Skip to main content

Price War in the US and EU


From the series Industry and pharmaceuticals


The contention in the biopharmaceutical field between the two sides of the Atlantic addresses the issue of costs, in two different ways. In a letter to the Financial Times published on April 23rd, Vas Narasimhan and Paul Hudson, the CEOs of Swiss company Novartis and French company Sanofi respectively, presented a harsh diagnosis of the state of European biopharmaceuticals compared to their major competitors, the United States and China. Narasimhan, an American son of immigrants from Tamil Nadu, and Hudson, a Briton, head two of the world's ten largest pharmaceutical multinationals. The two executives see "a strong outlook for the US – thanks to policies and regulations conducive to fast and broad patient access to innovative medicines". In contrast, Europe, "while home to some of the most important biopharma companies in the world", risks decline. "Against a backdrop of waning European biopharma competitiveness, the uncertainty of tariffs is further reducing incentives to invest in the EU". Furthermore, "in the new world context, Europe's pharmaceutical model of producing in Europe and exporting to the US cannot continue. It needs to strengthen its domestic market". They note that in recent weeks biopharmaceutical companies have announced investments in the US of over $150 billion, while there have been no such plans in Europe.

The view from Europe

"Europe's largest issue is failing to properly value innovation", according to Narasimhan and Hudson. "European price controls and austerity measures reduce the attractiveness of its markets. Launch prices are suppressed, patented medicines' growth capped, and prices reduced when new applications are found". As a result, more than 30% of medicines authorised in the United States were still not available in the European Union after two years. The US and China encourage innovation, while Europe penalises it: "Over time it is inevitable that clinical trials and R&D will further shift to the US and China". The CEOs of more than 30 pharmaceutical companies (including US companies) operating in Europe have urged European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to introduce measures to compensate for the costs of innovation and deliver "radical policy change" in pharmaceuticals [Reuters, April 15th]. The "major European pharmaceutical reform" currently being finalised by the Commission has also attracted criticism, particularly the planned changes to intellectual property protections. For the EFPIA (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations), it is "a missed opportunity to position Europe's life-sciences sector at the forefront of global competition" [If Sale 24 Orc, June 10th]. Novartis and Sanofi are calling on the European Commission and European States for greater price liberalisation and incentives for investment in innovation to make their markets more attractive. Without deregulation, they write, European decline is inevitable.

According to research by the non-profit organisation RAND, based on 2022 data, the gross prices of prescription drugs (or "ethical" drugs) in the United States are on average almost three times higher than those in other OECD countries. RAND considers gross manufacturer prices because the final cost, after various discounts applied by companies along the distribution chain to wholesalers, pharmaceutical managers, health insurers, hospitals, and pharmacies, is not always known. Even taking into account estimated discounts, however, average prices remain three times higher than the OECD average [RAND, International Prescription Drug Price Comparison, 2024].

The view from America

The Trump administration brandished this figure in its May 12th executive order, which announced an "aggressive" plan "to bring prices for American patients and taxpayers in line with comparably developed nations". In reality, not all prescription drugs cost more in the United States. According to RAND, the average price of brand-name drugs is more than four times higher than in OECD countries, but generic products, where competition is fiercer, cost a third less (67%). Generic drugs account for 90% of prescriptions in the US, compared to an average of 41% in the other OECD countries considered.

In the executive order, the White House accuses manufacturers of offering discounted prices "to access foreign markets and [subsidising] that decrease through enormously high prices in the United States". The United States is "subsidising drug-manufacturer profits and foreign health systems". The world benefits from American research supported by "generous subsidies".

Under the order, the Department of Health is tasked with setting "price targets" to be negotiated with companies, based on prices in other countries, according to the "most favoured nation" principle. In the event of non-compliance, the order threatens rules imposing reductions and other "aggressive action" such as importing from countries with better prices.

