Skip to main content

1919-2019. One hundred years from the foundation of the Communist International

The Analysis of a Defeat

From the special series 1919-2019. One hundred years from the foundation of the Communist International


It was in Lenin’s legacy that the generation of the ’20s and ’30s could have found the theoretical tools to deal with the unprecedented Stalinist counter-revolution and execute an organised retreat for the world party.

Socialism in one country?

Lenin had already framed the essential characteristics of that issue in 1915: given that Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism, it could be assumed that the victory of socialism would be possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone. What that first unequivocally means is that either the socialist revolution is replicated internationally, or it is inevitably defeated. Moreover, since the revolution had begun in backwards Russia, in 1917 it was already predictable that the time given to this inception in one country would be very short. Of course, extensions were possible, such as the one allowing us to win the civil war thanks to the imperialist front’s internal disputes. But there was no need to be under any excessive illusion: the time of an isolated socialist revolution in a backwards country would remain limited.

This correct approach to the problem of international revolution would be completely distorted by Stalinism which, from the premise of uneven development, would jump to opposite conclusions with the thesis of building socialism in one country and of peaceful coexistence.

Lenin’s clarity

Still, Lenin spoke and wrote with a clarity that left no space for misunderstanding. At the III CI Congress he declared:

When we started the international revolution […] We thought either the internatonal revolution comes to our assistance, and in that case our victory will be fully assured, or we shall do our modest revolutionary work in the conviction that even in the event of defeat we shall have served the cause of the revolution and that our experience will benefit other revolutions. It was clear to us that without the support of the international world revolution the victory of the proletarian revolution was impossible. Before the revolution, and even after it, we thought either revolution breaks out in the other countries, in the capitalistically more developed countries, immediately, or at least very quickly, or we must perish.

Lenin’s last lesson

It is no coincidence that Lenin’s last writing is a reflection on the retreat being undertaken in Russia and internationally, and on the possibility of the defeat. The article Better fewer, but better [Pravda, March 4th 1923] was dictated by Lenin in the first days of February 1923, that is a month before the illness forced him to suspend all activity. We can therefore consider it his theoretical testament. Lenin puts the question on the agenda:

Shall we be able to hold on with our small and very small peasant production, and in our present state of ruin, until the West-European capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism?

Lenin’s answer is articulated and complex. Before examining it, however, it’s of use to note that Lenin didn’t expect history to grant the Russian commune an extension for a second time in the next catastrophic collapse or in a prolonged stagnation of world capitalism, but in the acceleration of capitalist contradictory development.

Four main factors are combined in Lenin’s last article: 1) the possibility of Soviet power resisting by keeping the worker-peasants alliance intact and allowing the development of Russian capitalism under the control of the proletarian dictatorship; 2) the political ability of the CI, the KPD and the Soviet foreign policy to exploit the struggle between the great imperialist powers around Germany — defeated and reduced to a semi-colony — for the benefit of the international revolution; here the powerful German proletariat could still play a role if a favourable opportunity emerged; 3) the accelerated capitalist development of Asia could have triggered a further round in the race for its definitive division among the great victorious powers and, at the same time, could have raised a wave of national and democratic revolutions in China, India, Persia, etc.; 4) in that case, ascending Japan would, in turn, enter into collision with Western powers, making a major conflict with an Asian epicentre and global repercussions inevitable. In short, as already hypothesised in 1921, one could expect a war to break out say, in 1925, or 1928, between, say, Japan and the U.S.A., or between Britain and the U.S.A., or something like that.

Thus, a war between the Versailles powers dictated by the competition for divvying up the Asian market would allow a civil war in Germany, reproducing the conditions of the October revolution in an advanced country.

In Lenin’s strategic vision, political, economic and military factors, class struggles and national upheavals of the colonial peoples in the peripheries met in a complex, dialectical and non-mechanistic elaboration in which the failure to consolidate the Versailles order around a recovery for Germany — the second weakest link in the imperialist chain — combined with the development of Asian capitalism, made a new and more catastrophic breakdown of the world order probable. At the core of Lenin’s reasoning was not a maximalist expectation that the last crisis of dying capitalism would arrive, but that the fact capitalism is incapable of maintaining a world balance found confirmation in the material facts of international politics.

