From the series European news
In our analysis, we have considered how the most likely path to EU rearmament could be through the creation of a European pillar within NATO. Rather than a common deterrence signifying the supreme affirmation of the sovereignty of a continental State, it would probably involve the sharing of State sovereignty at European level, in the form of nuclear sharing. This assessment is confirmed by a significant French source.
Nuclear backing
In an October report by the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), Emmanuelle Maître and Etienne Marcuz elaborate on the concrete prospects for cooperation between States to achieve European-scale deterrence. Together with the British system, they write, French nuclear deterrence forms the foundation of a true European pillar within NATO
. The creation of a Franco-British Nuclear Steering Group with the Northwood Declaration of July 10th signals a change in France's conception of nuclear deterrence
, though without calling into question its autonomy or sovereignty. The political decision to open discussions on the role of French nuclear deterrence within the European defence architecture creates opportunities for cooperation [...] that could benefit not only European allies but also France itself
.
Inspired by cooperation between NATO member States on nuclear missions, France has recognised that the concept of épaulement (backing
) increases the credibility of deterrence
. All European NATO countries, and especially those involved in nuclear sharing (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands), also provide non-nuclear capabilities in support of missions: escort fighters, tanker aircraft, radar aircraft, and the suppression of enemy air defences. Similarly, other European countries could provide support to the French Strategic Air Forces. The authors recall how President Emmanuel Macron, in a speech at the École de Guerre in 2020, invited European partners to observe French Strategic Air Force exercises, and how an Italian tanker aircraft directly participated in them.
France's readiness to engage was then formalised in the July 2025 issue of the Revue nationale stratégique. The credibility of the European dimension of deterrence can be further strengthened, the authors write, by allowing the French Strategic Armed Forces to be deployed at air bases in allied territories. This is reminiscent of the proposal by Jean-Dominique Merchet of the French newspaper L'Opinion, which we reported in our newspaper [The Crisis in the World Order Starts Up the Deterrence Race Again
, Internationalism, May 2024]. According to FRS experts, such backing
could also strengthen the naval component of French and British deterrence. European partners could provide submarines, ships, and maritime patrol aircraft to detect and, if necessary, counter threats to Paris and London's ballistic missile submarines. These solutions could be implemented quickly and at almost no cost
.
Armed lessons
Regarding the future potential for cooperation on European deterrence, the FRS document seeks to take into account the lessons of recent armed conflicts. In the war in Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated the effectiveness of its arsenal of deep-strike missiles, which are mostly dual-capable
, i.e., capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. On the other hand, Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory — including the one against the Engels air base, which houses Russian strategic bombers, and the one against the Armavir radar station, also linked to Russian deterrence — did not provoke a nuclear response. This highlights the vulnerability of such systems to sub-threshold
attacks.
As for the recent twelve-day war
between Israel and Iran, it demonstrated how a regional missile defence system can counter massive ballistic attacks, while deep strikes [...] gave the Israeli air force virtually full freedom of action over enemy territory
. Recent technological advances in long-range precision weapons and AI-assisted terminal guidance
now allow conventional weapons to engage a wide range of targets that once required tactical nuclear weapons
. This highlights the strategic importance of expanding European cooperation on high-precision long-range conventional weapons
, along the lines of the current European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) project, which would function as a deterrent in itself and further strengthen French and British nuclear deterrence.
Eye and shield
In addition, the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), launched by Germany in 2022, could form the basis for a future sovereign shield against conventional strategic strikes
. It is no coincidence that these are the three elements of the strategic concept
on which Macron had called for a round table
in 2024: missile defence, long-range weapons, and nuclear devices [Berlin and Paris Negotiate on European Deterrence
, Internationalism, June 2024].
Contributing to the strategic concept
of European deterrence, therefore, does not necessarily mean only participating in or co-financing a French or British nuclear programme; it can include backing
French strategic forces, protecting French and British ballistic missile submarines, developing long-range conventional missiles — with dual capability or not — or contributing to a missile shield. All these elements must be integrated with each other, the FRS report emphasises: The operational credibility of a European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, combining both conventional and nuclear capabilities, would require deeper integration and the establishment of sovereign command, control, and intelligence structures, which are currently provided primarily by the United States
. Allowing the shared use of satellites belonging to various European nations would strengthen the ability to monitor areas of strategic interest. The Odin's Eye programme, a European early missile warning system involving thirteen nations, will provide a space-based capability for detecting ballistic, hypersonic, and anti-satellite threats
.
Is European deterrence therefore within reach? The reality is not so simple. Germany's massive rearmament is beginning to shake the European balance and create tensions. In 2029, Berlin will invest €153 billion in defence, while Paris hopes to reach €80 billion in 2030. Added to this is competition for procurements between the big defence industry groups. To mention just one example among many, OHB, the Bremen-based group at the head of the European consortium building Odin's Eye, has criticised the attempt formalised on October 23rd by Airbus, Leonardo, and Thales to merge their activities to form a major European player in satellite construction.
Tensions in Berlin
Meanwhile Rheinmetall, the German giant in the production of cannons and tanks, hopes to open the door to the space sector by securing a contract worth at least €3 billion for a constellation of radar satellites for the German armed forces, thanks to its 60% stake in the joint venture with Finnish satellite manufacturer Iceye [Handelsblatt, October 24th]. On the other hand, Le Monde reports the concerns
of the French space industry about German ambitions, which are supported by a revolution
in Berlin's military funding. On September 25th, the German defence minister announced that Germany will spend €35 billion by 2030, an average of €7 billion per year, on launchers and satellites. This figure is comparable to the current annual budget of the entire European Space Agency. Paris, politically and financially weakened, does not have the capacity to follow
; at the moment, power is in the hands of the biggest customer
[October 23rd]. These are clashes which will mark the coming years of European rearmament.
Lotta Comunista, November 2025