The issue of drug prices is a long-standing one in the US. In Europe, where single-payer healthcare systems prevail, prices are negotiated by government agencies, which have strong bargaining power with regards to companies. In the US, manufacturers set list prices and then negotiate discounts with insurance companies, hospitals, and intermediaries such as Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).

Towards the end of his first term, Donald Trump had already tried unsuccessfully to impose a price cut on 50 drugs. In 2022, with the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), then-President Joe Biden shook up the pharmaceutical market by allowing Medicare, the federal healthcare programme for the elderly, to negotiate prices directly with pharmaceutical companies, which had previously been explicitly prohibited. The following year, the Biden administration released a list of the first ten drugs targeted by the new policy, and in 2024, amidst a presidential election campaign that included healthcare spending as one of its main issues, Biden and candidate Kamala Harris announced a "historic" agreement with drug companies that will take effect in 2026 unless cancelled. The cut will average 25%, and the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that Medicare will save $100 billion over a decade [Financial Times, March 20th, 2023].

Regulation or market

The reforms contained in the IRA had to overcome fierce opposition from multinational pharmaceutical companies, which argued that a price cap would discourage investment in the research and development of new medicines. Six Big Pharma companies from three continents sued the Biden administration on several grounds, including violation of the First Amendment for "the taking of private property for public use without just compensation" [The New York Times, August 29th, 2023]. The US companies Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Johnson & Johnson, Japan's Astellas Pharma, Britain's AstraZeneca and Germany's Boehringer Ingelheim were also supported by the Chamber of Commerce and the PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America) lobby.

President Trump's current executive order, on the other hand, has so far elicited a "lukewarm" response from companies, which are sceptical about its practical implementation. According to legal and health policy experts quoted by the British Medical Journal, "the executive order reads more like an aspirational statement than a serious attempt to initiate a policy change". The "legal powers" to impose a price-control mechanism not provided for by Congress (traditionally resistant to regulatory interference, especially on the Republican side) are being questioned. Legal disputes are on the horizon. A more likely scenario is "isolated price reductions" through voluntary negotiations [BMI, "Can Trump Really Lower US Drug Prices and Raise Them in Other Countries? Probably Not", June 6th, 2025].

The order seems to be more aimed at intermediaries such as PBMs, big groups that negotiate with companies on behalf of insurers and hospitals. This criticism is shared by the drug companies, which add a dose of protectionism. In a May 12th statement on the order, PhRMA President Stephen J. Ubl said that the "real reasons" prices in the US are higher are "foreign countries not paying their fair share and middlemen driving up prices for US patients. The administration is right to use trade negotiations to force foreign governments to pay their fair share for drugs. US patients should not foot the bill for global innovation".

Between competition and opportunity

For any State, it is a question of public spending, which weighs heavily in the confrontation between powers. Imperialist metropolises are struggling to bear the costs of healthcare. New equipment and increasingly promising – but also more expensive – diagnostic and therapeutic methods are challenging the sustainability of national budgets. Life-sciences companies, on the other hand, are engaged in international competition based on their capacity for innovation.

The rise of China looms over the United States and Europe. According to Narasimhan and Hudson, "China, now the second largest biopharma market, has expanded its position by attracting multinationals and creating a vibrant biotechnology environment". A 2023 European Commission analysis of the 2,500 companies worldwide with the highest R&D expenditure found that 12% of the companies investing the most in health research are based in Europe, compared with 55% in the US and 17% in China [Financial Times, April 26th, 2024].

In medical biotechnology, Chinese companies have produced many promising new molecules, but these require further development to an advanced stage and investment that Chinese companies lack. Western groups, primarily European ones, offer the necessary capital and guarantee marketing licences outside China. Chinese biotech companies have signed 98 cross-border licensing agreements worth around $60 billion. In the first quarter of this year, there were 33 agreements worth $36.2 billion. The "new frontier" of Chinese biotechnology is a challenge for Western groups, but is also an opportunity.

