But this is only part of the work
: she will have to manage Donald Trump’s return to the White House and position Tokyo at the forefront of efforts to link the CPTPP and the European Union
, the Trans-Pacific and European areas, creating a trade bloc covering over 30% of global output
. Finally, she will have to implement deregulation measures, attract migrants
and not demonise them
, and avoid fiscal populism.
The formula that sums up the assessments expressed by both the Japanese and international press is a mandate for political realism
, with an emphasis on pragmatism. This is also evident in the fact that the new Takaichi government is unchanged from the previous one.
For the liberal Mainichi Shimbun, while the election debate focused on inflation, the real issues are the revision of the three non-nuclear principles
and rearmament. In her election speeches, the prime minister clearly stated: If we want to strengthen our defence capabilities, we need to expand the economic pie
. For a senior government official, this is a pedagogical formula: Under the banner of the economic growth we will strengthen our defence capabilities and will get the understanding of the public opinion
.
Japanese-style Zeitenwende
A comment published shortly before the elections in the German newspaper Die Zeit seems significant. According to the paper, Prime Minister Takaichi has sparked an internal debate in Japan on security policy, similar to the German discussion on the Zeitenwende
, the epochal turning point: a country burdened by the guilt of war, which for decades has hidden militarily in the shadow of the US
, now finds its pacifist image suddenly shaken. Die Zeit cites the opinions of former diplomat and LDP parliamentarian Rui Matsukawa, for whom the three major challenges to Japan’s security are China, China, and China
, followed by North Korea and, finally, Russia. Matsukawa also raises the unthinkable
: nuclear deterrence requires Tokyo’s involvement in American decisions on the matter. She also suggests an approach similar to that of South Korea and proposes adapting the Constitution
to allow the deployment of American submarines in Japanese waters
. The reference is to abandoning the third of the three non-nuclear principles, which stipulates that no atomic weapons should be introduced into Japan.
This is not a constitutional provision, but a guideline, as Takaichi herself points out; on the other hand, according to Kitaoka’s assessment, the three principles fall under the precedents
whose continued observance undermines strategic flexibility. We have already noted in the past how Tokyo looks to the German and European debate, and not only to that of Seoul, although it refers to it only obliquely. The reference to the Constitution concerns Article 9, which theoretically prohibits Japan from possessing armed forces and the means to wage war
, limiting its external projection.
The thousand deaths
of Chudo
According to Jio Kamata, Tokyo correspondent for The Diplomat, February 8th marks the end of the long debate on Japanese pacifism
. The discussion has shifted from mere possession of military sufficiency
to the quality and effectiveness of defence capabilities
. This is also pointed out by Yuichiro Tamaki, leader of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) for whom the era of the DPJ has come to an end
, i.e., the era of a centre-left party advocating constitutional pacifism
. The successor to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) which governed from 2009 to 2012 is the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) led by Yoshihiko Noda, who served as prime minister between 2011 and 2012. He launched the Centrist Reform Alliance (known as Chudo) with Komeito.
Although oriented towards more realistic positions on defence and nuclear energy, this alliance’s electoral debut on February 8th was disastrous: from a pre-election parliamentary strength of over 160 seats, it retained just 49, including 28 held by Komeito, thanks to the loyalty of its urban electorate, which carries weight in proportional voting. In 2024, the CDPJ won 11.5 million votes; Komeito, then allied with the LDP, won almost 6 million. Today, the alliance has won just 10.4 million votes. Before resigning, Noda admitted that one plus one does not make two
and that he deserved one thousand deaths
for the electoral defeat.
Among voters aged 18 to 30, Chudo obtained just 4% of the vote. The JDP won 33%, thanks in part to Takaichi’s media savvy and personality, which allowed her to come across as frank
and deliver simple and concise messages
, encapsulated in the election slogan a strong and prosperous Japan
(a clear echo of the Meiji Restoration slogan Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Armed Forces
). It also proved effective to present the election as a direct election
, a choice between Takaichi and Noda (who are personally acquainted). In Japanese political circles, Noda was nicknamed unagi, or river eel
– prized for its meat, but elusive, hunting at the bottom of lakes and rivers. In 2012, faced with internal fragmentation within the DPJ and the Senkaku crisis with China, he decided to call early elections, which Abe won in a landslide. In effect, he performed an honourable seppuku
, the ritual samurai suicide, to put an end to the factionalism
within the Democratic Party and steer it towards the centre.
The Burmese tuna
There is no doubt that Takaichi also gambled on her personal popularity and used populist rhetoric, as seen in the nervous reaction of the markets – especially the bond markets – to her proposed tax cuts, particularly the cut in VAT on food. According to the government, this proposal was put forward to sterilise an issue taken up by the opposition
. The same can be said of immigration. The Asahi Shimbun notes that the issue occupied barely 1% of the prime minister’s campaign rallies. Nor did the rhetoric adopt the Japanese first
tone used by Sanseito, which won 15 seats in the Diet but was forced to ride the Sanae wave
.
According to Stephen Nagy, a Canadian political analyst, commentator for the Japan Times, and researcher at the JIIA, a think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese voters knew who and what they were voting for: realism
in a Japanese foreign policy grappling with a dangerous neighbourhood
. This perception has been heightened by diplomatic tensions with China and Beijing’s muscle-flexing after Takaichi’s statements about a possible Japanese military role in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The immigration issue proved to be something of a non-issue, as public opinion is aware of the need for immigrant labour
, and the government is reviewing some regulations for granting residence and work permits.
In the midst of the election campaign, the Sankei Shimbun, the most right-wing of Japan’s daily newspapers, highlighted the issue of Burmese tuna
: in hundreds of fish processing companies, including tuna, 15 to 20% of the workforce
is now of Burmese, South Vietnamese, or Indonesian origin
, and the workforce from Southeast Asia exceeds that of Chinese or South Korean origin
. According to the Mainichi Shimbun, the same is true for agricultural businesses, where the majority of workers are Vietnamese.
Lotta Comunista, February 2026