By keeping the worker-peasant alliance, Soviet Russia could have obtained a second extension. But, specifies Cervetto, for Lenin the existence of Soviet power is a very important factor that must be safeguarded in all ways, except in that of its involution and, in this sense, the worker-peasant alliance is not considered necessary for the construction of socialism in the nation, but rather as an indispensable condition for the maintenance of workers’ power until the next revolutionary conjuncture.

The slow rise of nationalist Asia

Could Russia resist until the next military conflict between the counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist Easts? What did the possibility of a second extension depend on? Lenin:

I think the reply to this question should be that the issue depends upon too many factors, and that the outcome of the struggle as a whole can be forecast only because in the long run capitalism itself is educating and training the vast majority of the population of the globe for the struggle. In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population. […] In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.

Many have misunderstood these considerations, seeing in it a third worldist Lenin who by then looked at the Asian peasant world as a decisive factor in the world revolution. It is not so. In Lenin’s view the geographical epicentre of the world revolution remained in the capitalist West and more precisely in Germany. However, causing the new rupture of the order, allowing a new proletarian assault, lay with the contraditions of Asian development, with the uprisings of colonial peoples and their national wars. Cervetto: It is the East that objectively comes to the aid of proletarian Germany.

However, the time necessary for Asia to civilise was unforeseeable, and it was this factor that determined the degree of power wielded by national States, deciding whether they were capable of challenging the old western metropolises. In order for the victory of socialism to be fully assured — writes Lenin — this majority [Russian and Asian] must become civilised in time. Lenin does not fail to point out the importance of many unknown factors and, among these, first of all, the prostrate condition of Germany and the fact that the entire East, with its hundreds of millions of exploited working people, reduced to the last degree of human suffering, it is still far from being a real challenge even to one of the smaller West-European states.

Cervetto comments: The pace of economic development of the revolutionary and nationalist East thus becomes the pace of development of the objective conditions for the crisis of imperialism and for the proletarian revolution. The existence of Soviet power is conditioned by this pace: if the East will have time to develop and cause a war with the imperialist West, the existence of Soviet power will be assured. In retrospect it must be recognised — concludes Cervetto — that the development of Asia in the ’20s and ’30s was a slow development and that the East did not have the time to civilise to save Soviet power. When the 1929 crisis came, and, ten years later, the new great imperialist war, the Stalinist counter-revolution had already brought down Soviet power and the CI had become a docile instrument of foreign policy for the reborn Russian imperialism.

The defeat of the International

If the defeat of the Russian commune, at that point, was inevitable, the same cannot be said for the complete defeat of the CI, if only some of its departments had succeeded in preserving continuity with this strategy. Unfortunately, centrism and maximalism remained the prevalent element in the political training of cadres in the world party that formed too late to live up to the task it had set itself.

In a report marking the 50th anniversary of the founding of the PCd’I, Cervetto gave an account of the lesson derived from that glorious experience. An evaluation that is also valid for the world party: 1) The Party must be formed in the counter-revolutionary phase in order to test itself; 2) the Party cannot be built in a rush (because it would inevitably be maximalist as in 1921); 3) the Party needs theoretical and practical preparation; 4) the Party must be homogeneous and cannot be formed of various currents. Russia taught us that it is a single line (Lenin) that wins.

The internationalists fell fighting. And in that resistance to the counter-revolution, social-democratic at first and then fascist and Stalinist, they showed great passion and courage. It was not enough. When Lenin, summarising in a single sentence his idea of the party, wrote that without revolutionary theory there is no revolutionary movement, it was no mere catchphrase. He raises, if anything, the fundamental question: that retreat following the defeat, which saved only the honour of brave militants, was so disastrous precisely because of the failure to assimilate the strategy. Passion is not enough. To face the communist struggle in the long periods of imperialist development, the armoured passion of reason, disciplined and anchored to the theory is necessary.

