From the series European news
At the Davos Forum in January, US President Donald Trump withdrew his threats to take Greenland away from Denmark and impose tariffs on all countries that opposed him. However, the damage had already been done. The episode was a trauma
for Europe: now we no longer know how far the Americans might go
, commented Emmanuel Macron. The French president warns against an illusory sense of relief after the peak of tensions. This Greenland moment
has undoubtedly made Europeans aware that they are under threat
. Now, we must think of Europe as a power
[Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 11th].
The German chancellor also spoke out in favour of more European power
in his speech to the Bundestag on January 29th. There, Friedrich Merz issued a warning: Anyone in the world who believes [...] that it is necessary to use customs tariffs against Europe must know—and now knows—that we are ready and able to defend ourselves against this if necessary
. The senior cadres of European imperialism are now trying to use the Greenland moment
to accelerate rearmament and political centralisation.
Pragmatic federalism
In his speech on February 2nd, on the occasion of receiving an honorary degree from the Catholic University of Leuven, Mario Draghi said that the best path for Europe is the one it is already on: Concluding trade agreements with partners who share our principles and offer diversification, and strengthening our position in supply chains where we are already key players
. According to the former president of the European Central Bank, this is only a first step, because it is a maintenance strategy, not a destination
. Europe must therefore choose its destination: Do we want to remain simply a large market, subject to the priorities of others? Or do we want to take the necessary steps to become a power?
. The confederation logic
, i.e., grouping together small countries
, does not automatically produce a powerful bloc
. To become a power, Europe must move from confederation to federation
, because where Europe has federated—on trade, competition, the single market, and monetary policy—we are respected as a power and negotiate as a single entity
. To move in this direction and break the impasse we find ourselves in today
, Draghi proposes the approach of pragmatic federalism
: Pragmatic because we must take the steps that are currently possible, with the partners currently available, in the areas where progress can be made. But federalism, because the destination is important
. According to Draghi, the euro is an example of the success of this method.
For Enrico Letta, on the other hand, Europe must set itself the goal of completing the integration of the internal market by 2028, i.e., integrating what is not yet integrated
. The current president of the Delors Institute stresses the importance of precise deadlines: I learned from Jacques Delors that policies without deadlines are like academic debates, and it is precisely the absence of deadlines that is one of the reasons for the failure of the capital market union over the last ten years
[Il Sole-24 Ore, February 6th]. Delors was president of the European Commission from 1985-1995, during which time the 1992 deadline for the single market was imposed and the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated, laying the foundations for the euro.
A new Maastricht moment
Letta and Draghi, former Italian prime ministers and the authors of two reports in 2024 calling for structural reforms of the EU, were both guests at the informal European Council summit on February 12th at Alden Biesen Castle in Belgium, not far from Maastricht. There, the heads of State and government of the 27 member countries met with European Council President António Costa and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Discussions focused on setting up a roadmap with deadlines for various issues: Buy European
rules that would introduce new levels of protectionism to defend European industry; the creation of a 28th regime, or EU Inc.
, that would provide companies with a single legal framework valid across the continent; a reform of federal antitrust law to favour European champions; a reduction in regulations and bureaucracy; reform of the energy market; and the unification of capital markets under the new name of the Savings and Investment Union (SIU).
Von der Leyen said after the summit: At the next European Council in March, I will present the 'One Europe, One Market' roadmap
. As for the SIU, if there is not enough progress by June, I will propose moving to enhanced cooperation
, i.e., moving forward with a group of willing countries. This would breach a taboo
, commented Politico Europe [February 13th]. According to Costa, this is a new Maastricht moment
[Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 14th]. However, he indicated that, in his opinion, the argument for enhanced cooperation serves above all to put pressure on others and convince them not to stay out
[La Stampa, February 14th].
