Here it is at last, the Trump Doctrine, laid out in black and white in the NSS, the National Security Strategy. Some comment that it is more of an ideological manifesto than a real action plan, a patchwork of positions from the various political currents that move in and around the White House. That may be true; sometimes these documents amount to little and end up forgotten. Yet, the fact remains that the NSS pieces together fragments of pre-existing American policies, and is therefore not simply dominated by Trump's ideological fervour. Moreover, it describes things that the United States is already doing. It asserts American primacy in Central and South America – and Washington is increasing military pressure on Venezuela. Russia is no longer considered an enemy – and Trump is dealing with Putin over the heads of the Europeans. There is an offer of coexistence with China – and we saw the thawing of relations between Trump and Xi in South Korea. And so forth.
This is also why the most hard-hitting part of the document, a declared hostility towards the EU, is taken extremely seriously in Europe. It is said to be a declaration of political war. A call for a transatlantic divorce. The beginning of the end for the Atlantic Alliance. We shall see; what is certain is that the Atlantic crisis is at a turning point, and Europe has to react. The European Council has allocated €90 billion to Ukraine, and to that end it has launched more Eurobonds. Through a pragmatic approach, majority voting has effectively been introduced in practice. Arm Ukraine to arm Europe
seemed like a catchy slogan, but rearmament is now mobilising billions.
Europe risks being caught between America and China, they say. If it does not want to be the anvil, it must become the hammer. A trick of memory: this was the image evoked by Bernhard von Bülow at the end of 1899 to justify German naval rearmament. In the 20th century of Weltpolitik – world politics – Germany could be either the hammer or the anvil, at the mercy of other powers. A large fleet capable of competing with the British Royal Navy would make the difference. We know how that ended.
War is back at the centre of political struggle. Can we prevent history from repeating itself? We need proletarian opposition to European imperialism and its rearmament, but only the revolutionary path can truly achieve this. The internationalist battle must be organised. It must be done now, or the anvil will be the workers and young people, once again facing conscription talks. A European Leninism must be built.
The end of the year is when the major Italian research and analysis institutes take stock: as far as the world of work is concerned, the emerging picture is far from clear-cut.
The backdrop is demographic dynamics: Italy ended 2024 with fewer than 370,000 births, and 2025 is set to mark another record low, with around 350,000 expected. Sixty years ago, in 1965, there were more than a million births, three times the level of today.
Demographics and the world of work
Overall economic activity has seen increases below 1%: 0.7% in 2024 and an estimated 0.5% in 2025, while industrial production has been declining since 2023. Contractual wages are clearly in decline: according to ISTAT, in September 2025 they were still 8.8% below January 2021 levels.
These figures need be taken into account when considering the much-publicised historic high in employment of 24.2 million reached in October. As Francesco Giavazzi notes [Corriere della Sera, December 11th], an increase in employment combined with stagnant GDP indicates more low-productivity jobs. Furthermore, in analysing the age groups, it can be seen that the entire increase in employment is attributable to the over 50s, due to the combined effect of the labour-market reform of the Fornero Law and reduced options for early retirement. The one-year increase of 483,000 in employment for this age group compares with decreases of 100,000 in the 35-49 age group, 51,000 in the 25-34 age group, and 108,000 in the 15-24 age group [Il Sole 24 Ore, December 3rd].
Combined with the demographic decline, all this does not bode well for employment in the coming years. According to a report from the Italian Centre for Social Investment Studies (Censis), 84% of the increase in the two-year period 2023-24 was attributable to people over the age of 50.
European restructuring
On the employment front we must also consider the ongoing crises, some of which are significant. One of these is the crisis at the former Ilva steel works in Italy, which has required workers to respond decisively, in a struggle which is nonetheless defensive and with as yet uncertain prospects.
Restructuring is in fact an ongoing process in all the old metropolises, under pressure from new emerging powers. Staying with the steel industry, we can point to the case of ThyssenKrupp in Germany, where the metalworkers' union IG Metall has had to sign an agreement that includes a reduction in production, the closure of plants, the elimination of 5,300 jobs (part of a plan to cut 11,000 jobs by 2030), and wage cuts for employees. In the automotive sector, discussions are set to reopen within the Volkswagen group, where four sites are operating below capacity. This comes just one year after the Christmas compromise
was reached on a reduction of 35,000 jobs by 2030. From the corporate perspective, this may not be sufficient.
