Joong Ang Ilbo, a newspaper associated with the Samsung group, the second largest in South Korea, writes that Tokyo’s "meticulous preparations" for the February 7th talks in Washington between its Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and Donald Trump, “intended to mitigate the potential repercussions of the proverbial” and vaunted “unpredictability” of the American president, “offer valuable lessons” for Seoul. Korea is today shaken by the worst political-institutional crisis since the coup d’état of December 1979. with the impeachment and arrest for “insurrection” of President Yoon Suk-yeol, after his attempt to establish martial law and close Parliament on December 3rd.
For the international media, Ishiba’s performance was “a masterful exercise in flattery diplomacy”, aimed at obtaining “Trump’s favour”. But for Joong-Ing his traditional “courtesy diplomacy” can not be dismissed as “mere submission” and “flattery”. The Japanese saying goes, “the bamboo that bends in the storm is stronger than the oak that resists it”. Realising the relative weakness of his internal position, Ishiba has adopted the path of least resistance in his relationship with Trump. The “power vacuum” in Korea, continues the newspaper, forces Seoul to have its own “communication channel” with Washington in Tokyo, taking advantage of the strengthening of bilateral relations paradoxically achieved under the Yoon presidency. However, “depending on Japan to represent Korean national interests has clear limitations”. Among these is the risk that those same interests will be dictated by the agreements between Washington and Tokyo.
Trumpian “K-drama” in Seoul
Based on various analyses, both Korean and international, the failed power grab by the Yoon presidency in early December seems to be a local variant of the assault on the US legislature carried out by Trump supporters in January 2021. Yoon is a former judge with a reputation for being “incorruptible” for having prosecuted and sent to prison two conservative presidents, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. He established himself as a candidate of the conservative People Power Party (PPP), riding a wave of judicial populism, which included nostalgia for the military regimes that ruled from the 1960s to 1987 and oversaw Seoul’s economic miracle. Among his supporters, writes Le Monde, Yoon includes the movement of the evangelical pastor Jeon Kwang-hoon, “a prominent figure of the new Korean right wing”, violently hostile to both the Pyongyang regime and the “South Korean left wing” which is considered to be “subservient” to its northern neighbour.
In 2022 Yoon won the presidency with just a 1% margin over the centre-left candidate Lee Jae-myung. Already in decline in popularity since 2023 and not eligible for re-election, he is said to have considered declaring martial law to “bring the Parliament under his control”, continues Le Monde, particularly after losing his parliamentary majority last April. Yoon considered this defeat to be the result of fraud, carried out by the opposition with the support of Beijing and and Pyongyang, According to Le Figaro, it cannot be ruled out that “Trump’s strong victory” in the American elections influenced Yoon’s decision to force a parliamentary cohabitation with the opposition.
According to political commentator Kim Ou-joon, the choice of December 3rd as the date to declare martial law was allegedly endorsed “by a shaman belonging to the first lady’s entourage”. Although half of South Korea is Christian and Yoon himself is a Catholic, shamanism is still widespread in the country. The northern regime also applies a shamanic-Stalinist synthesis to legitimise the Kim dynasty. The whole affair writes — the conservative Chosun Ilbo, the country’s major daily newspaper — has resulted in a “parody of a coup”. A “K-drama”, according to many international observers, much like the South Korean shows streamed globally on platforms like Netflix. Parliament then overturned the presidential decision and dismissed the head of State. For the Japan Times, often an informal voice of Japanese diplomacy, the “botched coup” on December 3rd attests to the “incompetence” and “lack of political acumen” of Yoon, who, unable to govern from the centre, tried to “give himself power and legitimacy” by declaring martial law to impose himself on the legislature. A “desperate” and “failed” act that risks jeopardising the “positive steps he had taken” in strengthening relations with Tokyo and Washington, whilst also damaging Japanese national interests.
The “han” cycle and the balance of power
This assessment is echoed by Victor Cha, a former member of the National Security Council of the Bush Jr administration in 2006-08 and former director of the Korean programme of the CSIS: he believes that Seoul’s “political dysfunctionality” will drag on for most of 2025, leaving it “totally unprepared” to face the return of Trump, who promises to un leash “a major typhoon” in commercial and political relations, and “overwhelm the entire nation”.
According to Cha, the balance of power has had a decisive impact on Korean history, with Japan, China, Russia, and the US competing for control of the peninsula, which has occupied the role of a “shrimp among whales”. The series of Korean “historical traumas” has fed a moral factor marked by the concept of ban. Central to the national “emotional identity”, it can be translated as “resentment for past injustices”, which has shaped a political culture oriented more towards “destroying the adversary” than towards compromise. Despite their being part of the Confucian cultural tradition, the Beijing Global Times emphasises that Koreans are among “the most emotional people” in the region.
