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Uneven Energy Development


From the series The world energy battle


The UN Climate Conference COP30 fails to put an end to fossil fuels and sheds light on a cracked international order [Euronews, November 24th].

A snapshot of the global energy economy

A detailed analysis of the global energy situation, as shown in the tables, explains why fossil fuels are still necessary for global economic development.

The sources for our analysis are World Bank data and the latest reports from the International Energy Agency (IEA): the "World Energy Outlook 2025" and "Electricity 2025".

For the comparison between gross domestic products (GDPs) from 2010-2024, we took as a reference the statistics, in constant 2015 dollars and at current exchange rates, published by the World Bank. We made this choice in order to have consistent data for the period. There are often large discrepancies between different statistics, even from the same source. Statistics are a means by which different interest groups struggle to advance their positions: behind the figures lie the historical processes of peasant disintegration, urbanisation, proletarianisation, capital concentration, electrification, motorisation, energy, and the industrialisation of science. In our considerations, we always have in mind the concrete development of capitalism on a global basis.

Numerical metrics like GDP do not capture the complexity of social and political reality. Our analysis in this article is based primarily on overall energy supplies and the electrification of the economy, both in absolute terms and per capita. It is quite clear that there is a difference between an American Ford Explorer SUV, with a 3,000cc engine, and a 1,200cc Citroën C4. According to the International Energy Agency, the average car in the US weighs 1,800 kg, in Germany 1,500 kg, in China 1,300 kg, and in India 1,100 kg. According to Ziggurat Real Estate, the average size of a home in India is 47 square metres, in China 60 square metres, in France 112 square metres, and in the US 200 square metres. These figures reflect different historical trajectories and patterns of consumption. While quantitative comparison is necessary in order to examine the fundamental economic processes of political powers, it must be understood in the context of flesh-and-blood social realities.

Uneven extensive and intensive development

There are two fundamental concepts in our analysis: uneven extensive development across geographical areas, and uneven intensive development through global technological and scientific competition for productivity. China has both.

Between 2010 and 2024, the world population increased by 18%, energy supply by 22%, and electricity generation by 45%. This is the extensive dimension of economic development: the global economy is hungry for energy. Throughout human history, man has relied on this fundamental interchange with nature, extracting and transforming energy. During the Industrial Revolution, the invention of the steam engine allowed large-scale harnessing of energy, unleashing its potential; electricity followed in the next century.

It is the uneven aspect of development (table 1 and table 2) which has disrupted the world order. While overall energy supply increased by 22%, that of the US fell by 1.2% and the European Union by 17%, whereas it rose in China by 63% and India by 75%. China and India are still in the phase of strong extensive expansion, while old industrial regions are increasing energy productivity by reducing absolute and per capita energy consumption. This is one of the objective bases of CO2 emission reduction policies, mainly driven by the EU, whose output per unit of energy used has risen by 48% compared to 40% in the US and 47% in China (table 2). This indicates that China also has an intensive Euro-American type of development.

Emissions are the result of combustion, in which the carbon from fossil fuels is combined with oxygen. Imposing a reduction in emissions means imposing an increase in energy efficiency: this can happen either by improving the efficiency of thermodynamic processes, as in the case of coal-fired power plants transitioning from subcritical to supercritical, or by electrifying the entire economy, ranging from electric cars to heat pumps. Renewable energies contribute in part, under favourable geographical conditions such as the North Sea wind or the Spanish sun.

China is the world's leading producer of electricity, responsible for 33% of global production (table 3), and is at the forefront of electrification: electricity represents 21% of total energy in China, compared to 19% in the European Union and 18% in the US (table 4). In China, between 2010 and 2024, overall productivity measured by GDP per capita grew by 127%, compared to 26% in the US and 20% in the EU. In terms of energy productivity, the European Union is the world leader with $1.1 produced per kWh of energy consumption, ahead of the US at $0.9 and China at $0.4 (table 5).

China, with a population of 1.4 billion, is simultaneously experiencing both extensive and intensive development.

The insatiable hunger for fossil fuels

The World Bank figure for per capita GDP in 2024, measured in constant 2015 dollars, was $66,706 in the United States, $35,022 in Europe, $13,067 in China, and $2,415 in India, with a global average of $11,473. It is to be expected that, in the future, other regions will aim to reach the levels of the US and Europe. This will require extensive development of the first phase of industrialisation, with very high energy consumption, including metallurgy, basic chemicals manufacturing industry, glass and cement production. The failure of COP30 is not only due to the interests of oil-producing countries, but also to the desire of all human beings to have a car, a phone, a washing machine, a home, and the European and American standard of living. This will require metals, chemicals, power plants, glass, and cement: all voracious consumers of coal and natural gas.