Market contradictions
The Italian labour market, meanwhile, continues to display contradictions. What emerges from the periodic survey of the Excelsior project on companies' employment programmes, collected by the Italian Chamber of Commerce, is that projected demand for labour for the period December 2025 to February 2026 shows a decline, reflecting the economic situation. Nevertheless, companies continue to report significant difficulties in finding staff, stating that they have problems finding 46% of the profiles required
. As a result, the use of foreign workers is still increasing: they account for 22.7% of companies' projected demand, compared to 19.1% a year ago, an increase of 3.5 points.
This is now an established reality that everyone will have to accept. According to the statistical dossier on immigration, IDOS 2025, the increase in employment in 2024, which the sovereignist government touts as its crowning achievement, has seen Italian workers grow by 1% and foreign workers by 5.9%. The immigrant component of the Italian labour force is expanding and is set to expand further.
Foreigners and immigrants
Furthermore, in order to assess the real weight of the immigrant component, a more complete calculation must be made. Usually, only foreign
workers, i.e., those without Italian citizenship, are included. However, every year, a proportion of immigrants who have been resident for a sufficient length of time obtain citizenship. In the five years between 2020 and 2024, there were a total of 900,000 new Italian citizens, a figure that has been growing over the last three years, with more than 200,000 each year. Some of these people enter the world of work, swelling the ranks of workers with an immigrant background. According to the Leone Moressa Foundation, 1.2 million foreign-born
workers should be added to the 2.5 million foreign workers (10.5% of the labour force), bringing the total number of immigrant workers to 3.7 million, or 15.2% [XV Rapporto annuale sull’economia dell’immigrazione, 2025].
Another calculation is provided by the INPS – the Italian institute for social security – in its July 2025 report, which considers workers insured according to country of birth
. Among private sector wage earners – including agricultural workers, domestic workers, and carers, but excluding the public sector – the share rises to 19.5%. In short, one in five of such workers comes from an immigrant background.
Given its growing importance, this segment of the working class deserves closer study. An ISTAT report in February 2023 focuses on foreigners and naturalised citizens in the Italian labour market
. From this, we can glean some characteristics of naturalised citizens, linked to their longer stay in Italy. Naturalised citizens have higher educational qualifications than foreigners
: 60% have a diploma or degree, compared to 46%. They skilled professions in 21% of cases, compared to 8%, although more are qualified for these professions, given their education. They obviously have a better knowledge of the Italian language: eight out of ten are at an advanced level, compared to an average of five out of ten for foreigners
. And with a better knowledge of the language, ISTAT notes, the chances of finding work also increase.
This factor is also relevant for technical jobs, where the number of immigrants can be expected to increase, given the demand for workers. This form of social mobility is set to shape the future of the working class.
Bourgeois imbalances, internationalist perspective
From all this, we can also infer how heavily the dysfunctions of parliamentary politics weigh against the very needs of the bourgeoisie itself. Migration flows are proof of this. Already insufficient to meet labour requirements, they have proved even less effective in practice: of the quota of work permits for foreign workers allocated for 2023, only about 9% resulted in actual employment contracts [IDOS, 2025]. Bureaucratic obstacles are compounded by xenophobic and racist campaigns.
For the ruling class, immigrants are labour-power to be incorporated into the production process to fill labour shortages. However, even with this need, there are signs of the imbalance of an ageing and fearful society.
For Leninists, on the other hand, immigrants are a component of the wage-earning class to be organised. It is the same for trade unions: foreigners make up 15% of active workers registered with confederal trade unions, but they account for a third of workers in construction and 25-30% in transport, logistics, agriculture, and the food industry. These percentages increase when new Italian citizens are also taken into account.
The scope for unionisation is increasingly broad. But our commitment as internationalists lies above all in the perspective of the political unity of the working class.