Lotta Commisita, July-August 2025

Popular posts in the last week

The EU Commission Plans for Rearmament and a Clean Industrial Deal

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Page 2 From the series European news Following the European elections which took place on June 6th - 9th, the leaders of the Member States met on June 27th at the European Council. Ursula von der Leyen was nominated as president of the next European Commission, after she was chosen as the European People’s Party’s (EPP) Spitzenkandidat (“leading candidate”). The agreement also included the election of former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa as president of the European Council, and the appointment of former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Subsequently, on July 18th, Parliament elected von der Leyen as president of the Commission by an absolute majority, with 401 votes out of 719 MEPs. On September 17th, von der Leyen presented her team of commissioners to the European Parliament and, two days later, the Council adopted this list of...

The Fourth Plenum of China's War Preparations

Internationalism No. 83, January 2026 Page 2 According to Nicolas Baverez of Le Figaro , China’s proposed Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, accepted by the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, marks China’s transition to a war economy . At the national level, the focus would not be on rebalancing demand, but on reducing dependencies in order to resist external pressures and international sanctions. War preparations, writes the French economist, are now fully integrated into China’s economic development strategy. In our view, it would be more accurate to speak of a rearmament economy , since no major power has yet moved towards the proportions of a full-scale war effort, i.e., military spending historically measured in tens of percentage points of GDP. Instead, the variations have so far been a few percentage points and fractions of a point. This does not mean that there is no rearmament process affecting the economy and society as a whol...

“Polish Moment” at Risk

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 3 From the series European news In July, the strategic triangle of London-Paris-Berlin was strengthened with the Northwood Declaration, in which the United Kingdom and France signalled the possibility of coordinating the use of their nuclear weapons through the creation of a “Nuclear Steering Group”, and with the Kensington Treaty, an Anglo-German defence pact. These agreements complement the Franco-British agreements of Lancaster House and the Franco-German Treaty of Aachen. Although Poland signed the Treaty of Nancy with France in May 2025, it was excluded from the recent “E3” consultations, in which only the United Kingdom, France, and Germany participated. Nevertheless, the establishment of the new government led by Donald Tusk, the Civic Platform (PO) leader, in the October 2023 elections, after eight years of antagonism with Brussels under the Law and Justice Party (PiS)-dominated government, ha...

The National Gamble of Poland

Internationalism No. 33, November 2021 Page 3 From the series European News In a lawsuit brought by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, the Constitutional Tribunal, which is composed of judges chosen by the government, ruled that fundamental parts of the EU Treaty are incompatible with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. This ruling thus denies the primacy of European law over national law, undermining both the political assumption of continental integration and the supranational character of the EU . Vectors of Polish history We can shed light on this event if we consider the four field vectors that cross Poland: its traditional ethnic-religious nationalism, its marked Atlantic tropism, the objective attraction exerted by the European force field, and the looming threat of Russia. The general picture is global collisions: China’s irruption and the crisis in the world order have put pressure on Warsaw to define its st...

India’s Weaknesses in the Global Spotlight

Farmers’ protests around New Delhi have been going on for four months now. A controversial intervention by the Supreme Court has suspended the implementation of the new agticultural laws, but has raised questions about the dynamics between the judiciary and the executive, and has failed to unblock the negotiations between government and peasant organisations. The assault by Sikh farmers on the Red Fort during the Republic Day parade as India was displaying its military might to the outside world — the Chinese Global Times maliciously noted — paradoxically widened the protest in the huge state of Uttar Pradesh. The Modi government has been trying to revive India’s image with the 2021 Union Budget: it announced one hundred privatisations and approved the increase to 75% of the limit on direct foreign investment in insurance companies. For The Indian Express ( IEX ) this is a sign of the commitment to push ahead with reforms despite the backlash from rural India. Also for The Economi...

