When, in 2015, Moscow initiated direct military intervention in Syria against ISIS bases and in support of Bashar al-As-sad's regime, this was seen as a signal of Russia’s resurgence as a great power: it was its first deployment in a war zone outside the territory of the former USSR since its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989.
Singers of the resurrection
Sergey Karaganov, honorary chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, and currently one of the most fervent supporters of the war in Ukraine, wrote that this action “has strengthened Russia’s international position”, to the point of making 2015 “one of the most successful years in the history of Russian foreign policy” [Russia in Global Affairs, February 23, 2016).
Dmitri Trenin, then head of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, which was later closed by the authorities in 2022, revisited this in his 2018 book What is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Moscow, he wrote, has returned to the global stage after a 25-year absence, demonstrating “a combination of realism, strong political will, knowledge of the area, diplomatic capabilities, and a capable army”. In the Eurasian neighbourhood, it is seeking to build “a system of relations no longer domi nated by the USA nor under the shadow of a single ‘local’ hegemon, China”; it is particularly this latter point that should not be overlooked. However, he also recognised the limits in this regard imposed by “insufficient economic and financial resources”.
A Henry Kissinger thesis
This thesis, disseminated in Russia, and echoed in the West, emphasised the so-called “offensive” side of the rationale for intervention. At the same time, however, one should not forget the “defensive” aspect: this intervention represented a way of safeguarding against the feared spillover of terrorism from the Middle Eastern region into Russia’s sphere of influence, if not into Russia itself.
The defensive aspect was raised in Henry Kissinger’s analysis at the time, on which we reported in this newspaper in October 2015 [included in The Crisis in the World Order and the Pandemic of the Century, éditions Science Marxiste, 2023]. The former secretary of state started with the observation that the Russian intervention was a “symptom of the disintegration of the American role in stabilising” the area; this allowed for “a deployment unprecedented in Russian history”, a challenge to the USA unheard of, “at least in the last 40 years”. That said, Kissinger acknowledged the validity of Russian interests in Syria, particularly the need to prevent it from becoming an operational base for Sunni terrorism that would endanger the Caucasus and the Muslim regions of Russia. In short, it was a way to “divert the Sunni Muslim threat from Russia’s southern border region”.
Terrorism risk
This topic has also come up in the. Russian debate since the onset of the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), noted a “general pessimistic perception” in Russia regarding the consequences of the “Spring”, particularly concerning the risks of terrorist actions: “after years of Islamic terrorism in the North Caucasus, Russian public opinion is on Assad’s side” [Moscow Times, August 16th, 2012].
Vladimir Putin himself, speaking on September 15th, 2015, at the Collective Security Council of the CSTO, a military alliance of former Soviet States, expressed his “concern” about a “possible fallout” of terrorism “in our territories”. Two weeks later, on September 30th, the first Russian airstrikes against ISIS and other groups opposed to the regime began.
On the same day, Vasily Kashin (who was also linked to CAST) wrote that ISIS had strengthened its influence in Afghanistan and the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. He concluded that Moscow had two options: “fight ISIS now in the Middle East or do it tomorrow in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, where it would have to conduct “ground operations and risk many casualties” |Valdai, September 30. A choice had to be made.
At the end of that year, Andrey Sushentsov, later director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MGIMO), summarised the three objectives that Moscow wanted to pursue with that initiative: dismantling the infrastructure of Islamist radicalism before it could develop at Russia’s borders; supporting its Syrian ally that guaranteed Moscow access to the Mediterranean Sea; and sending the message that Russia was back among the great world powers [Valdai, December 1“, 2015).
The dog and the tail
In 2021, ten years after the ”Arab Spring“, Andrey Kortunov, then gener al director of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), outlined a first assessment of the initiative, in chiaroscu m. Russia could only consider itself victorious ”tactically“, having gained a role in the region with a ”relatively low-cost military operation“, but in five years it had failed to provide a strategy for exiting the crisis. Hence the question about the actual iniluence that Moscow was able to exert on the Damascus regime: ”Is it the dog that wags the tail or the tail that wags the dog?“ In other words, Kortunov implied that Moscow had become involved in the Syrian crisis at a level that exceeded its intentions and capacities.
