Skip to main content

Indo-African Opposition at the WTO

Since March 1st, the Nigerian economist Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala has been the new director general of the World Trade Organization. Like a coach hired by a team languishing at the bottom of its league — writes Larry Elliott of The Guardian — Okonjo finds herself in the happy position of taking over at the WTO when the only way is up, This historic international institution is unlikely to experience extinction or irrelevance. However, the appointment of Okonjo does not in itself remedy WTO’s deep troubles.

An alternative in plurilateralism

The negotiating function of the WTO has been lacking for twenty years now. The latest ambitious goal of liberalising trade in goods and services, announced in Doha in November 2001, became bogged down by the impossibility of a general compromise between old powers and large emerging economies.

In 2015 Michael Froman, President Barack Obama’s Trade Representative (USTR), officially called for the abandonment of the Doha Round. Froman’s alternative proposal was a pragmatic multilateralism, which would allow the WTO to host so-called plurilateral negotiations, limited in scope by the issues involved and the participating states. That year the WTO ministerial conference in Nairobi closed with the unprecedented admission of different views on the future of the Doha Round. Froman claimed a turning point representing the possibility of tackling new issues with a plurilateral approach, had been achieved between subsets of WTO member states, overcoming the practice of multilateral consensus. The same position was held by Robert Lighthizer, USTR of President Donald Trump.

The subsequent 2017 WTO Conference, in Buenos Aires, closed for the first time without a shared final declaration. The Doha Round seems definitively shelved. Lighthizer celebrates the moment when the impasse at the WTO was broken, in favour of plurilateral solutions, which disarm the veto power of individual nations. Some initiatives, such as the Joint Statement Initiative (SI), are launched from the Argentine capital, with the participation of about half of the 164 member states of the WTO and dedicated to specific topis, including the increasingly important e-commerce sector.

Delhi-Cape Town axis

Okonjo’s debut at the WTO General Council in early March was greeted by a combative stance from India and South Africa against the aforementioned JSIs. A document expressing the Indo-African position defends the multilateral underpinnings of the WTO and consensus based decision-making. The crucial point is that to introduce new rules in the WTO, it is necessary to involve all member states in the decision-making process. The Indian representative Brajendra Navnit explains that renouncing the tradition of unanimity will create a precedent for any group of Members to bring any issue into the WTO [...] undermining balance in agenda setting, negotiating processes and outcomes. The issue on the table is who makes decisions, how and on what matters. In the form of an abstruse legal dispute, via articles and treaty clauses, a political battle is being waged over the functioning and the very nature of the WTO.

The position held by India and South Africa in the course of the discussion in Geneva was criticised by the delegates of many capitals. The representative of the European Union, the Portuguese João Aguiar Machado, affirms that the WTO’s negotiating arm has not been able to deliver [many of the significant improvements in the multilateral trade rulebook, therefore it is vital to maintain the option of developing rules that correspond to the economic and trade realities of the 21st century through plurilateral agreements. Otherwise, there would be no other option than developing such rules outside the WTO framework. This would increase fragmentation and risk eventually condemn the WTO to irrelevance, As already demonstrated at the Nairobi and Buenos Aires Conferences, in substantial alignment with the White House, the EU takes sides in favour of open plurilateral negotiations.

A realist genesis

Within the WTO there are two plurilateral agreements - on public procurement and civil aviation - which are referred to as closed, because their benefits are accessible only by the participating states. These two agreements, negotiated under the terms of the GATT back in the 198os, are the only plurilateral agreements which survived the transition to the WTO. The ITA agreement on information technologies, however, is an example of an open plurilateral agreement. Its benefits also extend to non-signatory states, based on the ‘most favoured nation’ mechanism. According to historian Craig VanGrasstek, WTO rules show an ambivalent view towards plurilateral agreements. On the one hand, they recognise plurilateral agreements, which are considered binding only for the participating states. On the other hand, they consider the consensus of all member states as necessary to integrate a new plurilateral agreement into WTO rules. The consensus of all member states is indeed one of the legal arguments used by India and South Africa.

