Arrigo Cervetto (31 October 1954)
After Mossadegh* and as early as January, the Zahedi government moves towards a compromise with imperialism. The resumption of oil production is the sign of this. Permission is granted thanks to the intervention of eight companies (Standard, Shell, Anglo-Iranian, and others) with a capital of 25–50 million dollars.
Mossadegh’s position had become untenable. In fact, the world’s oil production had risen from 524 million tons in 1950 to 654 in 1953. Hence, the Iranian production of 10–40 million tons had become insignificant (indeed, its temporary halt in production had indirectly increased the Syrian production controlled by the United States). In spite of the various theorists that pontificated about Iran, this provides us with another example of how the bourgeois revolution in the imperialist phase undoubtedly follows the law of the uneven development of capitalism in the world, even though it is now completely determined by the power relations of unitary imperialism.
The colonial problem is therefore more complex than it once was and, since it takes on various aspects in the different countries, requires differentiated tactics.
These tactics are now the nerve centre of the anti-imperialist struggle: if there are no tactics, there is no struggle. The mechanistic theorisers should know this, and a number of groups (such as Le Libertaire, for example) that sometimes, in their propagandistic fervour, incline towards subjectivism, should often bear this in mind.
We have had an example of the diversity resulting from the development of the colonial problem in these last ten–fifteen years. In Southern Asia (India, Burma, Indonesia, etc.), the national bourgeoisie, favoured by the letting-up of imperialist pressure during the war, has conquered positions (both in the anti-Japanese struggle and in direct or indirect collaborationism, as in the case of Nehru and the Congress Party), strengthened its own economic control, developed its own industry (this is again India’s case), often exploited the workers’ help, provided by Stalinism, faithful to the Allies’ policy, and, finally, obtained independence, even though relative, by exploiting the post-war crisis. In essence, it has taken power even without its own revolution.
In the Middle East and Africa, where power relations during the war were unfavourable, the national bourgeoisies’ attempts occur late, fail or reach a compromise. Nevertheless, the national bourgeoisies have advanced everywhere.
Iran now finds itself at the centre of the inter-imperialist struggles to capture the markets. Since it needs capital, France is investing 5 billion francs and Germany 60 million dollars, while Japan is financing the construction of six sugar refineries. We therefore find these three rival countries alongside the US and the UK.
This inter-imperialist competition gives the Iranian bourgeoisie a breathing space, and the negotiations with the eight companies drag on: the consortium of foreign oil companies asks for a thirty-year concession, while Teheran wants to concede it for a shorter time. The agreement is signed on 5 August: Iran will receive half of the export revenue, and in the first three years the state-owned National Iranian Oil Co. will receive 150 million pounds.
In essence, the agreement helps resolve Iran’s serious economic crisis, and there is already talk of a five-year plan for the construction of dams and the cultivation of new areas. Funding over the five years will be provided by the 500 million dollars resulting from the oil concessions.
Report to the 4th GAAP National Conference, Bologna, 31 October - 1 November 1954; unpublished
Source: Unitary Imperialism, Volume I, pp. 154-155.
* As the Iranian prime minister in 1951, he had the Oil Nationalisation Act approved by parliament and liquidated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. A military coup led by General Zahedi ousted Mossadegh in August 1953. Anglo-Iranian received compensation and could continue its exploitation of Iran’s oil resources.