The conflict in the Gulf has entered its third month, marked by a precarious truce that reflects a strategic stalemate, with Tehran’s “selective blockade” of Hormuz and the US Navy’s “counter-blockade” of Iranian ports. According to the Pakistani daily Dawn, bilateral negotiations — mediated by Islamabad with the explicit support of Riyadh and the “discreet and indirect” backing of Beijing — appear to centre on the price of reopening the energy artery. For Washington, writes the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat, the negotiations should yield some kind of “tangible result” on the nuclear issue, allowing both sides to “claim victory”, given that the priority is resuming commercial traffic. To this end, granting Tehran the opportunity to collect some form of revenue has not been ruled out.
Iranian “pragmatic” factions are raising the idea of maritime traffic service fees via the new Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), created under the auspices of the Pasdaran, would be formally responsible for collecting tolls. According to Gideon Rachman, a columnist for the Financial Times, shipping and oil groups do not consider Iranian demands of one dollar per barrel transported to be excessive, as this would amount to less than 1% of the cargo’s value. It is worth recalling that Donald Trump himself, in his media outbursts, has suggested a 50/50 split of the toll between himself and “some ayatollah”.
The Saudi veto on “Project Freedom”
Faced with growing frustration at being unable to extricate himself from his “little excursion” in the Gulf, Trump announced “Project Freedom” — an operation to escort stranded ships — before travelling to Beijing. The initiative, which sparked a fresh flare-up of military tensions, was cancelled after 36 hours. According to the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, as well as Le Monde, “shipping companies, insurance groups, and oil executives” deemed the measure insufficient. It takes little for Tehran, whose missile and drone arsenal remains 70% operational, to deter insurance and shipping groups from putting “billion-dollar supertankers” at risk, not to mention their cargo. A “minimal sign of assent from the Iranian side”, notes Le Monde, is considered necessary in addition to any military escort.
According to the Financial Times, as well as other sources, Riyadh’s veto on the use of its bases and airspace is said to have factored heavily in the “freezing” of the escort mission. Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar and other regional players, reportedly complained that it had not been warned in advance. According to Faisal Abbas, editor of Arab News, one of the English-language newspapers linked to the Saudi monarchy, “Even the Oracle of Delphi would have thrown in the towel” when it comes to making predictions about the Gulf conflict or the next moves of its many players, especially given the “unpredictable character” of the American president. Unlike the Saudi monarchy, whose officials “say what they mean and mean what they say”, both publicly and in private. And if Riyadh remains silent, “silence is a strategic choice and not a coincidence”. All the more so in a “militarised media context”, where responding to statements about the monarchy’s position would be like “wrestling with pigs: you get dirty while pigs enjoy it”.
The Saudi priority of a “negotiated solution”
In any case, in Abbas’s view, the Saudi calculation aims to reinforce as deterrence against Tehran, while keeping “a negotiated solution” on the table. Riyadh has never called for the withdrawal of the Iranian ambassador, but only of his military attaché a “symbolic yet strategic action”, which should be read as a “statement in itself”, accompanied by “full support for Palestinian mediation”. Saudi Arabia, unlike the Emirates, has not officially confirmed the military retaliatory actions against Iran attributed to it by the Wall Street Journal; but even if it were responsible for them, the strikes would have been a response to Iran’s violation of the 2023 “Beijing Declaration”. Riyadh, moreover, apparently took care to “inform Tehran in advance”, in order to comply with the “rules of engagement” and minimise respective “civilian casualties”.
The activation of military treatises with Islamabad, involving the deployment of troops and aircraft to Saudi territory, can be seen as an additional measure of deterrence. The Pakistani foreign minister stated that no one can “cast the evil eye” on Saudi Arabia. The “evil eye”, nazar or al-'ayn, also refers to a pendant that serves as a protective talisman. Metaphors aside, it is a military and nuclear umbrella that Pakistan has extended to Riyadh through bilateral agreements. Agreements that Saudi Arabia believes can be extended to Turkey and Qatar via Pakistan.
The Emirati challenge to Riyadh and Tel Aviv’s strategy
One of the factors behind the expansion of bilateral agreements with Pakistan is the Emirates’ decision to leave OPEC, and to accept the deployment of Israeli troops and an “Iron Dome” missile defence system on its territory. Withdrawal from OPEC, which the UAE joined in 1967 (when it was still a British protectorate, before it gained independence in 1971) has been described in the UAE as a “second independence”, both from the cartel and from Riyadh’s dominance, not only over the oil sector.