In general, VanGrasstek highlights the contradiction between the fundamental WTO principle of non-discrimination and an international reality divided by hundreds of preferential trade agreements, bilateral and regional Agreements, customs unions and even the European single market, In VanGrasstek’s interpretation of WTO history [The History and Future of the World Trade Organization, WTO Publications, 2013], the winning states of the Second World War, under the direction of Washington, established the GATT with the ambition of creating a multilateral system, but had a realistic awareness that the international order’s needs for discriminatory instruments. Therefore, they foresaw that the GATT could coexist with preferential agreements, under certain conditions (article XXIV), and allow protectionist measures motivated by national security (article XXI). This is the legal loophole which was abused in recent years by the tariff offensives of the Trump presidency.

The GATT precedent

Attacking the Indo-African position, the European ambassador Machado recalls that plurilateral agreements have been a driving force under the GATT and beyond and paved the way for many of the multilateral agreements that are today an integral part of the WTO agreement. In fact, as Bernard Hockman and Petros Mavroidis argue for the European University Institute, PAs were quite prevalent under the pre-WTO GATT regime, The Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round, spanning the 196os and 19705, created a series of plurlateral agreements, at the time defined as ‘codes of conduct’, binding only the few signatory states [WTO ‘a la carte’ or WTO ‘menu du jour’? Assessing the care for plurilateral agreements, EUI, 2013].

German academic Nicolas Lamp adds lesser-known historical detail: during the Tokyo Round, least-developed countries (LDCs) asked in vain that the adoption of such plurilateral ‘codes’ be subject to decision by consensus or at least by a broad majority. That initiative, led by Yugoslavia, challenged the lack of transparency and In inclusiveness in the Tokyo Round negotiations. In many cases, for example for the anti-dumping agreement, LDCs were invited to negotiation tables only when the general form of the ‘code’ had been determined by the United States and European countries (The club approach to multilateral trade lawmaking, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2016. Above all, writes Lamp, when the advanced countries agree separately on their priority issues, the LDCs fear that they will lose control of the agenda at the GATT. This is the same political issue raised by India and South Africa today at the WTO.

Imposed agreements

In the transition from the GATT to the WTO, many plurilateral ‘codes’ of the Tokyo Round were made multilateral. This was possible, explains Hockman, because the dominant states of the GATT inserted the ‘codes’ in a take it or leave it package deal, that is, as part and parcel of accession to the WTO. In Hockman’s retrospective opinion, this stratagem looks much less strategic The fear of being forced to adhere to these agreements, in fact, has motivated a many LDCs to use unanimity to oppose any WTO decision on new issues.

In line with Brussels’ position, Hockman proposes returning to the GATT model and carrying forward the JSI as open plurilateral agreements [Plurilateral cooperation as an altemative to trade agreements: innovating one domain at a time, BUT, 202 1). Lamp argues this compromise should be accepted by India and South Africa for two reasons. First, if the Indo-African duo would veto the JSI, albeit with good legal reasons, they would risk finding themselves in an isolated, politically unsustainable position. Further, even a successful veto could not prevent the JSIs from materialising, as preferential agreements outside the WTO, unnecessarily damaging the multilateral institation. Second, the current fault in the WTO does not clearly divide old and new powers. Comments on the March WTO Council include a notable Chinese silence. On the one hand, China speaks out on every occasion in defence of multilateralism, in line with President Xi Jinping’s speech at the Davos forum. On the other hand, Beijing participates in the contested JSIs, along with many other emerging countries and LDCs.

Functional fragmentation?

The evolution of the WTO is matter of international economics and politics, not a matter of law. VanGrasstek highlights the real change that, in the decades after the Second World War, enormously expanded world trade and transformed the balance of power between powers. Industrial production is increasingly international and the global political order is increasingly multipolar. Starting with customs duties alone, the scope of issues under discussion has expanded to include non-tariff barriers, intellectual property rights, trade in services and so on. From the 23 founders of the GATT, the states involved increased to about fifty in the 1960s, a hundred in the 19705, up to the current 164 members of the WTO.

