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European Rearmament Driven by Berlin

From the series European news

We are not at war, but we are no longer at peace either, said Friedrich Merz at the end of September, commenting on Russian drones and fighter jets flying over European territory. The German Chancellor's comment confirms what we have observed: the political currents of imperialist Europeanism are attempting to leverage the wars of the crisis in the world order to accelerate continental rearmament.

German-led rearmament

According to the European Commission's Defence Readiness Roadmap and the September report by the European Defence Agency (EDA), EU countries' military spending has increased from €218 billion in 2021 to €343 billion in 2024, reaching 1.9% of GDP; €392 billion in spending is forecast for 2025. This is only the beginning of European rearmament, because at the NATO summit at the end of June, the allies committed to increasing military spending to 3.5% of their GDP by 2035, and to dedicating another 1.5% to defence-related infrastructure spending. To reach the 3.5% target, the EU would need to spend an additional €288 billion each year, bringing the total to €680 billion. According to other estimates that take into account the likely increase in GDP over the next ten years, EU military spending could reach €800 billion, equal to four-fifths of that of the United States and five times that of Russia in 2024.

On the other hand, many States have limited fiscal headroom and have so far been unable to present a credible path to achieving the NATO target. Germany is not in this situation, and its response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been massive: the Scholz government's Zeitenwende (€100 billion for the armed forces); the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), an air defence project which includes anti-ballistic systems; the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets; and the agreement to install American medium-range missiles, pending the development of a European missile capability, initiated with the ELSA (European Long-Range Strike Approach) programme.

Under the shockwaves of the first moves of the new Trump administration, the newly elected Chancellor Merz eased the debt brake, freeing up German military spending; he also deepened the strategic dialogue on nuclear deterrence with France and the United Kingdom. Between 2021 and 2025, Germany's military spending rose from €47 billion to €86 billion, and it plans to exceed €150 billion in 2029, probably reaching 3.5% of GDP ahead of schedule. This financial effort is estimated to increase German public debt from the current 62.5% to 70-80% of GDP in 2029 [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 27th].

The weight of debt

By comparing military expenditure items in national budgets, the definition of which varies from country to country, the extent of German rearmament can be clarified. France has gone from €39 billion in 2021 to €62 billion in 2025 and is aiming for €80 billion in 2030. However, to reach 3.5% of GDP, it is estimated that around €120 billion will be needed. The other European nuclear power, the United Kingdom, has gone from €53 billion in the 2021-22 fiscal year (using current pound-euro exchange rates) to €76 billion in 2024-25; but reaching 3.5% would also require military spending in the order of €120 billion.

Poland has the fourth largest military budget in Europe. At the Warsaw Security Forum in late September, the Polish defence minister said that his country aims to spend €43.8 billion this year, or 4.7% of its GDP. However, he was honest enough to add that it remains unclear whether this goal will be achieved by the end of the year. Italy, with the fifth largest budget, spends €31 billion on defence, representing 1.5% of its GDP.

Among these five major European military forces, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy have public debt close to or exceeding 100% of their GDP and already spend more on debt interest than on defence.

European rearmament

The lack of resources to match their ambitions is forcing European countries to collaborate. This explains the success of the SAFE (Security Action For Europe) programme, which provides €150 billion in low-interest loans, guaranteed by the EU budget, for joint purchases of military equipment, with a preference for European products. Non-EU countries such as Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Ukraine can also participate in these joint procurements, and negotiations are underway between the European Commission and both the United Kingdom and Canada regarding their participation.

SAFE was approved at the end of May by the European Council and payments are scheduled to begin in early 2026. It was the first pillar of the ReArm Europe plan, which was then incorporated into the March white paper on European defence, Readiness 2030. The other pillars were the exemption of military spending from the constraints of the Maastricht criteria and the approval of the diversion of European funds – such as cohesion funds – to defence. At the European Council summit in June, the heads of state and government then tasked the Commission with the analysis of Readiness 2030. The result was presented on October 16th in the form of a roadmap called Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, according to which, within five years, Europe must be ready, meaning capable of responding to any aggression, and have a defence posture strong enough to credibly deter its adversaries.

To achieve this goal, four flagship projects are to be implemented urgently: the European Drone Defence Initiative, to develop both defensive and offensive drone capabilities; the Eastern Flank Watch, which will integrate anti-drone capabilities with air, land, and maritime defence systems to protect the eastern flank, which is exposed to hybrid attacks from Russia; a European Air Shield; and a European Space Shield. In addition, the Commission calls on States to form coalitions to strengthen military capabilities in nine areas: air and missile defence, strategic enablers (such as radar aircraft, air-to-air refuelling, and intelligence capabilities), military mobility, artillery systems, artificial intelligence and cyber warfare, missiles and ammunition, drones and anti-drones, land combat, and maritime combat. Targets for joint procurement quotas are also set out to stimulate the development of the arms industry on a continental scale.

European coordination

The plan has attracted criticism from the most pro-European commentators. Compared to the draft presented by the Commission at the informal summit of heads of State and government in Copenhagen on October 1st, the final version reduces the role of European institutions, emphasising instead that of member States and NATO. It could be argued that full federal centralisation of defence can only proceed on a de facto basis; it will never be purely Community-based or purely intergovernmental, but a combination of the two approaches. It is no coincidence that the roadmap presented by the Commission is, rather than a centralised plan, a collection of various national initiatives, or initiatives by groups of member States and their respective arms industries.

The broad outlines correspond to those of the document Economic Principles for European Rearmament, written in August by the Franco-German Council of Economic Experts at the request of the two governments, and suggest a strategic alignment with the Franco-German axis. The idea of a drone wall to strengthen surveillance on NATO's eastern flank was already supported in 2024 by Poland, the Baltic countries, and the Nordic countries. As for the ESSI, launched by the German government in August 2022, this project has now also been integrated into the EU's roadmap.

The role of the European institutions is mainly focused on coordination. The European Defence Agency will act as secretariat and the EU Military Staff will conduct an annual assessment of the implementation of the rearmament plan. However, the question of financing remains open. SAFE, which is only a temporary instrument, will not be sufficient, while the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) currently has only €1.5 billion at its disposal.

Debt and counter-insurance

Since 2022, Berlin has been the frontrunner in rearming; now it remains to be seen how much this will be anchored to the European rearmament and what form the counter-insurance against German military strength will take. The prospect of Germany spending almost twice as much on the military as France obviously fuels old fears. In an interview with the FAZ on October 21st, Emmanuel Macron saw Merz's support for the idea of creating reparation loans, guaranteed for the time being by national budgets, as proof that Germany is ready to take on joint debt for Ukraine. The French president concluded the interview by stating that Paris's nuclear umbrella has had a European dimension since 1962 and that he will deliver a policy speech on nuclear doctrine in early 2026. These statements fuel speculation that Macron may be aiming for an agreement that includes a swap of the Europeanisation of France's nuclear umbrella for a common European military budget similarly financed by a common debt.

Lotta Comunista, October 2025
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