For several observers, the clash over OPEC quotas is indicative of geopolitical differences, not only over relations with Tehran, but also over the competition for spheres of influence in Yemen, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa, as well as over relations with Israel. The Pakistani, Turkish, and Egyptian press accuse the UAE of “fragmenting the Gulf” and strengthening its relationship with Tel Aviv, thereby becoming a “foothold” for the Jewish State, in a convergence of ambitions for regional hegemony.
According to the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) in Paris, since October 7, Israel has employed its “forward defence” strategy to attempt to impose “a new balance of power” from the Levant to the Gulf. The neutralisation of the Iranian threat would serve as a pretext for attempting to establish itself as the “sole regional superpower”. A position of “regional dominance” would also be useful to Tel Aviv for removing the Palestinian question from the table, which its rivals use as political leverage. The Israeli escalation is to present itself both as an autonomous actor and as an “exclusive partner” of the US, capable of “independently defending American interests” as sort of deputy sheriff of the Gulf. This clashes with the Saudi strategy which, until now, has been based on “regional leadership” centred on “diplomatic engagement and geo-economic influence”. Riyadh, while dependent on American security guarantees, pursues “flexible multi-alignment”, striking a balance between Iran and Israel, the US and China, and India and Pakistan.
An “Islamic bomb” and a “Jewish bomb” in the Gulf
For Tel Aviv, an Iranian war is seen as a “golden opportunity” to force Riyadh to accept its regional primary via the Abraham Accords. But this objective has not been achieved: according to the FRS, Israel’s irruption — apart from a possible shift in Washington’s stance — is that its regional leadership is not achievable “against or without Riyadh”. The latter does absolutely not want to “give up space” to the UAE — nor, implicitly, to Tel Aviv — in defining regional dynamics. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies sees the Islamic Quad (which brings together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan) as a countermovement — and not just a Saudi one — where the “Pakistani bomb” is considered a “bilateral counterweight” to the “Israeli bomb” and the partnership with Abu Dhabi.
According to Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), linked to the army’s intelligence services, the Israeli government underestimates the possibility that the Islamic Quad could assume the role of a “cohesive regional block”, capable of creating a “dual counterweight” to both Iran and Israel. The INSS notes that from Egypt’s perspective, the quartet possesses “complementary sources of power”: a large population, a strong army, and the Suez Canal for Egypt; Saudi Arabia’s vast energy, financial, and religious resources; Turkey’s defence industry capabilities and NATO membership, a crossroads between East and West; and finally, Pakistan’s “nuclear umbrella”. Israel, therefore, risks finding itself increasingly isolated in the face of the “nucleus of a new regional order”, taking an “antagonistic attitude” on various regional issues. Tel Aviv should seek to “rein in the institutional quarter’s consolidation”. It should also abandon the rhetoric of redrawing the “regional map through military power alone”, which risks compromising even its “vital relationship” with Cairo.
Europe-Gulf dialogue
For Frédéric Charillon, a columnist for L’Opinion and former academic director of the Institute for Strategic Research at the Paris Military Academy (IRSEM), the Islamic quartet is a sign of “ongoing tectonic shifts”. It is not an “Arab NATO”, but a “collective diplomatic framework” which aims to limit tensions resulting from the conflict, operating between “prudent mediation and active neutrality”, as opposed to the “more destructive” strategies pursued by the UAE, the US, and Israel to “reshape the region”. In effect, the quartet demonstrates the existence of “an Arab-Islamic geopolitical plurality”, as now exists on both sides of the Atlantic between the US and the EU.
Polydoros Korakou, owner of the Greek Antenna Group, which controls La Repubblica in Italy, organised the first Europe-Gulf Forum in the Peloponnese, attended by the ECB, the IMF, and sovereign wealth funds, the Italian and Greek prime ministers, the Finnish president, the British deputy prime minister, and representatives from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. For the Greek publisher-financier, set to serve as a “bridge to bring Europe closer to the Gulf”, and provide a forum for assessing “possible convergences”, including between Arab countries. The third Gulf War, like its predecessors, creates space for multiple games.