Skip to main content

Tokyo’s Balancing Act over Rearmament for a Stormy Fifteen Years

The taifu shizun, Japan’s typhoon season, last from May to October and is especially intense between August and September. Straits Times, a prestigious Singaporean newspaper, recently used the metaphor, invoking the rumbling of thunder and lightning bolts in relation to the announcement of the AUKUS deal (Washington’s strategic relaunch in the Indo-Pacific), and the immediate Chinese economic response, with China applying to join the CPTPP, the equivalent trading bloc to the RCEP in the Pacific.

A hot autumn in the Indo-Pacific

Other events have contributed to upsetting the Asian waters: the American withdrawal from Kabul, which has raised doubts about American credibility among its allies and Asian partners; a succession of North Korean ballistic tests, with the novelty of a Pyongyang cruise missile being deployed; the test conducted by Seoul of a ballistic missile aboard a conventional submarine, with South Korea blatantly flaunting its ambitions to equip itself with nuclear-powered vessels. The region is also experiencing renewed militry tensions between China and Taiwan over Taipei’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), accompanied by massive naval manoeuvres by the Quad countries — the USA, Australia, Japan and India between Okinawa and the Bay of Bengal.

Tokyo has taken the opportunity to test its Izumo-class helicopter carriers — which were converted to de facto aircraft carrier[s], in the Global Times description — by having the marines’ F-34Bs aircraft take off from their decks. In , Japan approved the purchase of a batch of 42 F-35B aircraft; some will be deployed on the two converted carriers, the Izumo and the Kaga. In mid-October Russia and China held naval exercises in the Sea of Japan, with Beijing deploying some of its most modern and powerful units.

The Financial Times speaks of a hot autumn in Asian waters. Washington and its various allies are flexing their muscles in what Beijing views as its backyard, a harbinger of the region’s future in which east and south-east Asia is becoming the world’s busiest staging ground for military rivalry between Beijing and liberal democracies []. On the Financial Times front page carried the news of the Chinese test, which took place at the start of August, of a hypersonic missile with a very long range, which caught US intelligence by surprise. The USA underestimated China’s astounding progress, not only in hypersonic technology, but also in orbital weapons, or FOBS (Fractional Orbital Bombing System). A similar system was developed and tested by the USSR between and , to close the gap with the USA in intercontinental missiles (ICBMs). In this way the USSR equipped itself with nuclear warhead launchers with a theoretical range of 40,000 km [Hugh Harkins, The Soviet Globalnaya Raketa, Centurion Publishing, ].

The changing of the LDP guard amid Covid-19, China, and missiles

This is the geopolitical context in which the elections for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were held in Japan following Yoshihide Suga’s resignation on . Suga had previously succeeded Shinzo Abe in . The internal electoral rounds, equivalent to America’s presidential primaries, saw the victory in the second round of Fumio Kishida, who rose to the premiership as a candidate in the legislative elections of .

Suga’s downfall, according to the Japanese press, was caused by his lack of appeal to the electorate, following his defeat in the municipal elections in Yokohama, his electoral fiefdom, combined with a spike in Covid-19 infections over the summer. While his government achieved a vaccination rate of about 67% of the population [as per mid-October] — on par with France and above the USA — it has given mixed signals, particularly in applying emergency health regulations, with sectors of the economy, especially small businesses, suffering.

The conversion of the dove Kishida

Based on the narrative circulated at the time of Abe’s succession, Suga was seen by the LDP as an interim solution to avoid early elections in the midst of a health emergency. Suga was elected in large part thanks to the LDP’s Chinese faction, led by Secretary General Toshihiro Nikai. He ultimately proved to be the lightning rod in a struggle to succeed Abe and, according to Japanese reports, was unfit to lead the party in national elections as well as unable manage the internal confrontation over relations with Beijing, Taipei and Washington.

Even Nikai, who had to leave the secretariat, emerged weakened from the internal confrontation, and eventually resolved to support Kishida. According to the Japanese press, this affair has confirmed that Abe is the liberal-democratic kingmaker: if Kishida, foreign minister from to , had always been considered by the former premier as a potential successor, he was also judged as still immature, not very suitable to face a crisis, being considered by the LDP right wing as having pro-China dovish […] views. Along with his faction (the Kochikai), and in combination with Kakuei Tanka’s centrist faction (the Keiseikai), he supported the Yoshida consensus of pursuing a slow post-war Japanese rise, privileging the exercise of economic force and limiting the recovery of political-military instruments.