These objective complications are reflected in the timing of the liberalisation processes, In the first fifteen years of the GATT system [1947-1962], 5 rounds of tariff reduction were completed, lasting an average of 7 months each. After that, the Kennedy Round was extended to 37 months [19641967], the Tokyo Round doubled to 74 months [1972-1979], and the Uruguay Round took 87 months [1986-1994] to negotiate the switch from GATT to the WTO. The Doha Round, the first and last major multilateral negotiation of the WTO era, has not been closed since 2001.

Five years ago, commenting on the Euro-American proposals for plurilateral ‘clubs’ within the WTO, we wondered if they would mark growing fragmentation and dysfunctionality for the institution or, on the contrary, if they would facilitate a dialectic among coalitions and the definition of new balances, helping to safeguard the unitary sign of the WTO. We can reassert that question, as ambivalent as the WTO itself, guarantor of the general interest of capital in an open world market and, at the same time, arena for the irreconcilable clash of infinite particular interests.

Lotta Comunista, March 2021

Popular posts from this blog

Uneven Development, Job Cuts, and the Crisis of Labour Under Global Capitalism

Internationalism No. 73, March 2025 Page 16 Uneven development is a fundamental law of capitalism. We have a macroscopic expression of this in the changing balance of power between States: Atlantic decline and Asian rise are the key dynamics behind the political processes of this era, including wars caused by the crisis in the world order. But behind all this there is a differentiated economic trend, starting from companies and sectors: hence the differentiated conditions for wage earners. And this is the element to keep in mind for an effective defensive struggle. It’s only the beginning The electrical and digital restructuring imposed by global market competition affects various production sectors. The car industry is the most obvious, due to the familiarity of the companies and brands involved. We have already reported on the agreement reached before Christmas at Volkswagen, which can be summarised as a reduction of 35,000 employees by 2030. Die Zeit [De...

Forces and Consequences of the New Strategic Phase

The new strategic phase in the world balance, with its new corresponding political cycles within powers, requires attention to the materialistic, historical and dialectical method of political analysis itself. The changing forces and basic trends need to be identified; we can make conjectures about the developments in single political battles, but the outcome of these battles will always require us to contemplate a plurality of solutions: some more probable. others less. but never Just a mechanical consequence of long-term economic movements. Many fixed points of the method of political analysis are usual tools in our Marxist elaboration, but this does not mean they must be taken for granted: it is of use to recall them, in relation to the new unknowns of the political battle. Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from t...

The Works of Marx and Engels and the Bolshevik Model

Internationalism Pages 12–13 In the autumn of 1895 Lenin commented on the death of Friedrich Engels: "After his friend Karl Marx (who died in 1883), Engels was the finest scholar and teacher of the modern proletariat in the whole civilised world. […] In their scientific works, Marx and Engels were the first to explain that socialism is not the invention of dreamers, but the final aim and necessary result of the development of the productive forces in modern society. All recorded history hitherto has been a history of class struggle, of the succession of the rule and victory of certain social classes over others. And this will continue until the foundations of class struggle and of class domination – private property and anarchic social production – disappear. The interests of the proletariat demand the destruction of these foundations, and therefore the conscious class struggle of the organised workers must be directed against them. And every class strugg...

Another Kind of Politics

Donald Trump has said goodbye as befits his fame, with a tragic riotous revelry. A crowd with improbable disguises took its cue from the fake news on the Internet fomented by the presidency, assaulted the Capitol and wandered around its rooms and corridors with the aim of intimidating representatives and senators. All of this, however, taking selfies: a moment of fame on Facebook or YouTube and a trophy to show off back home in deepest America, while carousing in the local pub. His successor Joe Biden will seek a rebalance in a bipartisan collaboration, but he cannot escape from the dominant trait now characterising the political show . The swearing-in ceremony was the enthronement of a republican king, according to the rites of Hollywoodian show business: pop singers, actors, directors, and rock stars, and the new reigning couple hand in hand as they admired the fireworks in the night. Meanwhile, on the other shore of the Atlantic, a similar depressing show is going on the air with ...

