The Internationalism

The Hungarian elections of April 12th have taken on a significance that extends far beyond the borders of a country of 10 million inhabitants, as they have been interpreted as a contention between Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and, less openly, Beijing. Brussels has wielded leverage amounting to at least €16 billion, earmarked for Hungary on condition that the rule of law is restored. Outgoing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán combined an openly hostile stance towards Brussels and Kyiv with displays of his close ties to Moscow and Donald Trump's administration.

Five days before the elections, US Vice-President JD Vance also travelled to Budapest to support Orbán, a clear demonstration of the US National Security Strategy, published in December 2025: America encourages its political allies in Europe […] and the growing influence of patriotic parties […]. Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. Vance's intervention also laid bare the convergence between Moscow and Washington over their desire to weaken European imperialism. It goes without saying, as Yalta teaches us, that this is not the first time in history that this has happened.

European optimism

With 53% of the vote and 141 seats, Péter Magyar's Tisza party surpassed the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution. Orbán's Fidesz-KDNP coalition plummeted from 135 to 52 seats, and from 54% to 39% of the vote. The portrayal of a European victory, in the face of attempts at interference by other powers, was reinforced by European national-populist parties simultaneously distancing themselves from Trump, both due to the rise in fuel prices caused by his war against Iran and the outrage sparked by his verbal attacks against the Pope.

According to Der Spiegel, the proclaimed era of American intervention in European domestic politics has failed its first test and shows just how unpopular MAGA is around the world. This result is all the more significant in Hungary – writes Le Monde – which has historically been the European laboratory of illiberalism. The Financial Times highlighted that this is a blow for both Russia's Vladimir Putin and America's Donald Trump, and for the loose alliance of Christian populist nationalists for whom Orbán has been a standard bearer. The Hungarian people have overwhelmingly affirmed that they want to belong to Europe and that they do not want a government that ties the country politically and economically to the dictators in Moscow and Beijing, stated the Süddeutsche Zeitung. The Handelsblatt noted that the electoral defeat of the Orbán model is a sign of hope with geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences, and that the EU can hope to act in a more unified manner in the future.

Some commentators, however, cautioned against excessive optimism. Although Magyar has stated his intention to restore the rule of law, and that the country will once again be a solid ally within the EU and NATO, he has remained ambiguous about his willingness to lift the veto, imposed by Orbán, on the €90 billion EU loan for Ukraine. Additionally, like Orbán, Magyar opposes sending weapons to Kyiv and has shown little enthusiasm for the prospect of Ukraine joining the EU. The new prime minister is well aware of Hungarian farmers' fears of Ukrainian competition and, using nationalist rhetoric that is unwelcome in Kyiv, defends the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. On issues such as immigration, too, Magyar's positions are not so different from Orbán's.

The Orbán model fails

Prime minister from 1998 to 2002, and then from 2010 to 2026, Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party have shifted over the years from the centre-right, within the European consensus and within the EPP, towards increasingly ethno-nationalist and populist stances. In a 2014 speech, Orbán denounced the liberal model and embraced so-called illiberal democracy, citing Russia, China, Türkiye, and Singapore as examples. In 2024, Fidesz then joined the far-right group Patriots for Europe. Orbán's national cooperation system combined control of the media and the judiciary power with an economic policy described as clientelist, fuelled by Russian energy supplies at favourable prices.

As for export-oriented sectors, foreign capital has been attracted by tax incentives and lax labour legislation. German and Chinese investments in the automotive sector stand out. Audi, BMW, and Mercedes have built and expanded large plants. Overall, German companies account for around 7% of jobs in Hungary, generate over 11% of gross value added, and represent around one-sixth of private investment [Handelsblatt, April 8th]. In addition to funds from Brussels, it is this German capital that forms the basis of Budapest's European tropism. According to the Rhodium Group, over the last three years, Hungary has also attracted the majority of Chinese investment directed towards the EU, accounting for up to a third of the total. Of particular significance are the €4 billion electric car factory that BYD is building in Szeged and the investment of over €7 billion that CATL is pouring into a battery factory in Debrecen [Handelsblatt, April 17th].