Kishida, 64 years old, is a native of Hiroshima and an anti-nuclearist with a technocratic background. He was deemed more suitable than Taro Kono, former defence and foreign minister, who was responsible for the vaccination programme under Suga Kono, who is very popular among LDP members but is considered not very controllable by the party establishment, is disliked by the national-conservative right because of positions that are too liberal on the social level, and because he favours abandoning nuclear energy. Abe did not directly back Kishida for the presidency, supporting the candidacy of Sane Takaichi, a former interior minister with strongly nationalist views. Takaichi’s share of the votes, which placed her in third position after the first round, was swung by Abe to Kishida in the second round. The last televised debate between candidates, following the AUKUS announcement, was characterised by anti-Chinese overtones, with Kono and Takaichi arguing for Tokyo’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines: on this point Kishida broke away, saying he was against a Japanese AUKUS solution.

A force de frappe in the making?

However, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal on and reiterated a few days later in Nikkei, Kishida argued in favour of implementing the Abe line on a Japanese missile counterattack capability. If Japan couldn’t attack potential enemies first, […] it needed to be prepared for a scenario in which it was struck first and expecting further missile attacks. In such a scenario, Can we protect the lives of the people by watching silently as Japan gets hit? […] Don’t we need to have the ability to block the other side’s missile attack capability? In essence: the missile arsenal would not be used for a pre-emptive strike, but as a second-strike, retaliatory tool, as part of a defensive deterrence posture.

In many ways this echoes Tokyo’s position since the 1950s regarding the possession of an autonomous nuclear deterrent, considered constitutionally legitimate under the right to self-defence. In , Nikkei intervened in this debate by underlining how a static missile defence and enemy-base strikes were not mutually exclusive and should be considered within a broader concept of deterrence. The American, French and British concepts emphasised three dimensions: retaliating with nuclear or conventional weapons; a preemptive strike on an enemy base in the event of an imminent attack; and the use of anti-missile systems to parry an attack. Even neutral Finland, he added, has a strong deterrent plan, with the ability to attack Russian industrial areas near the border with precision munitions According to Kishida, Tokyo needs to overcome the false dichotomy between shield and spear and equip itself not only with cruise missiles, but also with a counterforce of ballistic missiles, in order to strike the adversary’s launching bases in a few minutes. A sort of force de frappe that, in Kishida’s formulation, is presented as self-sufficient defensive deterrence.

Stable realism and the rearmament perspective

Kishida came off in the Japanese mainstream press as a the status quo candidate and a stable realist, a balance between the normal-nationalism of Abe and the right-wing LDP and the Yoshida school. In , his apointment as foreign minister was interpreted as a signal to Beijing of the pragmatic political mix of Abe’s tempered revisionism [Japan’s Cautious Turn to Nationalism, Internationalist Bulletin, ]. The support of the right, with Takaichi elevated to the third executive position of the party, means that Japanese rearmament is now for the first time part of a liberal-democratic electoral platform. This platform plans to raise defence spending even above 2% of GDP, breaking the ceiling of 1%, which was introduced in . Essentially, this would be a jump in military spending from $50 to $100 billion. According to the Asahi Shimbun, it is an unprecedented commitment, which highlights Japan’s haste to acquire missiles, stealth fighters, drones and other weapons systems to deter the PLA [Chinese armed forces] in the disputed East China Sea. The time horizon, according to Kishida’s first measures, seems to be that of the next fifteen years, overlapping with the implementation timeline of the AUKUS agreements.

A more immediate dimension is that of economic rearmament. In an interview with the Financial Times, the new prime minister spoke of deeper collaboration between the state and the private sector to secure strategic assets and technologies such as chips and rare earths. which will be pivotal for economic security, and to ensure that Japan has a self-sufficient economy and indispensability in creating stable global supply chains. Japan, he said, has no specific plans to join the [AUKUS] framework but believes it is of the utmost importance for European and US countries to be interested and involved in Asia’s security environment. Economic relations with China should be stabilised but, at the political level, Japan must be able to firmly assert itself against China [].