In the near future, the war in Ukraine will pose a problem for the Kremlin regarding the choice of how to rationalise the use of its forces. Following an agreement with Turkey, the last Russian soldiers were supposed to leave Syria by mid-September 2022. In 2018, there had been 63,000 soldiers stationed there. [Moscow Times, September 15th, 2022].
The Mediterranean and Africa
Today, the fall of the Assad regime represents an undeniable setback for Moscow. The fate of its naval and air bases on the Syrian coast is the most glaringly visible aspect; it affects not only Russia’s presence in the Mediterranean, but also its projection towards Central Africa. Nikolai Sukhov, an Arabist at IMEMO, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations previously headed by Yevgeny Primakov, emphasises that ”none of our cargo planes can fly there directly“, so ”our active work with African countries today depends directly on Syria from a logistical point of view“ [Russia in Global Affairs, December 8th, 2024].
For this reason, Moscow continues to negotiate with Damascus and especially with Ankara, but it is meanwhile taking precautions by contemplating a shift towards Cyrenaica in Libya, which is itself not without problems. Jalel Harchaoui, a researcher at the London-based think tank RUSI, notes that to reach Libya, Russian planes will have to ask Turkey for permission to use its airspace [Le Figaro, December 27th]. The relationship with Ankara has its moments of ambivalence, with reasons for cooperation, such as gas transit, but some points of tension as well: for example, in the Caucasus, where Turkey has supported Azerbaijan in the war against Armenia for control of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Strategic problem
The problem that Moscow faces today in the Middle East is of an even more general nature: if the intervention in Syria was seen as the re-emergence of Russian power, how should its withdrawal be interpreted now? The discussion on this question is open in Moscow.
Pukhov, whose views in 2012 are quoted above, now sees the Syrian situation as a demonstration of the significant limits of Russia’s interventionist and ”great power“ policy: ”Moscow does not have sufficient military forces, resources, influence, and authority“ and can only act ”as long as other powers allow it“ [Kommersant, December 8th].
For Kortunov, Russia can no longer play the ”ace“ of being the sole leading power in Syria, ”but still holds some strong cards“, stemming from its long presence in the region, dating back to the times of the USSR. In that regard, let us not forget the role played by Primakov, who began his career in the Middle East, officially as a journalist, but in reality as an operative of the KGB.
In Kortunov’s evaluation, however, there is a significant threat: given its ethnic and religious complexity, he writes, Syria could become ”a second Somalia“, that is, a failed state, torn apart by infighting and rebellions against the central government Kommersant, December 9”].
Strategic repositioning?
The most thought-provoking argument comes from Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy and editor of Russia in Global Affairs. We follow his reasoning as reported by the government outlet Russia Today on December 10th. Russia has used its military presence to expand its influence in the Middle East and Africa, and in this sense, the collapse of the Syrian state is a setback. But there is also an opportunity: Moscow is in a different position than Tehran, which, being part of the region, cannot abandon it. “The Kremlin can leave the region. Tehran cannor”.
For Lukyanov, Moscow can therefore use the crisis to “adjust its commitments and strategically reposition itself”. But where? Ukraine is an “existential challenge”, “a conflict that Moscow cannot afford to lose”. And herein. lies the conclusion. The then US president Barack Obama had called Russia a “regional power”, using that term as an insult. Today, however, in a fragmented world, “being a capable regional power is perhaps the only sustainable form of influence”. According to Lukyanov, “consolidating its role as a dominant regional power” must therefore be Moscow’s objective. And the “region” in which Russia can and must exercise this role is its near abroad, the area of the former USSR. It is there that its energies must be concentrated, because “existential challenges” are at stake.
Given Lukyanov’s role in the Moscow establishment — the council he chairs works in conjunction with the presidential administration and the ministries of foreign affairs and defence — his analysis is worthy of attention. It certainly indicates that a debate is taking place at the top level of the State apparatus between those who call for maintaining an active projection towards the Middle East and Africa, and those who propose a repositioning to focus on vital areas. The evolution of events on the ground, in the Middle East and especially in Ukraine, will determine the answers to Kremlin’s dilemmas about its own limits as a power.
Lotta Comunista, January 2025