Industrial processes vital for the first phase of industrialisation require high temperatures, which can exceed 1,000 degrees. With today's technology, these temperatures can only be achieved through combustion: combining a fuel (carbon or hydrogen) with an oxidiser (oxygen). The combustion of carbon (C), which is found in fossils, with oxygen (O) produces carbon dioxide, CO2. A possible future perspective could be the replacement of carbon with hydrogen (H), producing water (H2O) vapour, but hydrogen technology at a competitive cost is not yet available on an extensive industrial scale. Table 6, showing how energy is distributed among the main economic sectors, is significant: in China 59% of energy goes to industry, compared to 31% in the EU and 23% in the US. Global industry, as it expands outside the Euro-American area, continues to need steel, copper, aluminium, sulphuric acid, glass, cement, and therefore fossil fuels.

Lotta Comunista, December 2025

1.

World US Brazil EU Russia China India Japan
Population (millions)
2010 6,843 309 193 439 143 1,340 1,182 128
2024 8,091 340 217 448 143 1,415 1,441 124
GDP (2015 billion dollars)
2010 73,930 16,340 1,700 12,000 1,250 7,710 1,540 4,220
2024 92,830 22,680 2,030 15,690 1,610 18,490 3,480 4,610
Total energy (TWh)
2010 149,000 26,139 3,389 17,917 8,083 29,722 7,694 5,806
2024 181,722 25,833 4,167 14,861 9,417 48,472 13,444 3,806
Electricity (TWh)
2010 21,519 4,354 516 2,955 1,036 4,236 972 1,164
2024 31,229 4,584 748 2,772 1,188 10,170 2,090 1,009

2. CHANGES 2010-2024 (percentages)

Population 18.2 9.9 12.3 2.1 0.1 5.6 21.9 -3.1
GDP 25.6 38.8 19.4 22.6 28.8 139.8 126.0 9.2
Total energy 22.0 -1.2 23.0 -17.1 16.5 63.1 74.7 -34.4
Electricity 45.1 5.3 45.0 -6.2 14.7 140.1 115.0 -13.3
GDP per capita 6.2 26.3 6.3 20.1 28.6 127.1 85.3 12.8
Total energy p.c. 3.2 -10.1 9.5 -18.7 16.3 54.4 43.3 -32.3
Electricity p.c. 22.9 -4.3 29.2 -8.0 14.6 127.5 76.8 -10.5
Energy productivity 3.0 40.5 -3.0 47.9 10.3 47.1 29.5 66.6

3. WEIGHTS (2024 percentages)

Population 100 4.2 2.7 5.5 1.8 17.5 17.8 1.5
GDP 100 24.4 2.2 16.9 1.7 19.9 3.7 5.0
Total energy 100 14.2 2.3 8.2 5.2 26.7 7.4 2.1
Electricity 100 14.7 2.4 8.9 3.8 32.6 6.7 3.2

4. ELECTRIFICATION (2024 percentages)

Electricity as a share of total energy 17 18 18 19 13 21 16 27

5. ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY

GDP per capita (dollars)
2010 10,804 52,829 8,799 29,157 8,754 5,755 1,303 32,969
2024 11,473 66,706 9,355 35,022 11,259 13,067 2,415 37,177
Total energy per capita (TWh/million inhabitants)
2010 21.77 84.51 17.54 40.81 56.60 22.19 6.51 45.36
2024 22.46 75.90 19.20 33.17 65.05 34.26 9.33 30.69
Electricity per capita (TWh/million inhabitants)
2010 3.14 14.08 2.67 6.73 7.25 3.16 0.82 9.09
2024 3.86 13.48 3.45 6.19 8.31 7.19 1.45 8.14
Energy productivity (dollars/kWh)
2010 0.496 0.625 0.502 0.714 0.155 0.259 0.200 0.727
2024 0.511 0.878 0.497 1.056 0.171 0.381 0.259 1.211

6. WEIGHT OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION (percentages 2024)

Industry 38 23 38 31 36 59 47 42
Transport 28 39 37 29 19 14 17 24
Construction industry 28 31 17 36 33 20 28 32

1 TWh is equivalent to 1 billion kWh.

Source: our analysis of World Bank data. "World Energy Outlook 2025" and "Electricity 2025" (IEA).

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