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The Islamic Quartet and China in the New Equilibrium in the Gulf

At the time of writing, the third Gulf War, which began on February 28th and escalated in April with a fresh Israeli intervention in Lebanon against Hezbollah, has reached an uncertain truce. Brokered by Pakistan's diplomats, it was agreed as part of a four-way Islamic agreement – bringing together Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey – and backed by China.

According to the Japanese newspaper Nikkei, the diplomatic initiative's origins date back to the extraordinary summit of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), of which Iran is also a member, and was sealed at the March 24th summit of the Islamic Quartet in Islamabad. First came the meeting between the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan; then came Chinese backing and Sino-Pakistani talks, which produced a five-point proposal for a ceasefire. The proposal was accepted by the US and Iran on April 7th, following a series of hyperbolic threats of escalation from Donald Trump, which included an implicit reference to the use of nuclear weapons. On April 11th–12th, indirect talks were held in Islamabad between the American and Iranian delegations, led respectively by US Vice President JD Vance and, for Iran, by Speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Islamabad, Beijing, and Ankara

According to the Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat, the deadlock in the negotiations, as well as the subsequent US imposition of a naval blockade on Iranian shipping from the Gulf, stem from Trump's search for a Nescafé solution to the crisis, i.e., an immediate one. But diplomacy also needs patience and not provocative tweets and hurly volte-face. It is worth recalling that during the peace negotiations between Washington and Hanoi that took place in Paris in 1973, it took fifteen days just to decide on the shape of the negotiating table.

Field Marshal Asim Munir, born in 1968, was the key figure in Pakistan's mediation efforts. According to Singapore's The Straits Times, he has a strong religious background: the son of an ulema, he is described as a hafiz, someone who has memorised the entire Quran; he rose to the post of Chief of the Army Staff from the ranks of Pakistan's military intelligence apparatus, the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence).

According to Saudi newspapers, Munir's rise is also linked to his bold and responsible handling of the military standoff with Delhi last May. By insisting that Islamabad's air force shoot down a few Rafales, Munir established himself as the guardian of Pakistani sovereignty. Munir's contacts include figures within Trump's entourage, but also within the Iranian Pasdaran, highlighted by the swift conclusion of the missile skirmish with Iran in January 2024 around the Balochistan region.

According to Lahore's The Nation, Pakistan's second-largest daily, Islamabad has used the regional mandate granted to it by the Islamic quartet – comprising countries traditionally aligned with the US – to pave the way for greater involvement on China's part in resolving the crisis. According to The Nation, the Dragon's entry into the Middle East – as Pakistan's iron brother – will not be American-style, but rather calibrated, gradual, and almost imperceptible. The absence of grand Chinese declarations, therefore, should not be mistaken for inaction.

Karachi's Dawn, the country's leading daily newspaper (founded in 1941 by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the historic father of Pakistan), highlights how Munir is following in the footsteps of Muhammad Ayub Khan [1907-74], a military dictator and later president of Pakistan who helped bring about the US rapprochement with Beijing in 1971-72. The newspaper advises Trump to cease his unbalanced statements – condemning, among other things, his attacks on Leo XIV – and to adopt a constructive approach towards Tehran. As for Iran, Dawn argues, either the oil market is open to all or there will be costs for everyone. This is why the herculean diplomatic efforts for peace undertaken by Pakistan have garnered the support of the entire international community.

Saudi petrodollars and the Pakistani nuclear armourer

As for Turkey's role, according to the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Ankara's current concern is the link between the Iranian nuclear dossier and the crisis in Hormuz. The latter is a priority: its resolution is in the common interest not only of the US, Iran, and the Arab Gulf States, but also of China, as well as of European and Asian powers.

Asharq al-Awsat, as well as the daily Arab News, the magazine Al Majalla, and Urdu News (Lahore, Pakistan) belong to the Saudi Research and Media Group (SRMG), founded in the early 1970s. Overall, the SRMG, which is directly controlled by the royal family, edits around 30 publications, with a readership of over 160 million across North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Al Majalla explicitly called into question the Carter Doctrine (promulgated in January 1980), whereby any attack on the Gulf would be regarded by Washington as an attack on vital American interests.

