The Internationalism

The joint attack by Washington and Tel Aviv on Iran, which began on February 28th and was dubbed Operation Epic Fury by the Americans, has been described as an epic gamble by the vast majority of international commentators, starting with the decision to eliminate Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader and a key figure for Shia Islam in Iran and beyond.

While Tel Aviv is said to be intent on degrading Iran's military capabilities, and thus weakening it in the long term, what motivates US intervention, even according to Israeli sources, is regime change: something akin to the script followed in Venezuela at the start of the year. However, according to Le Monde, Washington's approach amounts to an exercise in strategic improvisation, owing both to the unilateral decision to attack and to the contradictory series of justifications put forward to launch the military campaign, conducted without any coordination with allies or preparing domestic public opinion — presumably believing that a positive outcome could be achieved within a few days.

"Decapitation of the regime" and the Iraqi precedent

Jon Alterman is the Middle East director at CSIS, a US bipartisan think tank, whose members have included both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. In his view, decapitating the regime is regarded by Washington strategists as a tidy and rapid way to 'solve' a problem that for nearly half a century has resisted solution. However, the US track record in advancing ambitious political goals [...] through a limited military effort is poor, given that the most common outcome of external military intervention is instability or civil war. In 2003, the George W. Bush administration became convinced that by removing the dirty dozen — the leaders of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime — from power, the people would take their destiny into their own hands; the bulk of planning efforts were devoted to military action, while political planning was little more than an afterthought.

For Alterman, the main beneficiary in the region of the fall of the Baghdad regime was Iran, which also profited from American support for the creation of an ethno-confessional political system in its neighbouring, predominantly Shia country, from which a civil war sprang. Decapitation theories suffer from a simplistic view of systems of government: even in an authoritarian system, leaders do not rule by themselves, but alongside a plurality of centres of power and elaborate patronage networks. These systems are attuned to local circumstances and operate in harmony with them.

State centralisation and the "mantle of the prophet"

According to the Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian, both the 1979 revolution and the long conflict with Iraq [1980-88] have, on the one hand, strengthened the State-capitalist structure created by the Pahlavi monarchy, and on the other, consolidated the grip of the administrative apparatus and of Iranian national identity itself, even in the suburbs, traditionally resistant to central control [A History of Modern Iran, 2018]. For Abrahamian, the history of Iran since the late 19th century can be read as a long process of building a centralised State, in order to escape the status of a buffer State caught between Russian and British spheres of influence, and to counter both outside interference and the separatist attempts of some of its minorities, which often received foreign support. For the historian, who is hostile to Iran's clerical-military regime, the paradoxical outcome of the 1979 revolution — the result of an accelerated process of modernisation and urbanisation — is that it was the clerical bourgeoisie, aided by the political skill and charisma of Ruhollah Khomeini, who became the architect of State centralisation. The republican structures, which the secularising nationalist faction would have preferred to see more closely modelled on those of the Fifth French Republic, were instead framed in religious terms.

The wilayat al faqih, or guardianship of the jurist, from which the office of Supreme Leader derives — held first by Khomeini, then by Khamenei, and now by the latter's son Mojtaba — was devised by Khomeini to ensure an Islamic government, but finds its roots in Persian political-theological debates of the 18th century. Historically, the Shia denomination has always contested the legitimacy of the Sunni caliphates in leading the Islamic community, instead staking a claim to the bloodline of Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law, and his successors. Essentially, the twelve Imams, the last of whom has been in occultation since 941 CE, awaiting the end of time, are said to represent Muhammad's deputies on earth. They are therefore regarded as the custodians of the mantle of the prophet and the house of Muhammad.

The theory of guardianship, developed by Khomeini, makes the Supreme Leader the vice-regent of the twelfth Imam. This interpretation is not accepted by other branches of Shi'ism, such as the Twelver Shi'ites in Iraq. However, Khamenei was recognised as a sayyed, literally lord or master, a term denoting direct descendance from Muhammad via his daughter Fatima, with the religious credentials of a marja al taqlid (source of emulation). In 1981, Khamenei was elected Iran's first president with over 16 million votes, and in 1989, he was designated as Khomeini's successor, but without the title of imam, which in the Shia context takes on sacred connotations which Khomeini's supporters reserve solely for him. Khamenei's appointment as Supreme Leader, along with subsequent constitutional amendments, emphasises his ability to govern rather than his religious credentials, and remains subject to annual review by the Assembly of Experts regarding his ability to perform his duties.

