Skip to main content

Industrial Apparatuses in Confrontation

From the series The struggle against coronavirus

According to the British analyst firm Airfinity, some 9.5 billion doses of Covid-19 vaccines will be produced worldwide in 2021. This number is double the annual production of all types of vaccines in the pre-pandemic era (5 billion, excluding oral polio, travellers’ and military vaccines), and can be compared with the requirement of 11.5 billion to immunise two-thirds of the world’s population [Airfinity, March 8th]. The development of vaccines has been exceptionally rapid, but manufacturing them on a large scale has encountered difficulties and delays. In 2020, only 4% of the expected doses were in fact produced [ibidem].

Production is concentrated in a limited number of countries, largely interdependent due to supply chains that cross state borders and continents. The World Bank identifies, among the producing countries, a Covid-19 vaccine producers club of 13 countries that manufacture both the active ingredient and its components. This exclusive Vaccine Club is also awarded 60% of the total Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) — the advance purchase of vaccines — with pharmaceutical companies [World Bank, The Covid-19 vaccine production club, March 2021].

The World Bank’s concern is that aggressive forms of vaccine nationalism , by limiting exports, are disrupting global supply chains. For its part, the World Health Organization (WHO) fears that in much of the world, such as in Africa, vaccines will not arrive until 2023 or 2024.

Crippled internationalism

In June last year, the Global Vaccine Alliance (GAVI), together with the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the WHO, launched the COVAX programme. It covers 192 countries, with the aim of ensuring equitable global distribution of vaccines, initially providing two billion doses, two-thirds free of charge, to 92 lower-income countries. Donations were in short supply and, two months into the vaccination campaign, COVAX had still not been able to deliver a single dose to the poorest countries [Financial Times, February 13th]. Initially conceived as a single clearing house for vaccine orders around the world, from which all countries, rich and poor, would procure their doses, notes the City newspaper, the program almost immediately foundered in the race for bilateral deals between the richest nations and the vaccine companies, and the priority allocation to domestic needs practised by countries like the United States, the UK and, more recently, even India.

Limited production, coupled with the supply dispute that has arisen between the European Commission and pharmaceutical companies — in particular with the Anglo-Swedish company AstraZeneca — has prompted several European leaders (and various scientific and political figures) to raise the issue of patents. The President of the European Council Charles Michel at the beginning of the year raised the possibility of the EU adopting ‘urgent measures’ — provided for in Article 122 of the Treaty — to impose ‘compulsory licensing’ on companies [Politico, February 3rd]. In fact, last December, the request made by some countries, including India and South Africa, for companies to waive patent exclusivity was rejected by the United States, the UK and the EU [The New York Times, December 25th].

The protection of intellectual property is regulated by the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The amendment, adopted at the Doha Conference in 2001 and subsequently clarified, provides for the right of a state, in the event of a national health emergency, to produce (or have a third-party produce) a drug without the permission of the company holding the patent on the product or its manufacturing process. In 2017, two-thirds of the WTO membership had ratified the amendment, making it operational.

The compulsory licence could facilitate the entry of new companies into the market, but it still leaves the problem of production capacity for high-technology medicines (such as new vaccines) unsolved.

A kind of ‘vaccine internationalism’ is called for by many. Its realization presupposes, however, the overcoming of barriers and conflicts, commercial and otherwise, between states, and of competition between economic groups; it involves the pooling of resources and productive capacity, the coordination and direction of the global production of vaccines and their distribution according to public needs worldwide. At the very least, it means stripping vaccines of their characteristics of a commodity, which is the form in which the products of human labour are presented in the capitalist social system.

The critics of neoliberalism and globalization stop at the threshold of criticizing the very foundations of the capitalist socio-economic formation. They instead lash out at the excessive power of the banks or the greed of the multinationals, etc., and cultivate the illusion that it is possible to eliminate some of these most odious, but inevitable, forms of capitalism in its imperialistic maturity. Lenin called this wishful thinking.

Production sites for Covid-19 vaccines in the EU and the UK.

Production sites for Covid-19 vaccines in the EU and the UK. In some plants (highlighted in red) the biological active substance is produced, in others the final stages of production, such as bottling and packaging, are carried out. Some of the facilities belong to the company that owns the vaccine, while more than half belong to companies that work on behalf of third parties (CDMO, Contract Development and Manufacturing Organization). Four vaccines are licensed in the EU (BioNTech/Pfizer, Oxford/AstraZeneca, Moderna and J&J); the others are under review by regulatory bodies (CureVac and Novavax) or are still undergoing clinical trials.

Sources: EDJNet — European Data Journalism Network, March 5th, European Commission; corporate communications.

Industrial powers in confrontation

Airfinity calculates that at the end of March the production of Covid-19 vaccines stood at 229 million doses in China, 164 in the US, 125 in India, 110 in the EU (three quarters of which are in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands), and 16 in the UK. China exported 48%, India 44% and the EU 42%. The USA and the UK have kept all of their doses for their domestic markets [Airfinity, March 24th].

Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton believes the EU is winning the industrial battle: producing — he writes — over 200 million doses of vaccines, reaching current levels of production in the US, and the Union’s annual production capacity is expected to reach 3 billion doses by the end of the year. Breton also lays claim to the Union’s role as a top exporter worldwide. At least two-thirds of the 30 million doses administered in Britain were produced in Europe, and the UK depends on the EU for the second dose [European Commission, Beating COVID-19: Scale-up of vaccine production in Europe, April 8th].

Breton refers to 53 production sites for Covid-19 vaccines in Europe. 26% of the facilities are located in Germany. Together with the Netherlands and Belgium, the three countries host 40% of the sites, which in some cases produce more than one type of vaccine. In fact, at least thirty or so plants are owned by companies working on behalf of third parties (CDMO, Contract Development and Manufacturing Organization), of around ten nationalities, mostly German, Spanish and American.

The EU, writes Breton, is an industrial power that is and intends to remain a global player, rejecting vaccine nationalism. The European Commission has, however, since last January, made exports of vaccines subject to authorization. The EU, comments The Economist, is torn between its reputation as champion of open markets and the needs of internal supply [March 27th].

There is an ongoing struggle between the metropolises over health. The production capacity of vaccines, as well as the organisational efficiency in carrying out vaccination strategies — a precondition for a less or more rapid economic recovery — is a measure of the overall strength of states in the global competition.

Lotta Comunista, April 2021

Popular posts from this blog

The British Link in the Imperialist Chain

Internationalism No. 33, November 2021 Page 8 Lenin often used the metaphor of a chain that binds the world to describe imperialism. The October Revolution of 1917 broke a first link in that chain and hoped to pull the whole thing loose. The metaphor was adopted in those years by all the Bolshevik leaders and the leaders of the newly formed Third International. Within a decade, Stalin's well-known formula of socialism in one country signified the overturning of that strategic cornerstone and the defeat of the revolution in Russia, in Europe, and in the world. Dates that have come to symbolise historical change act as the synthesis of previously accumulated contradictions, and, while such a sudden change does not exhaust the possibility of future contradictions, the concentration of events in 1926 nonetheless marked a watershed that revealed the true extent that the counter-revolution had reached. The great general strike in the United Kingdom that year, wh...

German Socialism in 1917

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 6 From the series Pages from the history of the worker’s movement  According to Arrigo Cervetto [ Opere , Vol. 7], “paracentrism” is “the biggest obstacle to the formation of the worldwide Bolshevik party”. The Spartacists at Zimmerwald and Kiental Cervetto was analysing Lenin’s battle against centrism for the creation of the Third International, a battle which saw him isolated at Zimmerwald. He wrote down one of Zinoviev’s quotations from Histoire du parti communiste russe . “We were in the minority at Zimmerwald [1915]. […] In the years 1915 and 1916, we were nothing but an insignificant minority”. “But what is more serious?” – observed Cervetto – “is that the Zimmerwald Spartacists also said they were opposed to us”. In the strategic perspective of the “two separate halves” of socialism – the political conditions in Russia and the economic, productive, and social conditions in Germany – “for ...

The Theoretical and Political Battles of Arrigo Cervetto II

From the introduction to Arrigo Cervetto’s Opere Scelte (“Selected Works”), soon to be published in Italy by Edizioni Lotta Comunista. II “Neither Washington nor Moscow”, “Neither Truman nor Stalin”. These were slogans sufficient to rally the internationalist cause, not only against the influence of the Stalinist Italian Communist Party (PCI) on one front, but also, on the opposite side, against the pro-American, “Westernist” leanings present in certain political currents of anarchist individualism. There was a unitary imperialism to be fought, of which the US and the USSR were both expressions. 1951, Genoa Pontedecimo In the ideological climate of the Cold War, heightened by the Korean War, a third world conflict was considered imminent; La guerra che viene (“The coming war”) was the title of a Trotskyist-inspired pamphlet that ultimately leaned in favour of the USSR, but reflected a widespread perception. The internation alist principle alone proved insufficient. To maintain...

Militarised Scientists

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Page 13 From the series Atom and industrialisation of science “ The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers ” [Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto ). The Manhattan Project scientists In Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists , Robert Jungk [1913-1994] writes that the Manhattan Project was a labyrinth of winding paths and dead ends. Commenting on Jungk’s romanticised account of the first phase of the history of the atomic bomb, Edward Teller [1908-2003], often called the “father” of the H-bomb, wrote: “There is no mention of the futile efforts of the scientists in 1939 to awaken the interest of the military authorities in the atomic bomb. The reader does not learn about the dismay of scientists f...

