Three years of war in Ukraine have had deleterious effects on relations between Russia and Europe. The dramatic acceleration of European rearmament
, as we defined it in Internationalism, April 2025, has raised the tension. The plans of the coalition of the willing
in support of Kyiv in their military endeavours have also aroused Moscow’s reactions.
In an interview published on March 21st on the ministry’s website, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov recalled that in the past there was a unique Russia-EU format
in the relations between Russia and the European Union, when summits were held twice a year, something the EU never had with any other country
. This was evidence of a closeness and mutual interest between Russia and Europe. But, Lavrov complains, they are now telling us we have turned our backs on the West
. Obviously, he glosses over the fact that, between the before and the after, a war has intervened.
A historical relationship
In any event, nothing can alter the objective fact based on geography that, for Moscow, Europe is its Western neighbour
. However, Russia’s historical relationship with Europe is the primary consideration, even for the most vocal critics of a pro-Europe
policy.
One such critic today is undoubtedly Sergei Karaganov, the honorary chairman of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), who has reiterated his point of view for some time: So we are returning from a great journey to Europe, started by Peter the Great. It has been very useful, as we have enriched ourselves culturally
. But now we have exhausted the usefulness of our European journey. So, we are turning back home, where we came from. And turning back home means, of course, returning to the East and to the South
[report by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), January 13th, 2025].
Vladislav Surkov, who crafted the theory of sovereign democracy
, so demonised in the West, also talked about Europe in an interview with the French news magazine L'Express [March 19th]. He states that Russia has been saying for years that it is ready to speak with Europe; Europe could have answered at any moment and opened up a dialogue, but it has not done so
. However, he goes further, seeking the reason for this in the still intermediate
structure of the European Union: Europe must decide whether or not to be one State. Its member countries have delegated their sovereignty to the EU, but not completely: another half-measure! Consequently, neither the EU nor its members are completely sovereign
. As he sees it, a united Europe could give birth, together with Russia and the US, to a Nordic civilisation
able to resist the almost unsustainable demographic pressure on the part of the [global] South
.
It is implicit in this reasoning that Brussels should succeed in aligning all its members with this position, even its most recalcitrant Eastern countries.
Politics and energy
Above all, what has symbolised the Russo-European symbiosis
has undoubtedly been its energy relationship. From this point of view, the interruption of the flow of gas through the Nord Stream pipelines in the depths of the Baltic Sea – following the September 2022 sabotage, an act of asymmetric war of Ukrainian-Polish and American stamp – is emblematic. The political nature of this action is obvious, as it was aimed at interrupting the economic relationship, and even more than that, between Russia and Germany/Europe.
Stanislav Zhiznin, the president of the Centre for Energy Diplomacy and Geopolitics, wrote in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta of December 9th, 2024, that the American factor has largely contributed to slowing down the Russia-EU energy dialogue, including the fact that some of its new members have played the part of the American Trojan horse, in order to divide Europe
.
However, the Atlantic crisis, now full-blown thanks to the Trump administration's stance, predicts new scenarios for the Euro-Russian relationship, including energy. The executive vice president of Engie, Didier Holleaux, and the CEO of TotalEnergies, Patrick Pouyanné, have spoken of their interest in the resumption of flows of Russian gas following the pacification of Ukraine. In an interview with Reuters, the latter also specified that Europe will never go back to importing 150 billion cubic meters from Russia like before the war... but I would bet maybe 70 bcm [Reuters, April 14th, 2025].
European challenge to American politics
On Russia's part, attention to a possible about-turn
in the European attitude is growing. Dmitry Suslov is deputy director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies (CCEIS) at the Higher School of Economics (HSE), an RIAC member, and a well-known exponent of the hard line
in the Ukraine war. Suslov sees a positive side for Moscow in Donald Trump's initiatives: There are benefits which Russia will gain from these, i.e., that Europe itself will be more motivated to normalise economic relations with Russia
[Tass, April 3rd, 2025].
Notwithstanding a general climate characterised by the Ukraine war and Brussels' rearmament proclamations, more nuanced positions are not lacking in Moscow, starting from the highest position in the State. Vladimir Putin himself stated in the May 11th press conference that this gives us optimism and hope that sooner or later, [...] we will begin to move towards restoring constructive relations with European States
.
