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Tokyo’s Deterrence Mirrors Europe’s

We are living in an era in which the ‘Pax Americana’ is nearing an end without any substitute order taking its place. So wrote, in a 1980 report, the study group on Comprehensive national security, established by the then Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi Ōira.

According to Michitaka Kaiya, deputy editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun, this observation remains valid today, given the Trump administration’s dismissive attitude towards allies, a China that challenges the US-led order, the war in Ukraine, and the conflict in the Gulf.

At the end of April, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi attended the inaugural meeting of the committee of fifteen experts tasked with conducting the review of the National Security Strategy (NSS), presented at the end of 2022, through which Tokyo has defined its rearmament. On March 31st, the operational deployment of domestically produced Type 12 cruise missiles began in Kyushu.

The comprehensive national power

While the 1980 report tended to emphasise economic security within the broader framework of comprehensive national power, Kaiya argues, today Takaichi instead links diplomatic and defence capabilities with technological, intelligence, and personnel capabilities and with economic strength. It is no rhetorical exaggeration for the prime minister to describe the NSS as decisive for the fate of the nation: If Tokyo fails to formulate measures to properly ensure deterrence and response capabilities, the maintenance of Japan’s security and prosperity will be jeopardised.

On this point, she quotes several members of the panel, unanimously: the review, which will be finalised by the end of the year, must rethink Japan’s strategy to adapt to an era in which the US is altering the world order, and in which there are countries, as the Iranian crisis demonstrates, that are considering how to utilise the economy as a weapon. Takaichi, Kaiya concludes, will have to combine her strong convictions with persuasiveness, and show tenacity to unite the nation around a new general consensus.

Fifteen-member committee

As it was in 2022, the panel of experts is once again chaired by Kenichiro Sasae, a career diplomat, ambassador to Washington from 2012 to 2018, and subsequently president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). The Institute, which Shigeru Yoshida (prime minister from 1948 to 1954) founded in 1959 and directed until his death in 1967, is modelled after Chatham House, the public-private think tank of the British Foreign Office, founded in 1920. The committee of experts comprises six business executives, six academics, and three former senior State officials.

Among the business leaders are: Kenji Shimizu, chairman of the Fuji TV group, which also owns the right-wing conservative daily Sankei Shimbun; Toshikazu Yamaguchi, chairman of Yomiuri Holdings, which publishes the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s leading national conservative daily with a circulation of 6–10 million copies; Katsunori Saki, president of MUFG, Japan’s largest financial group and the 10th largest in the world; Masao Ohta, president of the Toray chemical group, part of the Mitsui conglomerate in which Mitsubishi Heavy Industries holds a stake; Takayuki Morita, director of NEC, a telecommunications and electronics group, part of the Sumitomo conglomerate; and Reiko Akiike, Japanese representative of Boston Consulting Group.

Among the academics are: Kazuto Suzuki, professor of international relations at the University of Tokyo, former president of the Japan Association for Security and Trade, and a collaborator with the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique in Paris, directed by Bruno Tertrais, one of the leading experts on nuclear deterrence; Ken Jimbo, professor of international relations at Keio University, former adviser to Shinzo Abe on the drafting of the 2013 International Security Act, and, from 2022, director of the IOG, the Institute for Geoeconomics.

This think tank, the Asian branch of the Trilateral Commission, has Yoichi Funabashi, former editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun, as its president emeritus. The IOG was established on the initiative of APIIO, the automotive components group owned by the Ogasawara family, which, since 1956, has also owned The Japan Times, the country’s oldest English-language daily newspaper, founded in 1897; from 1937–1945, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled the paper, and in 1933, Hitoshi Ashida (1887-1959), a career diplomat of national-liberal persuasion, headed it. Together with Shigeru Yoshida, his rival, he was the last of Japan’s diplomat-prime ministers, serving as head of government in 1948. Yuichi Hosoya, a professor of international relations at Keio University and an adviser to Shinzo Abe in the establishment of the Japanese National Security Council (NSC) in 2013-14, is also a member of the IOG.