For Global Times, Kishida’s conversion to hawkishness can also be read as an election tactic. But the fact that he was hand-picked by Abe indicates that he will try to define China-Japan relatons within the framework of [Japan’s] alliance with the US [].

This is an assessment echoed by Dimitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Foundation in Moscow: Kishida must manage geopolitical fault lines in the Indo-Pacific region […] turning into frontlines the Sino-American rivalry has generated two poles in the global system, but not […] yet two blocs. Within the Sino-American rivalry, the Russian power seeks to maintain an equilibrium. This is different from equidistance, and Russia’s focus is on promoting its own national interests. For Trenin, Moscow’s position is a mirror image of Tokyo’s. In the game of multipolar balances, caught between prospective and real rearmaments, all players find themselves handing sticks of dynamite.

De Simone, Gianluca. Equilibri di Tokyo nel riarmo per un quindicennio tempestoso Lotta Comunista, , p. 13

Popular posts in the last week

Reckless Bets on Migrants in California

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 11 From the series Chronicles of the new American nationalism The tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump on allies, partners and opponents of the United States have opened a phase of negotiations with the affected countries and caused reactions from some key States. The legal opposition from almost all areas of the US poses a test: whether States, courts, and Congress can influence trade policy and constrain the expansion of executive powers. Amid conflicting rulings, the tariffs have been reinstated – an outcome that, The New York Times remarks, has “left Washington, Wall Street, and much of the world trying to discern the future of US trade policy”. California’s dispute with the federal government has expanded to immigration policy and the domestic use of military force. The political, economic, and power struggle...

Electoral Upheaval and Turmoil Inside Labour

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Page 3 From the series European news As Henry Kissinger wrote in his book Leadership (Penguin, 2022), in the British political system, parties are "rigorously institutionalized": "An electoral victory functions first to empower a party in parliament and, as a consequence of that, to install a new premier". Unlike presidential systems such as the American one, "the British system elevates members of the cabinet to the highest echelons of their party". The prime minister's authority "rests primarily on the maintenance of party discipline" because "the dissent of an influential clique, or the machinations of a single magnetic personality, can limit the premier's ability to pursue desired political objectives". "In extraordinary circumstances", warns Kissinger, ...

An Italianised Europe

Internationalism No. 88 - June 2026 Page 2 In almost four years in government, Italy’s renewed stability has been a key asset for Giorgia Meloni, also encouraging the European adaptation of the italian-style immigrants . However, the backlash from the referendum defeat, a real own goal, has opened a glaring rift that runs through both the end of the current legislature and the prospects for the next. There is debate over the political exhaustion of her government, forced to navigate the narrow path of budgetary statistics and under the threat of what the Financial Times has termed a “coming energy crisis” triggered by the blockade of the strait of Hormuz. At the referendum polls, the left-wing broad coalition “discovered” that it could compete with the centre-right, but no poll shows any substantial changes in the balance of power. The scenario of a “deadlock”, or a narrow majority for one...

The EU Commission Plans for Rearmament and a Clean Industrial Deal

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Page 2 From the series European news Following the European elections which took place on June 6th - 9th, the leaders of the Member States met on June 27th at the European Council. Ursula von der Leyen was nominated as president of the next European Commission, after she was chosen as the European People’s Party’s (EPP) Spitzenkandidat (“leading candidate”). The agreement also included the election of former Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa as president of the European Council, and the appointment of former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Subsequently, on July 18th, Parliament elected von der Leyen as president of the Commission by an absolute majority, with 401 votes out of 719 MEPs. On September 17th, von der Leyen presented her team of commissioners to the European Parliament and, two days later, the Council adopted this list of...

Opportunities for the Euro and Yuan

Internationalism No. 77, July 2025 Page 13 Estimates by international institutions for April to June confirm the slowdown in global output and trade. The World Bank forecasts a decline in GDP growth from 2.8% in 2024, to 2.3% in 2025, and a sharp fall in trade from 3.4% to 1.8%. The main cause of the new slowdown is the tariff war declared by Donald Trump, who has so far imposed a universal minimum tariff of 10%. The uncertainty arising from his peculiar art of the deal , consisting of lunges, postponements, relaunches, U-turns, and pauses, makes the policy of the world's leading power unpredictable. It is also paying the highest price, with US growth halving, from 2.8% to 1.4%. The Eurozone has been floating at a rate of less than 1% since 2023 and, according to the World Bank, will remain below this level in 2025 and 2026, while the OECD and the ECB predict a return to 1% in 2025. Chin...