Crisis in Europe’s Auto Industry: Labour Struggles, Class Conflict, and the End of Social Partnership

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Page 16 We have on several occasions pointed to the automobile manufacturing sector as an indicator of the shifting economic and, consequently, political balance of power between States. It is inevitable that this also applies to the dynamics of the labour market and therefore to the balance of power between classes. A new social cycle The emergence of the Chinese imperialist giant is also shaking up social relations in the old metropolises. We have defined this moment as the descending phase of social-democratisation , the era in which the “conquests” of the previous ascending cycle are called into question. It is the phase in which what was believed to be guaranteed, including in terms of employment relationships, is in danger of being lost. What appears at first glance as merely an effect of technology (in this sector, specifically the development of the electric car) in fact reflects a more general shift in influenc...

India’s Lift-Off

Internationalism No. 84, February 2026 Page 13 From the series The world steel battle Just over fifteen years ago, in the article “La rincorsa siderurgica dell’India” [ India’s Steel Catch-Up , April 2010], we focused on the rise of the Indian steel industry. Today, it ranks among the world’s giants and second only to China, having overtaken the United States, Japan, and finally the EU-27 plus the United Kingdom. In the early months of 2025, the annual growth rate of Indian steel production was still above 10%, compared with stable figures not only for global production but also for Chinese output. Alongside the advance of the national steel industry, Indian families at the head of major steel groups are increasingly active internationally. In addition to the Mittal and Tata dynasties, Gupta’s Liberty Steel and the two branches of the Jindal family are now present on the global market. ...

The Unstoppable Force: Capital’s Demand for Migrant Labour

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 16 “Before Giorgia Meloni became Italy’s prime minister, she pledged to cut immigration. Since she has been in government the number of non-EU work visas issued by Italy has increased”. This is how The Economist of April 26th summarises the schizophrenia of their politics; and this is not only true in Italy: “Net migration also surged in post-Brexit Britain”. The needs of the economic system do not coincide with the rhetoric of parliamentarism. And vice versa. Schizophrenia and imbalances in their politics Returning to Italy, the Bank of Italy has pointed out that by 2040, in just fifteen years, there will be a shortage of five million people of working age, which could lead to an estimated 11% contraction in GDP. This is why even Italy’s “sovereignist” government is preparing to widen the net of its Immigration Flow Decree. The latest update, approved on June 30th, provides for the entry of almost ...

Political Battles of European Leninism

Internationalism No. 73, March 2025 Page 1 Thirty years after the death of Arrigo Cervetto , we are publishing here the concluding passages of the introduction to his Opere Scelte (“Selected Works”) for the series Biblioteca Giovani (“Publications for young people”), soon to be published in Italian. The 1944-45 partisan war in Italy. The political battle within libertarian communism. The Korean War, and the watchword of “neither Washington nor Moscow”. The layoffs at the Ilva and Ansaldo factories, the political battle and trade union defence in the struggles of post-war restructuring. From 1953 onwards, the crisis of Stalinism, the 1956 Suez crisis, the Hungarian uprising, the 1957 Theses and the challenge of theory and strategy vis-à-vis the tendencies of unitary imperialism. The political struggle within Azione Comunista (“Communist Action”) and the Movimento della Sinistra Comunista (“Movement of the Communist Left”). From the 1950s to the early 1970s, t...

The Defeat in Afghanistan — a Watershed in the Cycle of Atlantic Decline

In crises and wars there are events which leave their mark on history because of how they make a decisive impact on the power contention, or because of how, almost like a chemical precipitate, they suddenly make deep trends that have been at work for some time coalesce. This is the case of the defeat of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, which is taking the shape of a real watershed in the cycle of Atlantic decline. For the moment, through various comments in the international press, it is possible to consider its consequences on three levels: America’s position as a power and the connection with its internal crisis; the repercussions on Atlantic relations and Europe’s dilemmas regarding its strategic autonomy; and the relationship between the Afghan crisis and power relations in Asia, especially as regards India’s role in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Repercussions in the United States Richard Haass is the president of the CFR, the Council on Foreign Relations; despite having ...