Among the academic members of the panel are also: Noriko Ido, a professor at Keio and one of the leading experts on nuclear safety, who has served as an adviser to the minister of Defense, as well as sitting on the board of NTT DOCOMO, Japan’s leading telecommunications group; Yutaka Matsuo, a professor at the University of Tokyo, one of the country’s leading experts on artificial intelligence and former executive director of SoftBank, a multinational founded in 1981 by Masayoshi Son, one of the world’s leading figures in technology investment; Atsushi Higashino, a professor in the Faculty of International Studies at the University of Tsukuba, where she teaches international relations and EU politics.

In addition to Kenichiro Sasae, the other two civil servants on the panel are: Tetsuro Kumo, an official at the Ministry of Defence since 1981 and deputy minister from 2015 to 2017, subsequently a consultant for Mitsui and Sumitomo; and Koji Yamazaki, chief of the Joint Staff from 2019–2023.

Rearmament, nuclear submarines, and the two and a half principles

The main items on the review agenda include: the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, the revision of the three non-nuclear principles, and an increase in defence spending, which is expected to rise from the current 2% to 3-3.5% of GDP, amounting to around $120 billion. According to Noriko Endo, Tokyo should acquire nuclear-powered submarines in response to increased Chinese activity in the Pacific. Submarines and the revision of the three non-nuclear principles, according to Yamazaki, are one of the panel’s objectives.

According to The Japan Times, Takaichi’s approach would be to move towards two and a half principles, revising the issue of the non-introduction of nuclear weapons. For Joshua Kurlantzick, a researcher at the CFR, by amending the three non-nuclear principles, Takaichi can open the door about the option of nuclear arms acquisition. In essence, this would imply highlighting the possible erosion of the other two principles, but in the immediate term it would allow for the creation of nuclear sharing mechanisms similar to those of NATO, and would strengthen Japan’s role in nuclear planning processes with Washington. Brad Glosserman, a columnist for The Japan Times and an adviser to the CSIS Pacific Forum, highlights how Tokyo’s decisions may be influenced by American ambivalence about a possible nuclear proliferation in Asia. Formulas for friendly proliferation by countries such as Germany, Japan, Canada, and South Korea can be seen as a potential enabler for the offshore balancing strategies being considered in Washington.

The French model of épaulement

Ibrahim Ogi, a military expert at the IOG and former under-secretary of defence from 2019–2022, believes there is an increasingly pressing need to strengthen conventional military capability, given that Chinese rearmament, including nuclear capabilities, could partially blunt American strategic deterrence. The expansion of both Chinese and American theatre nuclear weapons arsenals raises the question of whether Tokyo should acquire a balancing capability. In two ways: through reinforced American nuclear deterrence or via indigenous nuclear options. For Ogi, Japan could pursue both paths; but the most viable path would be to strengthen its conventional capabilities and encourage the production and deployment of US nuclear cruise missiles launched from submarines. For Ogi, however, the national debate on nuclear deterrence must remain flexible and open to all options, given that today’s strategic priorities are not set in stone. For Sasae, since the credibility of US commitments can no longer be taken for granted, Japan’s strategic options must be commensurate with the challenges of the times; while simultaneously strengthening its autonomy and indispensability, Tokyo must free itself from traditional constraints in thinking about national security and defence.

In an in-depth analysis of Emmanuel Macron’s March 2nd speech on forward deterrence, the French special researcher at the JIIA, Timothée Albessard, highlighted the concept of reciprocal épaulement (mutual reinforcement) between conventional and nuclear forces; for the French president, the former reinforce the latter, helping to prevent strategic surprise and the rapid creation of faits accomplis and to test the adversary’s resolve as early as possible, forcing them to reveal their true intentions. Deep strike capabilities, using missile systems, make it possible to broaden the spectrum of credible response below the threshold for nuclear use, and to escape the dilemma between the fear of nuclear retaliation and that of premature escalation.

The role of strategic conventional weapons appears to fulfill the function that, until the 1990s, the French doctrine attributed to pre-strategic weapons – tactical nuclear weapons which were also assigned a warning shot function. The Japan Times has emphasised that the implementation of Tokyo’s counter attack capability requires the development of an operational doctrine. In both its debates and its actions, Japan mirrors Europe’s rearmament.

Translated from the original work by , published in Lotta Comunista, , p. 15.

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