Plurality of centres of power

According to Simon Gass, former British ambassador to Tehran and one of the negotiators of the JCPOA (the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, which Trump withdrew from in 2018), there are essentially three real centres of power in Iran.

The first is the Office of the Supreme Leader, which appoints the commanders of the armed forces and the heads of the judiciary, oversees large sections of government and parastatal organisations and has access to enormous wealth, particularly via the bonyads (foundations). The second is the Revolutionary Guard: created as a political-religious militia during the revolution, it has become not only a military force but also a formidable economic force. Finally, the civil government, responsible for the country's administration, is a relatively weaker centre.

The Iranian system is built on the concept of challenge and opposition to the US, and the regime has a long history of resistance and sacrifice dating back to the conflict of the 1980s, the cathartic experience that defined its worldview. For Gass, the sense of being prepared to suffer to protect the Iranian State is deeply rooted. US leadership has expressed surprise at Iran's willingness to escalate the conflict, striking the territories of neighbouring countries hosting US bases and threatening commercial traffic in the Gulf. But the threat to the energy artery is the trump card of Iran's asymmetric response, with the potential to trigger a global shock that will determine the duration of the conflict. For Tehran, there is no need to physically block the strait; it is enough to be in a position to deter shipowners from wanting to put their oil tankers at risk.

Petro-monarchies and "American strategic confusion"

Essentially, Iran's war aims, according to Gass, are the survival of the regime and being able to claim they have not been brought to their knees by American power. Furthermore, the conflict has sparked deep anger in the US-allied Gulf States: while Iran is accused of having attacked without provocation, resentment towards Israel is far greater, while Washington stands accused of failing to rein in the aggressiveness of the Israeli State, which has attacked several countries in the region, including Qatar last September. The petro-monarchies are led to wonder what value the American security guarantees hold if Washington proves incapable of honouring them. The same reasoning will also apply to the advisability of joining the Abraham Accords, which seek to normalise relations with Israel and have already been stalled by the war in Gaza.

According to Vali Nasr, a former US State Department official, Iran is prepared to wage an asymmetric war against the global economy long enough to persuade Washington to see a political solution as the only option. To this end, it is seeking to exploit the mounting pressure in this direction not only in the Gulf, but also in Asia, Africa, and even in Europe. According to Asharq al-Awsat, a Saudi newspaper close to the monarchy, Washington's strategic confusion concerns not only the objectives of the war but also coordination with Israel: Tel Aviv may believe it has been given a blank cheque to extend the conflict. Furthermore, the religious rhetoric employed by both Israel and the United States represents a strategic mindset that should concern everyone: a narrative of religious war, whether implicit or explicit, risks transforming a geopolitical conflict into something far more dangerous. The killing of the Iranian spiritual leader may have let the djinn [genie] out of the bottle, and the question is whether anyone is still able to control the course of the conflict.

According to Al Majalla, a magazine published by the Al Arabiya media group, the Gulf is now [held] hostage by a complex web of interconnected threats, with Hormuz being used as a geopolitical lever by parties to the conflict to impose their terms. Foreign bases in the region, once a protective umbrella, have become magnets for tension, exposing the Gulf's infrastructure to direct risks. Today, exclusive dependence on external security guarantees is no longer sufficient to protect sovereign interests.

On September 17th, a week after the Israeli attack on Qatar, Saudi Arabia announced its formal military alliance with Pakistan, including its nuclear capabilities. According to Le Monde, discussions are underway to extend this alliance to Turkey, in an agreement that would combine Saudi financial strength, Pakistani ballistic know-how, and the capabilities of the Turkish defence industry. According to official Pakistani sources, the meetings in Jeddah in early March between political and military leaders from Riyadh and Islamabad served as a signal to induce Tehran to adopt a stance of moderation towards the monarchy. Pakistan and Turkey are aiming for a negotiated solution to the conflict with Tehran. Meanwhile, the major Turkish and Pakistani newspapers are talking about regional security agreements which could counterbalance Washington's strategic oscillations.