At the same time, however, companies operating on the domestic market have faced pressure, extraordinary tax burdens, and political intervention designed to favour national groups close to the Orbán clan, which are often given preferential treatment in procurement processes. According to the former prime minister, good investments are those that export, and bad investments are those that generate profits on the domestic market, over which the Hungarian State wishes to assume control or reduce competition [Handelsblatt, April 8th].

Continuity of interests

Paradoxically, it was also European funding that contributed to this system. For more than a decade, EU cohesion funds accounted on average for over 3% of GDP. Their misuse, and the failure to respect the rule of law, have put Orbán on a collision course with Brussels, which began blocking funding from 2022. It was therefore the surge in inflation, peaking at 24% in 2022, against the backdrop of the pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, that made the issues of living costs, corruption, and internal dysfunction weigh on Orbán's approval ratings.

Unlike much commentary in the European press, Russian commentary tends to downplay the impact of the change of government in Budapest, pointing to the continuity of Hungarian interests. Dmitri Trenin, president of the Russian International Affairs Council, assesses that Orbán was not a pro-Russian politician, but rather a moderate Hungarian nationalist who, through his relations with Moscow, safeguarded Hungary's interests, particularly in the energy sector. Trenin notes that Péter Magyar has also expressed a willingness to maintain dialogue with Russia on energy matters. Furthermore, Trenin sees Hungary as an example of how Russia can develop long-term ties with Europe on a bilateral basis, between sovereign States, rather than on an ideological platform centred on opposing blocs [RIAC, April 15th].

For Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Foreign and Defence Policy Council and research director at the Valdai International Discussion Club, none of the geopolitical problems facing Hungary will be resolved by Orbán's departure from the scene. The antagonism with the EU, he writes, was actually useful to certain European leaders, as Orbán provided a convenient cover. Divergences within the EU will not disappear, and now this lack of a unified position among member States will become evident, adds Lukyanov. His prediction is that there will be structural changes in the EU and a certain regionalisation [Vzglyad, April 14th]. Both commentaries reveal a Russian desire to use the interests – primarily energy-related – of certain European countries to foster good mutual relations while simultaneously dividing the EU. This is precisely what Brussels wishes to avoid, seeking strength in European unity to negotiate with Moscow.

Despite the war in Ukraine, Hungary has always maintained energy ties with Russia and continues to depend on its gas and oil. But in reality, Europe has never completely severed that link either. According to an analysis by the Bruegel think tank, in the final quarter of 2021, the EU imported 37 billion cubic metres of gas from Russia, a figure that fell to 10 billion in the final quarter of 2025. Russian oil also continues to flow into Europe: according to the EU Commission, imports fell from 114 million tonnes in 2021 to 10 million tonnes in 2025. Furthermore, Bruegel notes that most of the nineteen Soviet-built nuclear power stations still operating in the EU continue to source uranium from Russia. Under Orbán, Hungary had even signed an agreement with the Russian State-owned group Rosatom for the construction of a new power station.

Normalisation with Moscow?

The upheavals of America's decline have already severely damaged transatlantic relations. Now Washington is also clamping down on the Middle Eastern energy artery, after the war in Ukraine partially blocked the Russian one, thereby increasing dependence on American hydrocarbons. In this situation, seeking to normalise relations with Moscow may become a more attractive option for Europe.

Orbán had made himself politically unpalatable and appeared far too obviously to be a Kremlin pawn to play a credible role in this regard. Will Magyar, like Orbán, become a disruptive element in the EU? Or will Hungary, with a new prime minister, become a European asset, instrumental in restoring EU-Russia relations, should the issue return to the agenda? According to Lukyanov, interviewed by the Slovak magazine Marker, a different European orientation will depend on Germany. It goes without saying that this would inevitably require an agreement on Ukraine.