The Gaza Declaration
, signed on October 13th in Sharm El-Sheikh in the presence of Donald Trump and around twenty heads of State and government from European and Islamic countries, established a fragile truce in a conflict that had gradually spread throughout the region, from Lebanon to Syria, Iran, and, finally, Qatar, with the Israeli raid on September 9th.
The attack on Qatar represented a turning point in the war, calling into question Washington's security guarantees to its Arab regional allies. Just a week later, Riyadh announced a military pact with Pakistan, which implies that Islamabad will provide its nuclear umbrella to the Saudi monarchy.
Euro-Islamic coalition for Trump's plan
Since last spring, Saudi Arabia, together with France, has been promoting a diplomatic initiative for the recognition of a Palestinian State at the UN, with the aim of providing a political framework for the truce in Gaza, linked to a relaunch of the two-State solution. Both London and Paris, members of the UN Security Council, have recognised the Palestinian State. On the sidelines of the General Assembly in New York, a coalition of Arab and Islamic countries, including Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan, endorsed the twenty point Trump's Gaza peace plan
. The American president's double visit to Israel and Egypt, carried out in the hyperbolic and spectacular manner dear to Trump, sealed the deal.
According to Le Monde, in the shadow of Trump's spectacle—who did not pass up on the opportunity to remind everyone of the US's military power in the region, evoking its participation in the clash between Tel Aviv and Tehran in June—Europeans, Arabs, Turks, and other participants engaged in intense discussions aimed at filling the gaps
in Washington's plan, going beyond the American president's search for immediate results
. Paris has made it known that it is working in a complementary, not competitive, manner. It is said to have succeeded in bringing PNA President Mahmoud Abbas back into the family photo
in Sharm El-Sheikh, despite Trump's reluctance. It is also said to be working with London on a draft resolution that would give the plan for Gaza a UN framework, predicated on an abstention rather than opposition from Washington at the Security Council.
Before his visit to the region, Trump received Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, forcing the Israeli prime minister to make an official apology to Qatar by telephone, directly from the Oval Office, with photos to prove it. At the same time, the American president signed an executive order extending formal US security guarantees to Doha. According to former Israeli ambassador to Paris Eli Barnavi, Trump used Tel Aviv's military gamble in Qatar to reaffirm Israel's condition of vassalage
to the US, and thus as leverage to obtain the commitment of Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt to exert pressure on Hamas to accept the truce.
According to Bruno Tertrais, a leading expert on deterrence, uncertainty remains about the true potential of the American plan. It is premised on both a weakened Hamas, which wants to ensure its survival
, and on signs of fatigue from Israel, which was struggling to mobilise reservists. Added to this is the fact that Israeli military authorities crossed a red line
with the attack on Qatar, certainly impressing regional States, but also irritating the occupant of the White House. Tertrais doubts that the final outcome will produce a fully sovereign
Palestinian State. Not only would this require a different political majority in Israel, but it cannot be ruled out that Tel Aviv may work to create one in Gaza alone
, excluding the West Bank.
Bazaar
tradition and art of the deal
According to Paul Webster Hare, a former senior Foreign Office official, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have conducted astute transactional diplomacy
. This led Trump to accept the Saudi vision of a new Middle East
, which limits the extent of Israeli interests in the region
and opposes further Jewish annexations in the West Bank, obtaining a broad commitment to the two-State solution, which was removed from the Abraham Accords in 2020. In those agreements, the Palestinian question was downgraded to a simple real estate issue
. In particular, the petro-monarchies leveraged the interests of the Trump clan and its private cabinet
, which are closely linked to Saudi and Qatari capital
, insisting that the US president take personal responsibility for the key elements of the agreement over the next three years
.
In essence, according to the former diplomat, the Saudis and Qataris have ensured that Trump is indebted to them for numerous favours
. This makes an extension of the Abraham Accords without the recognition of a possible Palestinian State unlikely
. It should be remembered that the Arab tradition of the bazaar is no different from the art of the deal: low ball deals are always possible, without losing face.