Ishiba and the “Abe handbook”
In evaluating the outcome of Ishiba’s visit to Washington, the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s leading daily newspaper, emphasises how the prime minister adopted the “Abe handbook” in his negotiations with Trump. In his posthumous memoirs, former prime minister Shinzo Abe responded to criticisms of excessive “deference” towards the White House occupant, claiming that resorting to “flattery” had proven to be an effective “diplomatic tool”: resorting to “logical or political arguments [that] Trump does not like” would not have been useful to Japan’s national interest and would risk damaging bilateral relations. Based on his personal knowledge, Abe also believed that “behind his extreme rhetoric” Trump “was bluffing”: while claiming to be inspired by the “madman theory” formulated by Richard Nixon, Abe believed that the American president “would be secretly frightened” of the use of military force and, “in case of an emergency, he could back out”. In short: doubly unreliable.
For Ishiba, the aim of the summit was to obtain recognition of “Japan’s sincere efforts” for “peace and regional stability” and to share “the importance of multilateral frameworks such as the Quad” — the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the US, India, and Australia — and of the agree ments established berween Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and Manila. Trump credited Ishiba with having started, together with Abe, the process of Japanese rearmament, although the programme had been confirmed by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the end of 2022. Trump, meanwhile, was the first American president to set foot on one of Tokyo’s de facto aircraft carriers and to sign off the sale of the F-35 fighter jets they carry. On the Japanese side, the debate on the adoption of missile counterattack capabilities and greater autonomy for Tokyo in the bilateral alliance with Washington signed in 2017 took into account both the rise of China and increased American political convulsions. In the opinion of the Yomiuri, that his demands were met dissuaded Trump from putting in doubt American military guarantees to obtain commercial concessions. This threat had already been raised during his first term in office and was also directed towards Seoul.
Declinist demonstrations and nuclear offers
The London-based IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) emphasised that the Japanese Prime Minister arrived in Washington ready to put on the table the operational capability of the nationally-produced Type-12 missile systems, the range of which has been extended from 250km to about 1,000km; mass production of these systems was included in the 2025 defence budget, which was increased to $60 billion. For the Yomiuri, Ishiba, who made his debut as prime minister at the head of a minority government, is now strengthened by a combination of external and internal circumstanees. The successful meeting with Trump allows him to quell the rivalry within the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) and gives him scope to obtain support from part of the opposition for the budget law. The same stumbling block with regard to the elections for the House of Councillors, scheduled for July, could also be overcome. Even if Trump is capricious, continues the Yomiuri, his affability may still be affected by the recognition of the American condition of “relative decline”, which makes Japanese cooperation “essential” for the US to “protect its interests” in the face of the Chinese rise.
According to the Japan Times, Ishiba has adopted Trump’s concept of “cooperation” which is “circumscribed”, and in which partners and allies are asked to “weigh American national interests more than their own”, reflecting the “reality of a diminished American presence in the world”. The prime minister does not rule out the possibility that Trump may seek agreements with China. Tokyo, therefore, aims to “stabilise relations” with Beijing as well, which could happen during a summit with Xi Jinping in May.
The Global Times emphasises that Ishiba has shown Japan’s ability to “carve out a space to survive” in the Sino-American game, which involves a “pragmatic approach” and the promotion of “open cooperation” between Tokyo and Beijing. In the debate in Seoul, the daily Hankyoreb, close to the centre-left opposition, argues that the defence of national interests involves “solidarity” with countries that benefit from a free-trade commercial order, from the EU to Japan itself, and even China.
For the Chosun, the American fluctuations present risks but also opportunities, such as the endorsement of the development of “independent nuclear arsenals” for Seoul and Tokyo. This hypothesis had already been aired during Trump’s first term and was taken up again by Elbridge Colby, Deputy Secretary of Defense. According to him, Washington should not oppose a South Korean deterrent, which would serve to counterbalance both Pyongyang and Beijing. A similar thesis by Robert Kelly and Min-hyung Kim, analysts at the universities of Busan and Seoul, respectively, appeared in early December in Foreign Af fairs. A “small arsenal of one hundred warheads”, similar to that of Israel, would allow for “local deterrence”, reducing the American burden of deterrence and the existential anxieties of Seoul. It would allow the latter to “take the path of maturity and strategic responsibility”, hitherto held back by its de pendence on Washington.
The authors exclude a cascading effect on Japan and Taiwan, given that Tokyo has coexisted with Pyongyang’s arsenal for twenty years without crossing the nuclear threshold. Or, it could be added, Tokyo could cross the threshold without explicitly declaring it, following the identical model of nuclear understanding, “the bomb in the cellar”, that exists between Washington and Tel Aviv.
Lotta Comunista, February 2025