Lotta Comunista, January 2020

Popular posts from this blog

Political Battles of European Leninism

Internationalism No. 73, March 2025 Page 1 Thirty years after the death of Arrigo Cervetto , we are publishing here the concluding passages of the introduction to his Opere Scelte (“Selected Works”) for the series Biblioteca Giovani (“Publications for young people”), soon to be published in Italian. The 1944-45 partisan war in Italy. The political battle within libertarian communism. The Korean War, and the watchword of “neither Washington nor Moscow”. The layoffs at the Ilva and Ansaldo factories, the political battle and trade union defence in the struggles of post-war restructuring. From 1953 onwards, the crisis of Stalinism, the 1956 Suez crisis, the Hungarian uprising, the 1957 Theses and the challenge of theory and strategy vis-à-vis the tendencies of unitary imperialism. The political struggle within Azione Comunista (“Communist Action”) and the Movimento della Sinistra Comunista (“Movement of the Communist Left”). From the 1950s to the early 1970s, t...

The Defeat in Afghanistan — a Watershed in the Cycle of Atlantic Decline

In crises and wars there are events which leave their mark on history because of how they make a decisive impact on the power contention, or because of how, almost like a chemical precipitate, they suddenly make deep trends that have been at work for some time coalesce. This is the case of the defeat of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, which is taking the shape of a real watershed in the cycle of Atlantic decline. For the moment, through various comments in the international press, it is possible to consider its consequences on three levels: America’s position as a power and the connection with its internal crisis; the repercussions on Atlantic relations and Europe’s dilemmas regarding its strategic autonomy; and the relationship between the Afghan crisis and power relations in Asia, especially as regards India’s role in the Indo-Pacific strategy. Repercussions in the United States Richard Haass is the president of the CFR, the Council on Foreign Relations; despite having ...

Crisis of the Order and European Question

The dialectic between economic weapons and weapons of war in the crisis in the world order requires specific reflection where concerns European imperialism. Dealing with monetary weapons in their book War by Other Means , Jennifer Harris and Robert Blackwill place great emphasis on the strategic success of the European monetary federation: Through forging the eurozone, Germany has also realized its century-long quest for a pliant European market for German manufacturing. Both of these were things it had previously tried (and failed) to accomplish by force. The long quotation below is from the speech Helmut Schmidt made to the Bundesbank Council in 1978 in favour of the EMS, the European Monetary System that would lead to the euro. Classified as confidential for 30 years, the text was declassified in 2008. There emerges from it a highly political vision of the German use of the monetary weapon and of the strategic weight of a single continental market: What now concerns German pol...

States and Courts Counterbalance Trump

Internationalism No. 73, March 2025 Page 10 From the series Chronicles of the new American nationalism Donald Trump’s political agenda has been dictated by the tempo of the dozens of executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations he has signed, challenging international partners abroad, and Congress, the States of the Union, and the bureaucracy at home. The execution of some orders has already been temporarily suspended by federal judges, while the chaos caused by a memorandum led the administration itself to withdraw it. Other rulings are expected from the courts at the request of citizens, NGOs, and States. Furthermore, as James Politi of the Financial Times notes, “the result of his political success” in the elections is that Trump will have to satisfy “a much more diverse political coalition” than in his first term. Ross Douthat, a conservative commentator for The New York Times , also believes that “at least until the Democratic Party gets up off th...

Elon Musk: Space Entrepreneur

Internationalism No. 71, January 2025 Page 12 In September 2001, Elon Musk discussed the possibility of private individuals launching space ventures with his former university classmate Adeo Ressi. In his biography of Musk, Walter Isaacson writes: “For a private individual it was obviously too expensive to build a rocket. Or was it? What were the necessary material requirements? The only thing really needed, he thought, was metal and fuel, which were not that expensive”. The two concluded that it warranted an attempt. Today, Musk is Tesla’s main shareholder and the owner of X (formerly Twitter). He is considered to be the richest man in the world and strongly supported the election of Donald Trump, whose adviser he will become. This article, however, will only deal with his activity as a space entrepreneur. Fail fast and try again In May 2002, Musk was already a millionaire after selling his Zip2 software company to Compaq when he acquired a small Califor...

