Skip to main content

British Nostalgia

From the series European News

In his book Britain Alone, the Financial Times columnist Philip Stephens argues that David Cameron’s decision to hold the Brexit referendum in 2016 was self-serving […] The prime minister wanted to snuff out a Tory rebellion and to give himself a quieter life in 10 Downing Street. For short term tactical reasons, Cameron gambled on the strategic issue of Britain’s link to Europe.

As for Boris Johnson, backing Brexit had been about personal ambition: establishing his claim to the leadership. In Stephens’ reconstruction of events, Brexit was an unwanted outcome for the leaders of the Leave campaign: When Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, […] appeared before the cameras on the morning of 24 June, they looked shell-shocked rather than triumphant. […] Winning was not part of the plan.

However, once Brexit had been set in motion, Johnson pursued it with wild abandon and made it the cornerstone of his bid for No. 10.

According to Stephens, there was no underlying strategy to the actions of the two main Tory architects of Brexit — the resulting outcome of which has, however, had a huge impact on London’s international stature.

Atlantic decline and nostalgia

The subtitle of the book is The Path from Suez to Brexit, and it retells the journey has been painful between two events which triggered national trauma during Britain’s protracted and conscious managing [of] relative decline. This process has for much of the time […] resembled a fight with history, a struggle to hold on to the past.

In L’età della nostalgia [The Age of Nostalgia], Marta Dassù and Edoardo Campanella argue that Britain’s decision to leave the EU embodies this new form of nostalgic nationalism in its purest form. It should come as no surprise that nostalgia characterises those powers affected by the Atlantic decline — although the book itself also details the use and manipulation of the past by the ideologies of Chinese, Indian and Turkish imperialism, this being a regular occurrence in the construction of national myths. As for the United Kingdom, the authors note that in 1884 Greenwich became the time keeper for the world. […] This was an inevitable choice given Britain’s dominance of the seas. Dassù and Campanella argue that Brexit constitutes a new Greenwich moment. By voting for Brexit, Britain has again attempted to move the hands of the clock, just like in 1884: only this time it has only moved the hands on its own clock, not the world’s; and this time, it has moved the clock back, not forwards.

In Britain’s bid to look to the past, its imperial legacy has played a decisive role. This phenomenon is not exclusive to Britain, it is a characteristic of all the main imperial powers of the recent past, such as Russia and Turkey. Empires do fall, but their ontological legacy has lasting effects on the nations which emerge — the post-imperil nations.

In these old declining powers, nostalgia arises from fear of losing acquired privileges to an emerging Asia, to migratory flows, and to globalisation. As reported by the authors, it is these factors which constitute the structural reasons for a yearning for the past.

The European mooring

As Stephens explains, Britain Alone is a story of inflated ambition and diminished circumstance: the dissolution of an empire that in 1945 was home to 700 million citizens left Britain in search of a new identity, in a world where other great powers made the rules.

From time to time, Britain’s political leaders have been brave enough to present the country with the unvarnished choices offered by relative economic decline, however more often, they sought to cling on to the illusions until they were overwhelmed by circumstance Stephens argues that the original sin belonged to Winston Churchill: Britain had won the war and the Allies, popular imagination had it, had played secondary roles in the great drama. Here were the roots of the exceptionalism that saw future generations closing their eyes to the shifting balance of power and clinging on instead to the baubles of national prestige.

During the early post-war period Britain rejected the European project. However, in 1961 — following the Suez debacle — London applied to join the EEC. This was met by De Gaulle’s veto. Britain had to wait until 1971 before Georges Pompidou finally lifted the Gaullist veto. This paved the way to Britain joining the EEC in 1973. Stephens writes that what really hurt was the evidence of absolute decline, particularly after Britain excluded itself from the early decades of European integration.