Battle Over Times for European Rearmament

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Pages 1 and 2 In current Anglo-Saxon vocabulary, appeasement stands for cowardly and illusory pacification, as exemplified by the Munich Agreement of 1938, which conceded to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia without stopping the march towards world war. Were Shigeru Ishiba, Ursula von der Leyen, Emmanuel Macron, and Friedrich Merz really, as has been said, the Neville Chamberlains of the tariff war, accepting appeasement on the 15% tariff in an ignominious surrender to Donald Trump's blackmail? And has Trump really revealed himself in Anchorage, Alaska, to be an appeaser towards Vladimir Putin? Was it, finally, only the firmness of the Europeans at the Washington summit which convinced Trump to remain as one of the guarantors of Ukraine's security? The plague of television and social media diplomacy feeds on simplistic and propagandistic images, but also consumes and contradicts them at the pace of...

Class Consciousness and Crisis in the World Order

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Pages 1 and 2 The consciousness of the proletariat “cannot be genuine class-consciousness, unless the workers learn, from concrete, and above all from topical, political facts and events to observe every other social class in all the manifestations of its intellectual, ethical, and political life; unless they learn to apply in practice the materialist analysis and the materialist estimate of all aspects of the life and activity of all classes, strata, and groups of the population”. If it concentrates exclusively “or even mainly” upon itself alone, the proletariat cannot be revolutionary, “for the self-knowledge of the working class is indissolubly bound up, not solely with a fully clear theoretical understanding or rather, not so much with the theoretical, as with the practical, understanding — of the relationships between all the various classes of modern society”. For this reason, the worker “must have a clear picture in ...

The Drone War

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 13 From the series War industry and European defence The Economist provides an illustration of how the use of unmanned and remotely piloted systems in warfare is expanding. In Africa, 30 governments are equipped with UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), or drones. In 2024, they were deployed 484 times in local wars in thirteen different countries, twice as frequently as the previous year, causing 1,200 deaths. The most widely used drone on the continent is the TB2, produced by the Turkish company Baykar, which has seen a decade of extensive use in conflicts across Syria, Azerbaijan-Armenia, and Ukraine. LBA Systems and MALE drones At the Paris Air Show in mid-June, an agreement was signed to establish LBA Systems, a joint venture between Baykar and Leonardo. The aim is to produce the Akinci and TB3 drones, the latter of which will be capable of taking off from helicopter carrier decks. The aircraft wil...

“Polish Moment” at Risk

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 3 From the series European news In July, the strategic triangle of London-Paris-Berlin was strengthened with the Northwood Declaration, in which the United Kingdom and France signalled the possibility of coordinating the use of their nuclear weapons through the creation of a “Nuclear Steering Group”, and with the Kensington Treaty, an Anglo-German defence pact. These agreements complement the Franco-British agreements of Lancaster House and the Franco-German Treaty of Aachen. Although Poland signed the Treaty of Nancy with France in May 2025, it was excluded from the recent “E3” consultations, in which only the United Kingdom, France, and Germany participated. Nevertheless, the establishment of the new government led by Donald Tusk, the Civic Platform (PO) leader, in the October 2023 elections, after eight years of antagonism with Brussels under the Law and Justice Party (PiS)-dominated government, ha...

Political Battles of European Leninism

Internationalism No. 73, March 2025 Page 1 Thirty years after the death of Arrigo Cervetto , we are publishing here the concluding passages of the introduction to his Opere Scelte (“Selected Works”) for the series Biblioteca Giovani (“Publications for young people”), soon to be published in Italian. The 1944-45 partisan war in Italy. The political battle within libertarian communism. The Korean War, and the watchword of “neither Washington nor Moscow”. The layoffs at the Ilva and Ansaldo factories, the political battle and trade union defence in the struggles of post-war restructuring. From 1953 onwards, the crisis of Stalinism, the 1956 Suez crisis, the Hungarian uprising, the 1957 Theses and the challenge of theory and strategy vis-à-vis the tendencies of unitary imperialism. The political struggle within Azione Comunista (“Communist Action”) and the Movimento della Sinistra Comunista (“Movement of the Communist Left”). From the 1950s to the early 1970s, t...

The SPD Faces the War

Internationalism No. 73, March 2025 Page 6 From the series Pages from the history of the worker’s movement The mystification of the First World War as a defensive war was accompanied by a misunderstanding of political forms, i.e., the illusion that the struggle for a democratic national shell was already a struggle against the imperialist content of German power, as if a democracy could exist outside of or above classes. Arrigo Cervetto, in The Political Shell, spoke of “the illusion of the primacy of politics”. At the same time, however, he emphasised the dialectic between structure and superstructure: “The basic view that political power relations depend on economic relations enables the revolutionary movement to overcome the obstacle of self-delusion; on the other hand, this view remains only a general idea if it does not inspire a restless and specific analysis of the situation, and if it does not demand an attitude consequent upon this analysis”. Mar...