Franco-German frictions
However, there is no shortage of sceptical voices regarding the ability of member countries to make a leap towards federalisation in certain areas. The main argument in this vein is the obvious friction in the Franco-German axis. Rather than an acute crisis, these are long-standing differences between Paris and Berlin, which are re-emerging under the pressure of the crisis in the world order. On trade and industrial policy, France tends to take a more protectionist stance than Germany, but this is more a difference in degree than a head-on confrontation. The German government is pushing for new trade agreements, while Macron, partly due to internal political fragility, continues to criticise the Mercosur agreement. However, the French president concedes that the strategic approach of trade diversification is valid
and praises the agreements concluded with India and Canada [Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 12th].
With the slogans Buy European
and Made in Europe
, Paris is pushing for European preference
measures aimed at protecting its industry, while European Commissioner Stéphane Séjourné is campaigning for his Industrial Accelerator Act, which also contains elements of industrial protectionism. For Berlin, European preference measures must be an exception and a measure of last resort, limited to critical and strategic technologies, not entire sectors
, and must be time-limited
[Le Monde, February 12th]. Germany, too, now recognises the necessity of having trade defence instruments, but prefers the Made with Europe
formula, emphasising openness to partner markets.
Another controversial issue is the sixth-generation Franco-German fighter jet, which is part of the FCAS project. A decision on this matter is needed in order to start building a prototype, but the respective governments have not yet been able to impose a task-sharing agreement on Dassault and Airbus.
Common debt
Macron's interview with the European press on the eve of the Alden Biesen summit, in which he made an emphatic appeal for new common debt, caused great irritation in German government circles. According to Adriana Cerretelli of Il Sole-24 Ore, this was a clumsy move: The facts have already shown that when necessary, such as post-COVID-19 and the €90 billion in aid to Ukraine, common debt is created with out fanfare and, above all, without declaring a religious war, which is precisely what has always hindered it
; all the more so if the country calling for EU-Bonds has accounts increasingly in the red
[February 12th].
However, when assessing Macron's move, the support he has received on this point from the European monetary power must be taken into account. The confidential document that the ECB sent to heads of State and government before the European Council summit on February 12th includes a request for the creation of a European safe asset
, i.e., EU-Bonds [Handelsblatt, February 12th]. Even more significant was the position taken in favour of EU-Bonds by the president of the German Central Bank. Making Europe attractive also means attracting investors from outside
, argued Joachim Nagel. To this end, the Bundesbank president believes that a more liquid European market with regard to safe European assets
would be helpful. He added—probably to appease the sensibilities of the German public and the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe—that such safe assets should only support specific purposes
and that European debt is not a free lunch
[Politico.eu, February 11th].
The European reaction is manifesting itself not only in the economic and institutional spheres, but also in the military sphere. I have initiated preliminary talks with French President Emmanuel Macron on European deterrence
, Merz said at Wehrkunde, the Munich Security Conference in February. At this annual meeting of leading figures in transatlantic relations, the German chancellor declared that a sovereign Europe is our best response to the new era
. He offered the United States a new transatlantic partnership
that is healthier
and has a self-supporting European pillar
. Macron, who was also present in Munich, barely mentioned the United States in his speech. Instead, he argued that Europe needs to become a geopolitical power
that defines its own security interests
; with Russia, it should negotiate a new architecture of security for Europe after [the war in Ukraine], because our geography will not change
.
The Wehrkunde of the Atlantic crisis
Like Merz, who tried to convince the Americans of the usefulness of NATO, stating that in times of rivalry between great powers, the United States will not be powerful enough to do everything on its own
, the British prime minister also defended the transatlantic alliance at the Wehrkunde. Instead of a moment of rupture, we must make it into a moment of radical renewal
, said Keir Starmer, who wants a more European NATO, underpinned by deeper links between the UK and the EU
.
Von der Leyen sees a true European awakening
underway, starting with defence investments that in 2028 will exceed what the US spent in 2025. Indeed, all the signs are there; it will become clear at the March European Council how far the proposals discussed at the Alden Biesen summit will become enforceable deadlines. If that does happen, it should be stressed that it will be just the start of a new series of battles, both inside and outside the EU.
A new European moment
that raises the strategic role of the Union will shift the global balance and is bound to provoke counter-reactions. The same applies to the internal balance within the EU, which is being strained by the current acceleration. In terms of military spending, this is already visible in French concerns about German rearmament.