Membership of the EEC allowed a workable compromise between the pull of the past and the realities of the present. As for the Trans-Atlantic relationship, as early as 1945, the Foreign Office had concluded that Britain would only be able to keep a place at the top table with the Ameri cans and the Soviet Union if it secured the leading role in Europe. Stephens describes how during a speech to the Commons in 1975, Margaret Thatcher stated that: Europe had opened windows to the world that would otherwise be closing with the end of empire

Today, with the intensification of tensions between the powers, the historic — and partly structural — deficit in centralisation within the EU has become even more evident; a deficit which has traditionally been promoted by British policy. Sergio Fabbrini has sought to quantify the delay by estimating that Next Generation EU could take eighteen months to roll out, compared to a mere two months for the US stimulus package. However, the continental scale of the EU means that its power will be enhanced.

Dassù and Campanella show how the arguments in favour of the Europcan option have been overturned and denied by the nostalgic illusion. This comprises three moments: the golden age, which refers to the age of empire. the great break, which was caused by the slow decline of empire and the decision of the UK to adhere to the European project in 1973 ; and finally the current discontent. Joining the EU was a break from the otherwise uninterrupted history of the United Kingdom since Magna Carta. In theory, Brexit represents a closure to this nostalgic cycle which will lead Britain back to the Golden Age.

A pocket-sized superpower?

Last March, the Johnson government published its Integrated Review on foreign policy, security and defence, entitled Global Britain in a Competitive Age. The document defines London’s global role for the next decade and deals with issues such as the tilt to Indo-Pacific which is described as the world’s growth engine, and the strengthening of Britin’s nuclear arsenal.

For the Financial Times [March 16th]: there is a Johnsonian have-your-cakeand-eat-it quality to this image of Britain as a pocket-sized superpower. A tilt to the Indo-Pacific makes sense, even if it is mainly a cover for opening markets, but there is a mismatch between the scale of ambition and the resources and capabilities available. The FT concludes: more realistic would be to accept the UK’s role as a sizeable European power, with global interests. London should represent a solid European pillar of NATO, The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific has some unrealistic aspects, with the risk of over-extension, and above all obscures a sizeable hole at the heart of the document — any vision for co-operation with the most important partner for Britain’s safety: Europe, and in particular the EU.

Le Monde comes to a similar conclusion. More than fifty years on from London’s decision to integrate Europe and proclaim its withdrawal ‘East of Suez’ thereby renouncing any ambition of being a global power […] it comes as a shock to see our neighbour turn away and adopt a vague and risky strategy on its own. One in which imperial nostalgia is accompanied by strategic know-how, and where global aspirations are used to mask the economic shock of Brexit.

American paternalism

As for the nuclear deterrent, Stephen highlights that Britain’s arsenal relies completely on American technology to keep it in service and may risk underestimating its political and military significance. This distinguishes Britain’s deterrent from France’s force de frappe. In Stephens’ view, the relationship with the USA has often appeared servile rather than special, with Washington often showing itself to be brutally unsentimental. For instance, Truman cancelled the Lend-Lease programme — the US loan to bankroll Britain’s war effort in the Second World War — without notice. Again, during the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower ordered the US ambassador to the United Nations to vote with the USSR against its own ally. Furthermore, the American Treasury blocked Britain’s access to the international money markets and in so doing hindered its attempt to support sterling during the crisis. Even during the supposedly idyllic relationship between the two during the Reagan-Thatcher years in the 1980s, the US President failed to consult Britain before invading Grenada — a Commonwealth member — and before initiating negotiations with Gorbachev, which included the future of the British nuclear deterrent. London’s participation in the Iraq war, at odds with the Rhineland axis, did not secure it a say in the post-Saddam Hussein era.