The Political Form at Last Discovered

From the special series 1871-2021. The 150 th anniversary of the Paris Commune The struggle, by now more than a hundred years old, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie encompasses the whole world. One hundred and fifty years ago, in March 1871, in a single city — Paris — and in a very short time span — 72 days — the assault on the sky attempted by the proletariat and ferociously repressed by a rising bourgeoisie resolved, in practice, fundamental theoretical issues of socialism that until that moment only had provisional solutions. In the Manifesto [1848], Marx and Engels had limited themselves to stating that the indispensable precondition for the communist revolution was the conquest of democracy , i.e., the conquest of the state machinery on the part of the proletariat. However, it remained to be seen whether and to what extent the dictatorship of the proletariat could avail itself of the bourgeois state machinery. Moreover, in the definition Lenin gives, Marx’s theo...

India’s Weaknesses in the Global Spotlight

Farmers’ protests around New Delhi have been going on for four months now. A controversial intervention by the Supreme Court has suspended the implementation of the new agticultural laws, but has raised questions about the dynamics between the judiciary and the executive, and has failed to unblock the negotiations between government and peasant organisations. The assault by Sikh farmers on the Red Fort during the Republic Day parade as India was displaying its military might to the outside world — the Chinese Global Times maliciously noted — paradoxically widened the protest in the huge state of Uttar Pradesh. The Modi government has been trying to revive India’s image with the 2021 Union Budget: it announced one hundred privatisations and approved the increase to 75% of the limit on direct foreign investment in insurance companies. For The Indian Express ( IEX ) this is a sign of the commitment to push ahead with reforms despite the backlash from rural India. Also for The Economi...

Chinese Rearmament Projects Itself in Asia

Internationalism No. 78-79, August-September 2025 Page 5 From the series Asian giants Trends in rearmament spending and comparisons of military equipment are increasingly set to dominate coverage of the contention between powers in the crisis in the world order . The military factor has entered the strategic debate, accompanied by a wealth of figures and technical details. The increase in military spending as a percentage of GDP represents a widespread sign of the rearmament cycle at this juncture, but spending alone cannot entirely explain the situation, given the qualitatively different natures of the arsenals being compared. Nor are comparisons between this or that type of weapon useful in themselves, because ultimately all weapons are only ever used in combination with the complex military means available to a power, either in alliance or in conflict with other powers in the system of States. Therefore, while it is difficult to assess the real significa...

The Hidden Costs of Covid-19

Internationalism No. 33, November 2021 Page 5 From the series The struggle against coronavirus Around 227 million people have been infected by the novel coronavirus SARSCoV-2 worldwide, causing 4.7 million deaths [Johns Hopkins University, September 17 th , 2021]. If tracked over time, both figures can be seen as indicators of the pandemic’s evolution . However, they do not give the full picture of the humanitarian disaster — not only because the coldness of the statistics hardly expresses the violence with which this health crisis has disrupted the lives of millions, but also because the official figures are believed to greatly underestimate the real situation. Missed diagnoses The number of Covid-19 cases indentified and registered in the statistics depends in fact on the number of diagnostic tests performed. It also varies greatly from country to country and in the different phases of the pandemic curve, as well as being...

Variations and Gradations of Democracy in China

Internationalism No. 50, April 2023 Page 10 From the series Giats of Asia : the dillemas of Chinese single-party pluralism Only the materialist analysis of the intraction between structure and superstructure can explain the variety of the political forms. Why did the entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production in China occur in populist and Maoist forms? Why does Chinese imperialism express itself in CP single-party pluralism and not, for example, in the classical multi-party system of imperialist democracy? This specific political analysis does not regard the study of the economic causes which determine China’s political struggles, a scientific investigation which is its premise, “but the way” in which these struggles present themselves in the superstructure. “By analysing basic economic facts, Marxism can identify at first the interests which find expression in the political struggle. The form in which these interests appear politically, however, is a qu...