Timofei Bordachev, programme director of the Valdai Discussion Club and Academic Supervisor of the CCEIS at the HSE, sets out how Moscow should regard Europe today in an article in Valdai [April 21st, 2025] which needs to be read thoroughly. The first part, in fact, seems to be in favour of a complete break with Russia’s Western neighbours
: Europe has always been a source of concern
for the whole world and a historical enemy
of Russia; today, Europe is now returning to its position as the main source of danger for all of humanity
, but – and this is the crux of the matter – this is not a reason why [we] should fence ourselves off from our Western neighbours and not pay them any attention
, for example by turning increasingly to Asia. This would not be the right strategy: Russia will still have to deal with Europe
. And his eventual conclusion is: therefore, it makes sense to think about possible scenarios for its development, to try to expand our knowledge about the state of our Western neighbours. Which, naturally, does not mean the need to take for granted their behaviour on the world stage and, especially, in relation to Russia
. In short, attention is awakening to a European policy set in motion again by Trump’s choices, even though the Eurasian line of expansion remains dominant.
Bordachev himself has previously suggested ways to test the possible evolutions of European policy within the coordinates defined by the new American presidency. He has written that America's policy regarding Europe has always had two aims: containing the restoration of European great power and militarism
and using Europe as a territorial base for its confrontation with Russia
[Valdai, February 10th, 2025]. We can observe that the two aims support each other: even the clash with Moscow, just like an agreement, was geared to limiting European actions; both the de facto alliance reflected in Yalta’s true partition and the world contention against the empire of evil
in the 1980s had Europe in their sights. Especially considering
– continues Bordachev – that the rivalry between the United States and China has every chance of becoming a central element of international politics in the coming decades
. In this case, a reduced American anti-Russian pressure on Europe may lead to a fairly rapid change not only in the rhetoric, but also in the practice of European foreign policy
.
A Russian response
A reflection by Vladislav Belov, the deputy director for research at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and head of the Centre for German Studies at the same institute [RIAC, April 15th, 2025] is well worth reporting. He begins with the important observation that in January the beginning of a new cycle of strategic confrontation between the two key actors in the transatlantic space
emerged with Trump’s return to the White House and the presentation of the Competitiveness Compass
in Brussels, based on Mario Draghi's report
.
The contours
– writes Belov – of a new reality in the Euro-Atlantic region took shape
, and he sees a confrontational but not broken transatlantic economic landscape
. In this context, EU institutions are trying to build a defensive position, while Washington demonstrates readiness for economic revisionism built on protectionism
. Therefore, the next stage of Euro-Atlantic relations will unfold in the realm of clashing economic interests and inevitable conflicts, where Germany plays the role of the European Union's central hub
.
The EU is once again at a crossroads between the desire for strategic autonomy and the fear of splitting the unity among its member States
, revealing the difficulties for Brussels of reassuring the countries of its Eastern belt, which are traditionally anti-Russian.
Fragmentation
is, in fact, one of the three scenarios Belov projects for the future of the EU, but it is in comparison with the other two – which reflect Europe’s reaction in seeking an autonomous position – that Moscow’s close attention to Brussels’ potential accelerations becomes clear.
The first scenario is defined as transatlantic mobilisation
and predicts that the EU, under external pressure and the internal push of France and Germany, will proceed to an institutional consolidation
, going so far as to possibly create a European sovereignty fund
, amplifying the powers of the European Commission in the field of industrial and trade policy
. The prerequisite for this outcome is that it should be backed by at least six or seven important members, among which Italy, Spain, and Poland are included.
The second scenario, which is even more interesting, is a Strategic Triangular Structure
, a Europe that focuses on the further autonomisation within the EU-US-China triangle
, seeking to play on the divisions between the US and China
. To accomplish this, the EU will have to carry out reforms in the EU budgetary mechanism
, and mobilise its industrial and defence potential
, as well as strengthen digital sovereignty
. This scenario is ambitious, but it is not excluded
, even if it will require the emergence of a new generation of pro-European pragmatists
. The prize
for Europe would be the opportunity to rethink its role within the collective West in the global economy and politics
.
Interwoven battles
Hence, there are those in Moscow who are considering with interest a recovery of European initiative. However, these processes will take time and involve intertwined battles within the EU, between both sides of the Atlantic and also in the relation with Russia.
Even in Moscow, there are internal disagreements, but in the convulsive months of the negotiations about the Ukraine war it is important that possibilities of reconnecting the European direction are being explored.