Unfortunate timing

The UK matured the tormented, strategic decision to adhere to the European project during the first three decades of the post-war period — the start of a long phase of development for the old powers. However, today’s conditions of imperialist tensions, Atlantic decline and growing tensions between continental power blocs, makes the decision to opt for Europe even more relevant. Stephens writes: the timing of the decision to pull up Britain’s anchor could scarcely have been more unfortunate. Predictions of a stable post-Cold War order have been confounded. History has moved in the opposite direction. China and Russia have challenged Western power. Now, Johnson promises a second Elizabethan age, with a buccaneering ‘Global Britain’, but the reality looks a lot more like Britain, or perhaps England, alone

It must be noted that while the current multilateral, liberist global cycle continues, it is possible for the agile British ship sailing the high seas to reap opportunities and advantages abroad. However, the persisting dialectic between multilateralism and power confrontation is taking place in a context of intensifying global tensions and is now on a continental scale.

Lotta Comunista, April 2021

Popular posts in the last week

Collaboration and Nationalism in Ukraine and Belarus

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Page 8 In her essay Economia di guerra e inquadramento della società in URSS ( The War Economy and Social Control in the USSR ), Rebecca Manley writes that initially the German advance in Russia was welcomed by the local population and threatened the legitimacy of the reigning power , while party leaders, officials, and factory managers often jumped ship , with the abandoned populace openly cursing them [A. Aglan and R. Frank, La guerra-mondo 1937-1947 ( The World War 1937-1947 ), Einaudi, 2015-16]. Her account goes on to describe the government's gradual reassertion of control: The cost in human lives was increasing and shortages were continuing to worsen [...] it was only with the victory of Stalingrad that Stalin and the Soviet system recovered a central role in war propaganda . Overall, according to this author, the war years saw a surge of popular patr...

Reckless Bets on Migrants in California

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 11 From the series Chronicles of the new American nationalism The tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump on allies, partners and opponents of the United States have opened a phase of negotiations with the affected countries and caused reactions from some key States. The legal opposition from almost all areas of the US poses a test: whether States, courts, and Congress can influence trade policy and constrain the expansion of executive powers. Amid conflicting rulings, the tariffs have been reinstated – an outcome that, The New York Times remarks, has “left Washington, Wall Street, and much of the world trying to discern the future of US trade policy”. California’s dispute with the federal government has expanded to immigration policy and the domestic use of military force. The political, economic, and power struggle...

Electoral Upheaval and Turmoil Inside Labour

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Page 3 From the series European news As Henry Kissinger wrote in his book Leadership (Penguin, 2022), in the British political system, parties are "rigorously institutionalized": "An electoral victory functions first to empower a party in parliament and, as a consequence of that, to install a new premier". Unlike presidential systems such as the American one, "the British system elevates members of the cabinet to the highest echelons of their party". The prime minister's authority "rests primarily on the maintenance of party discipline" because "the dissent of an influential clique, or the machinations of a single magnetic personality, can limit the premier's ability to pursue desired political objectives". "In extraordinary circumstances", warns Kissinger, ...

Multiple Games in the Third Gulf War

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Page 6 The conflict in the Gulf has entered its third month, marked by a precarious truce that reflects a strategic stalemate, with Tehran’s “selective blockade” of Hormuz and the US Navy’s “counter-blockade” of Iranian ports. According to the Pakistani daily Dawn , bilateral negotiations — mediated by Islamabad with the explicit support of Riyadh and the “discreet and indirect” backing of Beijing — appear to centre on the price of reopening the energy artery. For Washington, writes the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat , the negotiations should yield some kind of “tangible result” on the nuclear issue, allowing both sides to “claim victory”, given that the priority is resuming commercial traffic. To this end, granting Tehran the opportunity to collect some form of revenue has not been ruled out. Iranian “pragmatic” factions are raising the idea of maritime tr...

The EU Commission Plans for Rearmament and a Clean Industrial Deal

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Page 2 From the series European news Following the European elections which took place on June 6th - 9th, the leaders of the Member States met on June 27th at the European Council. Ursula von der Leyen was nominated as president of the next European Commission, after she was chosen as the European People’s Party’s (EPP) Spitzenkandidat (“leading candidate”). The agreement also included the election of former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa as president of the European Council, and the appointment of former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Subsequently, on July 18th, Parliament elected von der Leyen as president of the Commission by an absolute majority, with 401 votes out of 719 MEPs. On September 17th, von der Leyen presented her team of commissioners to the European Parliament and, two days later, the Council adopted this list of...