Turkish-Qatari guarantees for Hamas
The Gulf's financial muscle is combined with the role of Ankara and Cairo as guarantors—not only towards Hamas. According to Haaretz, Turkey and Qatar, who are committed to consolidating their influence in Syria, may induce the Sunni Syrian regime, led by the redeemed former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa, to sign security agreements
with Israel. According to the Israeli newspaper, Trump's peace plan does not envisage the dissolution of Hamas
, but the dismantling
of its military arsenal, leaving the door open to a political role
for the Islamist group in the Strip. For the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, which is close to the monarchy, this is a return to its original roots as a religious force committed to providing social assistance. With American backing, Hamas is once again performing the function of law-enforcement in the enclave, notably by controlling the delivery of humanitarian aid to the population. At the same time, it is also restoring its power of deterrence against local clans and militias which, since last spring, have been acting with Israeli support. It is worth remembering that relations between Palestinian factions, even within the PLO, were defined on the basis of military strength, as well as relations with the various regional powers.
According to British sources, a delay in disarming Hamas may come from the Iraqi experience of 2003: Washington's decision to dissolve the armed forces and the Baath Party opened the door to Sunni insurgency and civil war. Hamas does not rule out handing over its weapons to a Palestinian force
, which suggests that it is willing to negotiate a relative disarmament in exchange for entry into the PLO as a component of Palestinian nationalism. The role of British figures in drafting Trump's plan, such as Tony Blair and Jonathan Powell, chief of staff to the former prime minister and national security adviser to Keir Starmer, may introduce London's experience in the peace agreements with the IRA in Northern Ireland.
Ankara, as it has already done so in Syria, can bring a pacified model of political Islam to the table, but also its agreement with the Kurdish separatism of the PKK. Both Doha and Ankara have, Haaretz points out, powerful leverages
: on the one hand, Qatari financial subsidies and, on the other, the presence of companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange
owned by Hamas leaders with Turkish passports
. Even Cairo, despite its hostility towards the role of the Muslim Brotherhood, has a long history of cooperation with Hamas as part of its anti-jihadist operations in the Sinai. Moreover, the Hamas-Israel contention allows it to maintain a diplomatic role between the US, the Gulf capitals, and those of Europe.
The Saudi message of Pakistani deterrence
Historically, the Palestinian question has been as much an element of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic mobilisation as it has been a card played by regional and great powers to further their interests. For Ayham Al-Aswad, today it is becoming an element in redefining the balance of power, whose centre of gravity
is shifting towards the Gulf States, Turkey, and, perhaps, Egypt
, if it can overcome its economic crises and strengthen internal stability
. Iran's plans have been scaled back and Israel, despite its military superiority
, cannot impose full control
due to demographic and political limitations
, while Washington remains the driving force
capable of shaping the region.
The INSS in Tel Aviv, a think tank linked to the army's intelligence services, sees Saudi Arabia's timing
in presenting the defence pact with Pakistan a week after the attack on Doha as a political statement
—primarily to Washington, but implicitly also to Tel Aviv, with the entry of a nuclear actor willing to extend its defensive umbrella to Arab States
. At the very least, Israel must signal its non-hostility to the Gulf States, as well as to Islamabad, including through its operational military conduct
. Riyadh, in any case, is strengthening its negotiating position
with Washington: by negotiating a formal military security agreement regarding assistance for its civil nuclear programme, but also by making any expansion of the Abraham Accords
conditional on a commitment to a Palestinian State.
As reported by the Financial Times, Saudi Arabia's immediate goal is to obtain a Qatar plus
agreement from Washington: formal security commitments, such as those offered to Doha, but broader in scope. This may explain the absence from the Egyptian summit of both the Saudi crown prince and the emir-president of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. It may also reveal a desire to maintain a degree of distance from Hamas.
The realpolitik
of Indonesian multi-alignment
At the UN General Assembly, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto declared his willingness to recognise Israel in exchange for the recognition of a Palestinian State, as well as suggesting the possible deployment of 20,000 troops for the international stabilisation force in Gaza. For The Jakarta Post, this is an exercise in realpolitik by the presidency, which strengthens the international profile of the archipelago's multi-alignment, in conjunction with the Gulf capitals, but also with the US, Europe, and Turkey. Both the Turkish and Indonesian press interpret support for Trump's plan as an attempt by their governments to offer their political umbrella
to the American project, rather than a force representing
Palestinian interests.
To a certain extent, this is the trustee
formula evoked in 2023 by Ankara's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Turkey, alone or in combination with Arab Islamic countries, would become the trustee
of the Palestinians, and the US, along with other Western countries, would be the trustee of Israel. For Media Indonesia, the country's second largest media group, a Palestinian State could be useful to US security interests
in preventing Arab and regional countries from moving closer to Beijing. It would also promote Tel Aviv's long-standing dream of integration in Middle East
. That is, of course, if the throng of actors does not once again, as has often happened in the region, end up setting its wheel of fire in motion.