In World Order [2014], Henry Kissinger stated that American guarantees to the House of Saud were a necessary condition for preserving the Middle Eastern order, without which it would collapse. By funding the Pakistani nuclear armourer, Riyadh secured itself a natural source of externalised deterrence, serving as a steppe guarantee. This has now been explicitly confirmed. On April 16th, Riyadh announced the deployment of Pakistani aircraft and troops on its territory. RUSI, the British armed forces' think tank, does not rule out the presence of one or more nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. According to reports, this deployment of nuclear weapons has been active, albeit informally, since 2010.

Zeitenwende and an Islamic NATO

According to RUSI, the main target of Pakistan's deterrence signal is Iran, even though Saudi Arabia and Pakistan dress it up in anti-Israel terms. This move, however, carries broader significance; it fits within a debate which predated the conflict with Iran regarding the creation of an independent security framework for the Gulf, parallel to the traditional American umbrella, which has proved less reliable than expected. According to Mohamed Hegazy, a former Egyptian undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, writing in the newspaper Al Ahram, regional stability cannot be outsourced to external powers such as the US: their strategic calculations have repeatedly dragged the region into costly and debilitating conflicts, linked more to American and Israeli priorities than to those of the region. Such a security framework, modelled on the EU, should not exclude Iran, Israel, or others, provided that Tehran refrains from interfering in the internal affairs of its neighbours and Israel recognises a Palestinian state. The key regional players – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan – are in a good position to lead such an initiative, which could recalibrate the regional balance.

For RUSI, a Gulf Zeitenwende is on the horizon, a strategic turning point similar to Europe's at the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. According to Faisal Abbas, editor of Arab News, one of Saudi Arabia's leading daily newspapers, Riyadh continues to abide by the Beijing Declaration, the détente signed between the monarchy and Tehran in 2023 with China's approval, and is pursuing a policy of moderation. Boistered by its traditional relationship with Pakistan, Riyadh certainly aims to contain Iran, but has not abandoned the prospect of a peaceful and integrated region; there are no ideological objections to coexistence, rather only practical ones, i.e., Tehran's destabilising activities and the Palestinian question for Israel.

According to Bader Mousa Al-Saif, a former Kuwaiti government official, the new conflict represents a turning point for regional priorities and relations, and is driving a more collective approach, with the involvement of emerging powers such as India, Turkey, and others. An acceleration driven by Trump's unpredictability: the US president speaks of a masterful strategy, whereas for Al-Saif, the only thing masterful about it is the madness. The Gulf countries will work to diversify their partnerships and strengthen their indigenous defence capabilities, drawing on enormous economic resources, including the world's largest sovereign wealth funds.

Faisal al-Mudahka, editor of Doha's Gulf Times, envisions a Gulf NATO, open to Ankara and Islamabad, to strengthen regional deterrence. For Maleeha Lodhi, a Pakistani diplomat, Washington's aim in the conflict was to weaken China's allies. But it has allowed Islamabad to exploit its ties with Beijing and the Islamic Quartet framework to fulfil the role of both a diplomatic facilitator and a provider of security and sovereignty.

For Nabi Mis, director of SETA, the think tank of the AKP, the ruling party in Ankara, a peace for the Ummah (the Islamic community) is rendered almost impossible by American and Israeli manoeuvring. The problem in the Middle East is not military capability, but the absence of a stable regional order. Without a shared strategic vision, the region's future will continue to depend on Washington and its allies. Real change will only be possible when the countries of the region are masters of their own destiny.

The wheel of fire of the Greater Middle East

The complex web of rivalries within the Arab-Islamic world and the Greater Middle East is summarised by some historians as the wheel of fire, constantly set back in motion by the struggle for spheres of influence and for energy rents. The third Gulf War appears to be yet another turn of the wheel, triggered this time by the war in Gaza. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the Carter administration, likened the Greater Middle East to a global Balkans, combining historical ethnic-religious and national fault lines, demographic potential, and energy rents. For the Indian analyst Brahma Chellaney, Trump is the first American president to trigger a global energy crisis through direct military intervention, raising the question of whether he has set off an American Suez moment: not the failure of America's economic and military tools, but rather the erosion of its credibility as a regional guarantor. This erosion has been evoked in the debate we have summarised.

Translated from the original work by , published in Lotta Comunista, , p. 15.