Strikes at Samsung

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Page 7 From the series Workers’ struggles in the world The struggle waged by Samsung Electronics workers over the last three years has a particular significance in the panorama of workers’ struggles around the world. A great deal of this significance undoubtedly derives from its having been the first ever strike at the South Korean company where, moreover, no trade union existed until a few years ago: until 2020, Samsung was strictly non-union. But it is also important because, according to trade-union sources, it was the world’s first strike in the crucial chip-production sector. Today these are fundamental and indispensable components for a myriad of products, for both civilian and military use, and they are becoming even more important with the increasing hardware needs of artificial intelligence. This struggle therefore concerns a prod...

Beijing, Ambivalent About the G2, Opts for Temporary Stability

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Pages 4 and 5 Kolkata's The Telegraph announces "a rupture with the principle of post-War pacifism: that Japan and Germany had adhered to for decades". The West Bengal-based newspaper was founded in 1982 by Aveek Sarkar, a former protégé of Harold Evans at The Sunday Times in London. The editorial highlights certain aspects worth noting. First and foremost, there is a psychological dimension to the crises in the world order . The ideologies of the post-war order, imposed on the defeated bourgeoisies of Germany and Japan for decades, have permeated the whole of society to the point of becoming second nature that shape the German and Japanese ruling classes themselves. But today, a re-evaluation of these ideologies is in turn being imposed by an uneven development that, over the long term, has been economic, political, and military. This is a Z...

The KPD After January 1919

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Page 9 From the series Pages from the history of the workers’ movement The Weimar Republic took shape in the first six months of 1919, as Gustav Noske's Freikorps suppressed the revolution. The bourgeois parties of Weimar In the elections for the Constituent Assembly on January 19 th , 1919, the large corporate groups of German capital financed and steered the political forces. The four major banks alone contributed at least 30 million marks to the election funds of the various parties. At the head of the bourgeois forces were the great electricity magnates Walther Rathenau of AEG and Carl Friedrich von Siemens for the Democrats; Karl Helfferich of Deutsche Bank and Alfred Hugenberg of Krupp for the far-right nationalists; and major industrialists such as Hugo Stinnes for Gustav Stresemann's People's Party. Th...

Lotta Comunista: The Origins 1943-1952

Guido La Barbera Contents 9. Preface to the English Edition 13. Preface 19. Useful dates 21. Chapter One «ONE OUGHT TO KNOW WITH WHOM ONE IS DEALING» 25. The balance-of-power theory 27. Theory and the ‘strategy-party’ 29. Chapter Two THE FOUNDRY AND THE PARTISAN STRUGGLE 31. The Savona group 39. Passion disciplined by reason 40. Never again a tool in the hands of others 41. The Genoa group 46. The Sestri Ponente group 48. The groups in Rome and Tuscany 52. The strength of GAAP: ‘only a handful’ 55. Chapter Three LIBERTARIAN COMMUNISM: A DIFFERENT KIND OF COMMUNISM 58. Reckoning with Bordiga...

The Four Petrochemical Giants

Internationalism No. 86, April 2026 Page 15 From the series Major industrial groups in China When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, oil extraction in the country was practically non-existent, and the country was completely dependent on imports. The exploration and development of domestic oil resources required a major effort. As Jin Zhang reports in his book Catch-up and Competitiveness in China [Routledge, 2004]: The required massive human resources were supplied by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In 1952, Mao Zedong ordered the reorganisation of the 57 th Division of the 19 th Army of the PLA into the 1 st Division of Oil . The effort led to the discovery of several oil fields, the most significant of which was in Daqing, Heilongjiang Province, in northeastern China, in 1959. It became operational the following year, reaching a ...