Political Battles of European Leninism

Internationalism No. 73, March 2025 Page 1 Thirty years after the death of Arrigo Cervetto , we are publishing here the concluding passages of the introduction to his Opere Scelte (“Selected Works”) for the series Biblioteca Giovani (“Publications for young people”), soon to be published in Italian. The 1944-45 partisan war in Italy. The political battle within libertarian communism. The Korean War, and the watchword of “neither Washington nor Moscow”. The layoffs at the Ilva and Ansaldo factories, the political battle and trade union defence in the struggles of post-war restructuring. From 1953 onwards, the crisis of Stalinism, the 1956 Suez crisis, the Hungarian uprising, the 1957 Theses and the challenge of theory and strategy vis-à-vis the tendencies of unitary imperialism. The political struggle within Azione Comunista (“Communist Action”) and the Movimento della Sinistra Comunista (“Movement of the Communist Left”). From the 1950s to the early 1970s, t...

Lotta Comunista: The Origins 1943-1952

Guido La Barbera Contents 9. Preface to the English Edition 13. Preface 19. Useful dates 21. Chapter One «ONE OUGHT TO KNOW WITH WHOM ONE IS DEALING» 25. The balance-of-power theory 27. Theory and the ‘strategy-party’ 29. Chapter Two THE FOUNDRY AND THE PARTISAN STRUGGLE 31. The Savona group 39. Passion disciplined by reason 40. Never again a tool in the hands of others 41. The Genoa group 46. The Sestri Ponente group 48. The groups in Rome and Tuscany 52. The strength of GAAP: ‘only a handful’ 55. Chapter Three LIBERTARIAN COMMUNISM: A DIFFERENT KIND OF COMMUNISM 58. Reckoning with Bordiga...

Libertarian Communism: A Different Kind of Communism

Chapter Three LIBERTARIAN COMMUNISM: A DIFFERENT KIND OF COMMUNISM   An examination of the debate within the groups that were to create GAAP (Anarchist Groups of Proletarian Action) gives a vivid picture of the problems that between 1948 and 1951 had to be slowly and painfully faced. Three major confrontations, progressively more serious, took place between Cervetto and Masini in the autumn of 1949 and again in the spring and autumn of 1950. As preparations were being made for the National Conference at Pontedecimo – from which GAAP would be born – debate on the nature of the organisation and on theories of the State and imperialism began to define the characteristics of the new political group, but also revealed the differences. The first step had been to look for ‘a different kind’ of communism in anarchism. Along this road Cervetto , with an ever-surer grasp, would raise the issue that had been first posed by Marx and Lenin : our militant...

Beijing, Ambivalent About the G2, Opts for Temporary Stability

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Pages 4 and 5 Kolkata's The Telegraph announces "a rupture with the principle of post-War pacifism: that Japan and Germany had adhered to for decades". The West Bengal-based newspaper was founded in 1982 by Aveek Sarkar, a former protégé of Harold Evans at The Sunday Times in London. The editorial highlights certain aspects worth noting. First and foremost, there is a psychological dimension to the crises in the world order . The ideologies of the post-war order, imposed on the defeated bourgeoisies of Germany and Japan for decades, have permeated the whole of society to the point of becoming second nature that shape the German and Japanese ruling classes themselves. But today, a re-evaluation of these ideologies is in turn being imposed by an uneven development that, over the long term, has been economic, political, and military. This is a Z...

Multiple Games in the Third Gulf War

Internationalism No. 88, June 2026 Page 6 The conflict in the Gulf has entered its third month, marked by a precarious truce that reflects a strategic stalemate, with Tehran’s “selective blockade” of Hormuz and the US Navy’s “counter-blockade” of Iranian ports. According to the Pakistani daily Dawn , bilateral negotiations — mediated by Islamabad with the explicit support of Riyadh and the “discreet and indirect” backing of Beijing — appear to centre on the price of reopening the energy artery. For Washington, writes the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat , the negotiations should yield some kind of “tangible result” on the nuclear issue, allowing both sides to “claim victory”, given that the priority is resuming commercial traffic. To this end, granting Tehran the opportunity to collect some form of revenue has not been ruled out. Iranian “pragmatic” factions are raising the idea of maritime tr...