In the Depth of Our Class

The pandemic of the century is a storm that does not subside; it returns to its rampage after 40 million infections and more than a million official victims, perhaps two million according to estimates on the excess deaths. In the contention between powers, China stands as the winner: it seems to have tamed the virus, and industry and services are up and running; the USA and Europe, on the other hand, are moving towards a new wave of infections that casts yet more shadows on the economic cycle. Political structures and health systems are at the height of tension. In America, the elections have judged Donald Trump’s rash demagogy on the basis of the opposite reasons for containing the pandemic and the intolerance of small and large producers; in Europe the executives are attempting to steer between the surge in infections, increasingly stringent confinement measures and the threats of fiscal jacquerie in the tourism and catering sectors. Almost everywhere, in the Old Continent, governm...

1919-2019. One hundred years from the foundation of the Communist International

The Analysis of a Defeat From the special series 1919-2019. One hundred years from the foundation of the Communist International It was in Lenin’s legacy that the generation of the ’20s and ’30s could have found the theoretical tools to deal with the unprecedented Stalinist counter-revolution and execute an organised retreat for the world party. Socialism in one country? Lenin had already framed the essential characteristics of that issue in 1915: given that Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism , it could be assumed that the victory of socialism would be possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone . What that first unequivocally means is that either the socialist revolution is replicated internationally, or it is inevitably defeated. Moreover, since the revolution had begun in backwards Russia, in 1917 it was already predictable that the time given to this inception in one country would be very short. Of course, ext...

Variations and Gradations of Democracy in China

Internationalism No. 50, April 2023 Page 10 From the series Giats of Asia : the dillemas of Chinese single-party pluralism Only the materialist analysis of the intraction between structure and superstructure can explain the variety of the political forms. Why did the entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production in China occur in populist and Maoist forms? Why does Chinese imperialism express itself in CP single-party pluralism and not, for example, in the classical multi-party system of imperialist democracy? This specific political analysis does not regard the study of the economic causes which determine China’s political struggles, a scientific investigation which is its premise, “but the way” in which these struggles present themselves in the superstructure. “By analysing basic economic facts, Marxism can identify at first the interests which find expression in the political struggle. The form in which these interests appear politically, however, is a qu...

The British Link in the Imperialist Chain

Internationalism No. 33, November 2021 Page 8 Lenin often used the metaphor of a chain that binds the world to describe imperialism. The October Revolution of 1917 broke a first link in that chain and hoped to pull the whole thing loose. The metaphor was adopted in those years by all the Bolshevik leaders and the leaders of the newly formed Third International. Within a decade, Stalin's well-known formula of socialism in one country signified the overturning of that strategic cornerstone and the defeat of the revolution in Russia, in Europe, and in the world. Dates that have come to symbolise historical change act as the synthesis of previously accumulated contradictions, and, while such a sudden change does not exhaust the possibility of future contradictions, the concentration of events in 1926 nonetheless marked a watershed that revealed the true extent that the counter-revolution had reached. The great general strike in the United Kingdom that year, wh...

The Chinese Dragon Does Not Wait for American Rearmament

From the series News from the Silk Road According to The Washington Post , through the federal budget the White House has opened negotiations with the Senate that include long-term competition with China. The figures — $6 trillion, including infrastructure and family welfare plans — will vary in the negotiations, and will be centred on three directives. One demand is common to various proposals of expenditure: they must have a positive impact on the American productivity vis-à-vis China on the open fronts of industrial, energy and technological restructuring, or on the efficiency of welfare systems. In the case of welfare, the competition is also vis-à-vis Europe. Another calculation, attributed to Biden’s administration and the Democrats, is the enlargement of the electoral coalition in view of the next mid-term elections. Finally, there is a need to direct military expenditure, within the framework of a greater increase in the other items of discretionary expenditure, not absorb...

Militarised Scientists

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Page 13 From the series Atom and industrialisation of science “ The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers ” [Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto ). The Manhattan Project scientists In Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists , Robert Jungk [1913-1994] writes that the Manhattan Project was a labyrinth of winding paths and dead ends. Commenting on Jungk’s romanticised account of the first phase of the history of the atomic bomb, Edward Teller [1908-2003], often called the “father” of the H-bomb, wrote: “There is no mention of the futile efforts of the scientists in 1939 to awaken the interest of the military authorities in the atomic bomb. The reader does not learn about the dismay of scientists f...